Richard A. Posner is a judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals in Chicago and a senior lecturer at the University of Chicago Law School. He is the author of hundreds of articles and nearly four dozen books, including An Affair of State: The Investigation, Impeachment, and Trial of President Clinton (1999); Breaking the Deadlock: The 2000 Election, The Constitution, and the Courts (2001); Public Intellectuals: A Study of Decline (2002); and Catastrophe: Risk and Response (2004).

Richard Posner has tackled head on—and found dangerously flawed—the new law on our national intelligence system. His combination of scholarship, realism about the impossibility of preventing surprise attacks such as that on 9/11, and highlighting of the perils of centralizing intelligence authority, makes this an important and most timely book. Ambiguities in the law leave scope for interpretation by the Executive branch and Posner's trenchant analysis points the way to averting some of the worst hazards.

• Part 1 Preface Part 2 Introduction Part 3 Part I: From the 9/11 Commission's Report to the Intelligence Reform Act Chapter 4 1. The Commission's Organizational Recommendations Chapter 5 2. The Congressional Response Part 6 Part II: Toward the Optimal Organization of the U.S. Intelligence System Chapter 7 3. The History and Anatomy of Successful Surprise Attacks Chapter 8 4. The Principles of Intelligence Chapter 9 5. The Principles of Organization Chapter 10 6. Lessons from the Organization of Intelligence in Other Countries Part 11 Conclusion: What Is to Be Done?

Richard A. Posner is a judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals in Chicago and a senior lecturer at the University of Chicago Law School. He is the author of hundreds of articles and nearly four dozen books, including An Affair of State: The Investigation, Impeachment, and Trial of President Clinton (1999); Breaking the Deadlock: The 2000 Election, The Constitution, and the Courts (2001); Public Intellectuals: A Study of Decline (2002); and Catastrophe: Risk and Response (2004).

Richard Posner has tackled head on—and found dangerously flawed—the new law on our national intelligence system. His combination of scholarship, realism about the impossibility of preventing surprise attacks such as that on 9/11, and highlighting of the perils of centralizing intelligence authority, makes this an important and most timely book. Ambiguities in the law leave scope for interpretation by the Executive branch and Posner's trenchant analysis points the way to averting some of the worst hazards.

• Part 1 Preface Part 2 Introduction Part 3 Part I: From the 9/11 Commission's Report to the Intelligence Reform Act Chapter 4 1. The Commission's Organizational Recommendations Chapter 5 2. The Congressional Response Part 6 Part II: Toward the Optimal Organization of the U.S. Intelligence System Chapter 7 3. The History and Anatomy of Successful Surprise Attacks Chapter 8 4. The Principles of Intelligence Chapter 9 5. The Principles of Organization Chapter 10 6. Lessons from the Organization of Intelligence in Other Countries Part 11 Conclusion: What Is to Be Done?