Environmental Instruments and Institutions

Edited by Thomas Tietenberg, Mitchell Family Professor of Economics, Colby College, Kenneth Button, University Professor, Schar School of Policy and Government, George Mason University, US and Peter Nijkamp, Professor Emeritus, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, the Netherlands, the Centre for European Studies, Universitatea Alexandru Ioan Cuza din Iasi, Romania and the School of Public Policy and Management, Tsinghua University, China

• Contents:Introduction Part I: General Comparative Theory1. Bruno S. Frey, Friedrich Schneider and Werner Pommerehne (1985), ‘Economists’ Opinions on Environmental Policy Instruments: Analysis of a Survey’2. W.J. Baumol and David F. Bradford (1972), ‘Detrimental Externalities and Non-Convexity of the Production Set’3. John Pezzey (1992), ‘The Symmetry Between Controlling Pollution by Price and Controlling It By Quantity’ Part II: InstrumentsAFees and Charges4. Thomas H. Tietenberg (1973), ‘Specific Taxes and the Control of Pollution: A General Equilibrium Analysis’5. Susan Rose-Ackerman (1973), ‘Effluent Charges: A Critique’6. Wallace E. Oates and Diana L. Strassmann (1984), ‘Effluent Fees and Market Structure’7. Gardner M. Brown, Jr. and Ralph W. Johnson (1984), ‘Pollution Control by Effluent Charges: It Works in the Federal Republic of Germany, Why Not in the US?’8. Kenneth E. Train, William B. Davis and Mark D. Levine (1997), ‘Fees and Rebates on New Vehicles: Impacts on Fuel Efficiency, Carbon Dioxide Emissions, and Consumer Surplus’BTradable Permits9. William J. Baumol and Wallace E. Oates (1971), ‘The Use of Standards and Prices for Protection of the Environment’10. W. David Montgomery (1972), ‘Markets in Licenses and Efficient Pollution Control Programs’11. Randolph M. Lyon (1982), ‘Auctions and Alternative Procedures for Allocating Pollution Rights’12. Robert W. Hahn (1984), ‘Market Power and Transferable Property Rights’13. Robert N. Stavins (1995), ‘Transaction Costs and Tradeable Permits’14. Jonathan D. Rubin (1996), ‘A Model of Intertemporal Emission Trading, Banking, and Borrowing’ CCommand-and-Control15. David Besanko (1987), ‘Performance versus Design Standards in the Regulation of Pollution’16. Brian Beavis and Ian Dobbs (1987), ‘Firm Behaviour under Regulatory Control of Stochastic Environmental Wastes by Probabilistic Constraints’17. James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock (1975), ‘Polluters’ Profits and Political Response: Direct Controls Versus Taxes’18. Howard K. Gruenspecht (1982), ‘Differentiated Regulation: The Case of Auto Emissions Standards’19. Gloria E. Helfand (1991), ‘Standards versus Standards: The Effects of Different Pollution Restrictions’Part III: Implementation Issues20. Peter Bohm and Clifford S. Russell (1985), ‘Comparative Analysis of Alternative Policy Instruments’21. Hans Th. A. Bressers (1988), ‘A Comparison of the Effectiveness of Incentives and Directives: The Case of Dutch Water Quality Policy’22. Albert L. Nichols (1982), ‘The Importance of Exposure in Evaluating and Designing Environmental Regulations: A Case Study’23. Wallace E. Oates, Paul R. Portney and Albert M. McGartland (1989), ‘The Net Benefits of Incentive-Based Regulation: A Case Study of Environmental Standard Setting’24. T.H. Tietenberg (1990), ‘Economic Instruments for Environmental Regulation’ 25. Erik Verhoef, Peter Nijkamp and Piet Rietveld (1995), ‘Second-Best Regulation of Road Transport Externalities’Part IV: Enforcement26. Mary E. Deily and Wayne B. Gray (1991), ‘Enforcement of Pollution Regulations in a Declining Industry’27. H. Landis Gabel and Bernard Sinclair-Desgagné (1993), ‘Managerial Incentives and Environmental Compliance’28. Jon D. Harford (1978), ‘Firm Behavior Under Imperfectly Enforceable Pollution Standards and Taxes’29. Winston Harrington (1988), ‘Enforcement Leverage When Penalties Are Restricted’30. Wesley A. Magat and W. Kip Viscusi (1990), ‘Effectiveness of the EPA’s Regulatory Enforcement: The Case of Industrial Effluent Standards’ 31. Clifford S. Russell (1990), ‘Monitoring and Enforcement’32. Joseph E. Swierzbinski (1994), ‘Guilty Until Proven Innocent – Regulation with Costly and Limited Enforcement’Part V: Cost-Effectiveness: Empirical Studies33. Scott E. Atkinson and T.H. Tietenberg (1982), ‘The Empirical Properties of Two Classes of Designs for Transferable Discharge Permit Markets’34. William O’Neil, Martin David, Christina Moore and Erhard Joeres (1983), ‘Transferable Discharge Permits and Economic Efficiency: The Fox River’35. Eugene P. Seskin, Robert J. Anderson, Jr. and Robert O. Reid (1983), ‘An Empirical Analysis of Economic Strategies for Controlling Air Pollution’ Part VI: Uncertainty36. Zvi Adar and James M. Griffin (1976) ‘Uncertainty and the Choice of Pollution Control Instruments’37. Marc J. Roberts and Michael Spence (1976), ‘Effluent Charges and Licenses Under Uncertainty’38. Martin L. Weitzman (1974), ‘Prices vs. Quantities’Name Index