Dario Cecchini is a Postdoctoral Research Scholar at NC State University. He joined the NeuroComputational Ethics Research Group in November 2022, funded by the National Science Foundation project “Virtual Reality Simulations of Moral Decision Making for Autonomous Vehicles.” Before arriving in Raleigh, Dr. Cecchini obtained a Ph.D. in Moral Philosophy at the University of Genoa (Italy) in March 2022. He studied philosophy for his BA and MA degrees in Florence and Pisa.With a solid background in metaethics and moral psychology, Dr. Cecchini’s research interests have recently expanded into the field of applied ethics, focusing particularly on the ethics of artificial intelligence. His current projects concern moral judgment, the alignment problem for AI, the ethics of automated vehicles and carebots.

• Introduction.- Part 1: Moral intuition: Psychological foundations.- 1. The automaticity of intuitions.- 2. The strength of intuitions: A metacognitive account.- 3. The content of moral intuitions: Dyadic harm and help.- 4. Moral reasoning: The intuition-reflection interplay.- Part 2: Toward better intuitions: Standards, biases, and strategies.- 5. The progress of moral intuitions: A dyadic theory.- 6. Challenges to moral intuitions’ progress: The problem of biases.- 7. Debiasing strategies: The direct path.- 8. Debiasing strategies: Indirect and hybrid approaches.- Part 3: Moral intuitions and artificial intelligence.- 9. Artificial agency and the alignment problem.- 10. Artificial moral agents.- 11. Toward better socio-digital environments.- Conclusion.- Bibliography.

Dario Cecchini is a Postdoctoral Research Scholar at NC State University. He joined the NeuroComputational Ethics Research Group in November 2022, funded by the National Science Foundation project “Virtual Reality Simulations of Moral Decision Making for Autonomous Vehicles.” Before arriving in Raleigh, Dr. Cecchini obtained a Ph.D. in Moral Philosophy at the University of Genoa (Italy) in March 2022. He studied philosophy for his BA and MA degrees in Florence and Pisa.With a solid background in metaethics and moral psychology, Dr. Cecchini’s research interests have recently expanded into the field of applied ethics, focusing particularly on the ethics of artificial intelligence. His current projects concern moral judgment, the alignment problem for AI, the ethics of automated vehicles and carebots.

• Introduction.- Part 1: Moral intuition: Psychological foundations.- 1. The automaticity of intuitions.- 2. The strength of intuitions: A metacognitive account.- 3. The content of moral intuitions: Dyadic harm and help.- 4. Moral reasoning: The intuition-reflection interplay.- Part 2: Toward better intuitions: Standards, biases, and strategies.- 5. The progress of moral intuitions: A dyadic theory.- 6. Challenges to moral intuitions’ progress: The problem of biases.- 7. Debiasing strategies: The direct path.- 8. Debiasing strategies: Indirect and hybrid approaches.- Part 3: Moral intuitions and artificial intelligence.- 9. Artificial agency and the alignment problem.- 10. Artificial moral agents.- 11. Toward better socio-digital environments.- Conclusion.- Bibliography.

Dario Cecchini is a Postdoctoral Research Scholar at NC State University. He joined the NeuroComputational Ethics Research Group in November 2022, funded by the National Science Foundation project “Virtual Reality Simulations of Moral Decision Making for Autonomous Vehicles.” Before arriving in Raleigh, Dr. Cecchini obtained a Ph.D. in Moral Philosophy at the University of Genoa (Italy) in March 2022. He studied philosophy for his BA and MA degrees in Florence and Pisa.With a solid background in metaethics and moral psychology, Dr. Cecchini’s research interests have recently expanded into the field of applied ethics, focusing particularly on the ethics of artificial intelligence. His current projects concern moral judgment, the alignment problem for AI, the ethics of automated vehicles and carebots.

• Introduction.- Part 1: Moral intuition: Psychological foundations.- 1. The automaticity of intuitions.- 2. The strength of intuitions: A metacognitive account.- 3. The content of moral intuitions: Dyadic harm and help.- 4. Moral reasoning: The intuition-reflection interplay.- Part 2: Toward better intuitions: Standards, biases, and strategies.- 5. The progress of moral intuitions: A dyadic theory.- 6. Challenges to moral intuitions’ progress: The problem of biases.- 7. Debiasing strategies: The direct path.- 8. Debiasing strategies: Indirect and hybrid approaches.- Part 3: Moral intuitions and artificial intelligence.- 9. Artificial agency and the alignment problem.- 10. Artificial moral agents.- 11. Toward better socio-digital environments.- Conclusion.- Bibliography.