Kenneth A. Shepsle – författare

Imagination may be thought of as a 'work-around.' It is a resourceful tactic to 'undo' a rule by creating a path around it without necessarily defying it...Transgression, on the other hand, is rule breaking. There is no pretense of reinterpretation; it is defiance pure and simple. Whether imagination or disobedience is the source, constraints need not constrain, ties need not bind. So writes Kenneth A. Shepsle in his introduction to Rule Breaking and Political Imagination. Institutions are thought to channel the choices of individual actors. But what about when they do not? Throughout history, leaders and politicians have used imagination and transgression to break with constraints upon their agency. Shepsle ranges from ancient Rome to the United States Senate, and from Lyndon B. Johnson to the British House of Commons. He also explores rule breaking in less formal contexts, such as vigilantism in the Old West and the CIA's actions in the wake of 9/11. Entertaining and thought-provoking, Rule Breaking and Political Imagination will prompt a reassessment of the nature of institutions and remind us of the critical role of political mavericks.

Imagination may be thought of as a 'work-around.' It is a resourceful tactic to 'undo' a rule by creating a path around it without necessarily defying it...Transgression, on the other hand, is rule breaking. There is no pretense of reinterpretation; it is defiance pure and simple. Whether imagination or disobedience is the source, constraints need not constrain, ties need not bind. So writes Kenneth A. Shepsle in his introduction to Rule Breaking and Political Imagination. Institutions are thought to channel the choices of individual actors. But what about when they do not? Throughout history, leaders and politicians have used imagination and transgression to break with constraints upon their agency. Shepsle ranges from ancient Rome to the United States Senate, and from Lyndon B. Johnson to the British House of Commons. He also explores rule breaking in less formal contexts, such as vigilantism in the Old West and the CIA's actions in the wake of 9/11. Entertaining and thought-provoking, Rule Breaking and Political Imagination will prompt a reassessment of the nature of institutions and remind us of the critical role of political mavericks.

Through case studies, illustrations, and examples, the author provides students with the means to analyze a wide variety of situations. The Second Edition has been thoroughly revised to include updated cases and examples, new problem sets and discussion questions, and new “Experimental Corner” sections at the end of many chapters, describing experiments from social science literature.

The emergence of 'positive' political economy has been one of the most dramatic developments in contemporary economics and these volumes include some of the foundational works in this area.

An ambitious synthesis, Positive Theories of Congressional Institutions attempts to reconcile a number of rational choice viewpoints to produce a comprehensive look at congressional institutions. While most theorists have presented their work as exclusive alternatives for understanding Congress, this volume reconsiders that basic premise. If, in fact, these approaches are mutually exclusive, what evidence favors one over the other? Could it be that these views focus on different aspects of a more complex puzzle? Kenneth A. Shepsle and Barry R. Weingast have assembled leading proponents of rational choice approaches to debate these issues. Some emphasize the problems of legislative decisionmaking under uncertainty and the role institutions play in providing incentives for relevant actors to provide information. Other theorists focus on political parties and emphasize the conditions under which parties exercise institutional authority and monitor institutional practices (or fail to do so). Still others investigate legislative delegation, both within and without the legislature. In debating the relationships between these research strands, the contributors not only provide powerful evidence for the power of formal modelling but also invite those involved in other modes of research to join the discussion. Thus the volume suggests how a more satisfying and complete model might emerge. Positive Theories of Congressional Institutions is a timely volume that will provide the foundation for all future work in this area. Contributors include John H. Aldrich, David P. Baron, Gary W. Cox, John A. Ferejohn, Morris P. Fiorina, Thomas W. Gilligan, Keith Krehbiel, John Londregan, Arthur Lupia, Mathew D. McCubbins, Forrest Maltzman, David W. Rohde, Kenneth A. Shepsle, Barbara Sinclair, Steven S. Smith, James Snyder, and Barry R. Weingast.

This volume serves as an introduction to the field of positive political economy and the economic and political processes with which it is concerned. This new research tradition is distinct from both normative and historical approaches to political economy. Grounded in the rational-actor methodology of microeconomics, positive political economy is the study of rational decisions in a context of political and economic institutions. More analytical than traditional approaches, it is concerned with the derivation of principles and propositions against which real-world experience may be compared. Its focus is on empirical regularities, and its goal is theoretical explanation. The field has focused on three main areas of research: models of collective action, constraints on competitive market processes, and the analysis of transaction costs. Developments in all of these areas are covered in the book. The first part of the volume surveys the field, while the second part displays positive political economy at work, examining a variety of subjects. The final part contains essays by leading political economists on the theoretical foundations of the field.

Making and Breaking Governments offers a theoretical argument about how parliamentary parties form governments, deriving from the political and social context of such government formation its generic sequential process. Based on their policy preferences, and their beliefs about what policies will be forthcoming from different conceivable governments, parties behave strategically in the game in which government portfolios are allocated. The authors construct a mathematical model of allocation of ministerial portfolios, formulated as a noncooperative game, and derive equilibria. They also derive a number of empirical hypotheses about outcomes of this game, which they then test with data drawn from most of the postwar European parliamentary democracies. The book concludes with a number of observations about departmentalistic tendencies and centripetal forces in parliamentary regimes.

Making and Breaking Governments offers a theoretical argument about how parliamentary parties form governments, deriving from the political and social context of such government formation its generic sequential process. Based on their policy preferences, and their beliefs about what policies will be forthcoming from different conceivable governments, parties behave strategically in the game in which government portfolios are allocated. The authors construct a mathematical model of allocation of ministerial portfolios, formulated as a noncooperative game, and derive equilibria. They also derive a number of empirical hypotheses about outcomes of this game, which they then test with data drawn from most of the postwar European parliamentary democracies. The book concludes with a number of observations about departmentalistic tendencies and centripetal forces in parliamentary regimes.

One of the key constitutional features of a parliamentary democracy is that the political executive, or cabinet, derives its mandate from - and is politically responsible to - the legislature. What makes a parliamentary democracy democratic is that, once a legislative election has been held, the new legislature has the power to dismiss the incumbent executive and replace it with a new one. Moreover, it sits essentially as a court, passing continual judgement on the record of the executive, and continuous sentence on its future prospects. That is how citizens, indirectly, choose and control their government. But the relationship between legislature and executive is not one-sided. The executive typically has the authority to recommend dissolution of parliament and is usually drawn from the parliament. Executive personnel, therefore, have intimate familiarity with parliamentary practices; and for their part, parliamentary personnel aspire to executive appointments. Surprisingly little is known about the constitutional relationship between legislature and executive in parliamentary regimes; the present volume seeks to remedy this.

A dynamic authorial team of leading American politics scholars and a teachable Five Principles of Politics framework made American Government: Power and Purpose the gold standard in its field for more than 30 years. The Seventeenth Edition introduces the first new co-author in a decade, Hahrie Han (Johns Hopkins University), who brings a contemporary perspective on teaching American government and on the foundational collective action principle interwoven throughout the text. Together with InQuizitive, Norton’s online learning tool, and the new Norton Illumine Ebook, American Government engages students in applying the Five Principles framework to American politics. In the process, they learn to think critically about course concepts and understand how contemporary scholarship shapes our understanding of American government, past and present.

With its star-powered scholar author team, led by the newest co-author Hahrie Han, and innovative Five Principles of Politics Framework, Power and Purpose prepares students to analyze contemporary politics in the book and in the real world. Hahrie Han brings the collective action principle into focus, with expanded coverage in the Eighteenth Edition. The Norton Illumine Ebook's new Check Your Understanding questions, together with InQuizitive, engage students in applying the Five Principles framework to American politics.

In the Eighteenth Edition, co-author Hahrie Han introduces an innovative new case-study framework that helps students see their own significance in the political system. Each chapter opens with a real-life example of a person whose engagement with government provides insights on a key question: If, when, and how do people matter in the American political system? The case is then woven through the chapter to introduce key concepts, and help students understand the significance of how the American political system affects our lives. Additional features and pedagogy in the Norton Illumine Ebook help students make sense of data—a long-standing hallmark of the book—and see how they can use evidence to answer questions about American government.