Library of Ethics and Applied Philosophy – serie

Even though several branches of philosophy meet in the notion of trust, it has nevertheless been largely neglected by mainstream philosophy. Arguably, most existing analyses fail to give a just account of the reality of human experience. The author believes that this is not a coincidence but symptomatic of the irrelevance of received ideas of rationality for crucial areas of human agency. `Individualist' approaches, he argues, can be accused precisely of ignoring fundamental questions about the nature of the individual. Expanding on the works of Wittgenstein, Winch, and others, in Trust: The Tacit Demand the author demonstrates the conceptual significance of our dependence on others. The discussion stretches over philosophical psychology, epistemology, political philosophy and moral philosophy. The book may be of interest to anyone in philosophy, psychology or the social sciences.

The basic idea of reflective equilibrium, as a method for theory construction and decision-making in ethics, is that we should bring together a broad variety of moral and non-moral beliefs and, through a process of critical scrutiny and mutual adjustment, combine these into one coherent belief system. This book aims to explore systematically the promises and problems of reflective equilibrium. Part One discusses the various elements that may be involved in reflective equilibrium processes, such as principles, facts, considered judgements, background theories and ideals. Part Two is devoted to the role of fundamental views of life and religion. Part Three discusses methodological issues such as coherentism, warrant and the development of judgmental faculties by the moral inquirer. In Part Four, some alternative purposes for reflective equilibrium methods are suggested. The book closes with a number of case studies in bioethics. This book is dedicated to Robert Heeger, Professor of Ethics at Utrecht University on the occasion of his 60th birthday. He and his research group have been doing research on reflective equilibrium for many years.Twenty Dutch and Swedish colleagues have contributed to this book in his honour, which aims to be a systematic and coherent discussion of this theme.

Jeffrie G. Murphy's third collection of essays further pursues the topics of punishment and retribution that were explored in his two previous collections: "Retribution, Justice and Therapy" and "Retribution Reconsidered". Murphy now explores these topics in the light of reflections on issues that are normally associated with religion: forgiveness, mercy, and repentance. He also explores the general issue of theory and practice and discusses a variety of topics in applied ethics - for example, freedom of artistic expression, the morality of gambling, and the value of forgiveness in psychological counselling. As always, his perspective may be described as Kantian; and, indeed, this collection contains the first extended piece of Kant scholarship that he has done in years: a long essay on Kant on theory and practice.

What, ultimately, is there good reason to do? Proposing a unified theory of agent-dependent reasons and agent-independent reasons, this work holds that principles which assign reasons to agents are valid if and only if they make maximally good sense in the light of relevant data and background theories. The theory avoids problems encountered by views associated with Nagel, Parfit, Brandt, Hubin, Gert, Baier, and Tiberius, amongst others. By what criteria should a normative theory of ultimate reasons be judged? Plausible meta-level criteria emerge from a process of identifying the criteria that have been used, sometimes unwittingly, by various theorists; categorizing and evaluating the criteria in the light of each other; and proposing revisions on that basis. This method escapes the drawbacks of rival approaches, such as those associated with Parfit, Gert, and Darwall. The resulting criteria cast a favourable light on the proposed normative theory of ultimate reasons.

How, if at all, can we do moral philosophy in the light of the radical critique made by Elizabeth Anscombe in "Modem Moral Philosophy"? Among the principal theses of this essay is that ethical thinking (that of philosophers and others) suffers from a widespread appeal to incoherent uses of terms such as 'obligation,' 'ought,' 'right' and 'wrong. ' In this book I first explain and evaluate her thesis and the argument for it, and I then confront the challenge it poses: what ways are there of doing moral philosophy that avoid the kind of incoherence to which she has drawn our attention? The best way to show how it is possible for us to think about ethics is to demonstrate how to do so, using actual cases. This book therefore combines the critical study of central theoretical issues about ethics, in the first half, with concrete examination of serious practical issues, in the second. Following Dostoyevsky's Ivan Karamazov, it is often said that if God does not exist then everything is permitted. This is not literally the case, since God cannot permit anything if He does not exist, and those of us who do exist do not permit everything, or at least our parents, employers, and governments do not. It is true, though, that if God does not exist then nothing is forbidden in the traditional sense of 'forbidden'.

According to the neutrality thesis, in designing state policies governments should not allow themselves to be informed by any particular conceptions of the good life. The aim of this book is to contribute to the debate about this thesis in two specific ways. Firstly, the limits of acceptable state perfectionism are examined, not on a general level but by reference to some particular concerns of government policy: transgenic animals; future generations; the promotion of the arts; minority cultures; the allocation of scarce health care resources; the integration of mentally handicapped people into the community; and the expression of national identities. Secondly, the book as a whole evaluates the argument that the government has a special task to produce or to maintain intrinsically collective aspects of the good life, because these are to be seen as public goods.

Ton van den Beld This book is one of the results of the international conference on Moral Responsibility and Ontology, which was held at Utrecht University in 1 June 1998. It contains a selection of the revised versions of the papers discussed at the conference. The theme is in need of some clarification. In the first place, 'responsi­ bility' is an ambiguous term. Although addition of the adjective 'moral' reduces the variety of its meanings (for example, moral responsibility cannot be confused with causal responsibility), different interpretations are still possible. Thus, the care of dependent children is a parental moral responsibility. That is, parents have the moral obligation to care for their children. It is their moral task, or role, to do so. If they fail to fulfil this obligation, they might be morally responsible for the result of this failure. Here, another meaning of 'moral responsibility' is involved: the children's misery might be imputed to their parents. They may be liable to blame. Moral responsibility in this sense is what the conference was and this book is about. It is about the conditions which must be met for a person to be justly held responsible for his or her moral faults and failures.

The papers collected here represent the most recent work on a much­ neglected problem in practical reasoning. It is the problem of imperceptible harms and benefits. It is perhaps better to characterize the problem as a collection of puzzles or paradoxes, since those who deny the existence (or possibility) of imperceptible decrements (or increments) face problems no less perplexing than those who affinn their existence. The puzzles and paradoxes combine very practical and pressing worries about our obligations to relieve starvation, mitigate suffering and conserve resources, with deep metaethical worries about the nature of practical rationality. I use these brief introductory pages to familiarize the reader with the basic set of problems examined in this collection. Most of us think that an action cannot be wrong if its effects are entirely and always imperceptible.· Jonathan Glover's fanciful example of the 100 armed bandits and the 100 Wlarmed tribesman clearly illustrates a deep worry with such moral reasoning.

This text defends moral cognitivism with a new approach. The author maintains that the truth of moral judgments is determined in fundamentally the same way as is the truth of non-moral judgments, in other words by appeal to truth conditions which are incorporated in beliefs held in common by a wide variety of societies. She argues that if a moral theory can be developed which can account for widely held, well-established moral beliefs, this would provide a set of truth conditions for moral judgments. A theory designed to do this - and through which major moral disagreements can be resolved - is presented here, together with discussions of many actual and possible objections. The book is intended for professional philosophers and advanced students of philosophy.

The subject of personal and moral identity is at the centre of interest, not only of academic research within disciplines such as philosophy and psychology, but also of everyday thinking. This is why the Neth­ erlands School for Research in Practical Philosophy and the Institute for Ethics of the Vrije Universiteit in Amsterdam took the initiative to bring together scholars from various disciplines, interested in the subject. The expert-seminar on 'Personal and Moral Identity' took place from 12-14 January 1999. Financial contributions from the Vrije Universiteit, the Dutch Scientific Organisation (NWO) and the Royal Dutch Academy for the Sciences (KNA W) made the event possible. The chapters in this book either go back to papers presented at the seminar or were written afterwards by participants, inspired by the discussions that took place during the seminar. We are very grateful to Dr. Hendrik Hutter for his assistance in editing the texts and making the manuscript camera-ready. December 2001, The Editors. 1 Introduction Albert W. Musschenga Although scholars studying the identity of persons usually address diverging issues and have different research agendas, there is a grow­ ing awareness that one may benefit from insights and results present in other disciplines dealing with that subject. This explains the enthu­ siastic responses to the invitation of the Netherlands School for Research in Practical Philosophy and the Institute for Ethics of the Vrije Universiteit to participate in a seminar on 'Personal and Moral Identity'.

The aim of this book is to defend the Emotive Theory of Ethics, and, in particular, the versions of that theory proposed by A. J. Ayer in Language, Truth and Logic (1936) and by C. L. Stevenson in Ethics and Language (1944). For those readers who are familiar with the conventional history of Twentieth Century moral philosophy and the infamous place which the Emotive Theory occupies in that history, the question which may well spring to mind at this point is 'Why bother?' In order to answer this question, however, I will need to provide a rough sketch of the very unconventional history of Twentieth Century moral philosophy which inspired me to 'resurrect' a theory which most modem moral philosophers have long assumed to be safely dead and buried. From the very outset, the Emotive Theory (ET) was a misunderstood, misrepresented and unjustly ridiculed theory, but, contrary to what one might expect, it has, with the passing of time, become an even more misunderstood, misrepresented and unjustly ridiculed theory.

Patient autonomy is a much discussed and debated subject in medical ethics, as well as in healthcare practice, medical law, and healthcare policy. This book provides a detailed and nuanced analysis of both the concept of autonomy and the principle of respect for autonomy, in an accessible style. The unique feature of this book is that it combines empirical research into hospital practice with thorough philosophical analyses. As such, it is an example of a new movement in applied ethics, that of 'empirical ethics'.The key themes are informed consent and medical decision making, personal well-being, competence, paternalism and decision making for incompetent patients. Much attention is also devoted to autonomy in non-decision making situations - patient control over small everyday aspects of care, authenticity and existential aspects of illness, autonomy and the 'ethics of care', and the relationship between autonomy and trust in the physician-patient relationship.This book will be of interest to those working or studying in the field of medical ethics and applied ethics but also to healthcare professionals and health policy makers.

Ethics seeks answers to questions about the moral status of human actions and human lives. Actions and lives are temporal things. Thus, one would think that answers to ethical questions should take some account of their temporal features. And yet, while a number of authors have drawn attention to the relation between time and ethics (Derek Parfit and Thomas Nagel in particular), there has never been a systematic study of the impact of temporal considerations on ethical issues. There is a pressing need for an investigation into how time and ethics impact on each other. This book leads the way in addressing that need. The essays in this collection raise and investigate some of the key issues that arise at the intersection between these two areas of philosophy. Anyone with an interest in ethics, (undergraduates, postgraduates and professional philosophers alike), will have a reason to read this book, as will anyone with an interest in the metaphysics of time, and how it connects with issues in other areas of philosophy.

Most people (including moral philosophers), when faced with the fact that some of their cherished moral views lead up to the Repugnant Conclusion, feel that they have to revise their moral outlook. However, it is a moot question as to how this should be done. It is not an easy thing to say how one should avoid the Repugnant Conclusion, without having to face even more serious implications from one's basic moral outlook. Several such attempts are presented in this volume. This is the first volume devoted entirely to the cardinal problem of modern population ethics, known as 'The Repugnant Conclusion'.This book is a must for (moral) philosophers with an interest in population ethics.

The philosophical discussion of state punishment is well on in years. In contrast with a large number of ethical problems which are concerned with right and wrong in relation to a narrowly specified area of human life and practice and which hav- at least since the early 70’s - been regarded as a legitimate part of philosophical thinking constituting the area of applied ethics, reflections on punishment can be traced much further back in the history of western philosophy. This is not surprising. That the stately mandated infliction of death, suffering, or deprivation on citizens should be met with hesitation - from which ethical reflections may depar- seems obvious. Such a practice certainly calls for some persuasive justification. It is therefore natural that reflective minds have for a long time devoted attention to punishment and that the question of how a penal system can be justified has constituted the central question in philosophical discussion. Though it would certainly be an exaggeration to claim that the justification question is the only aspect of punishment with which philosophers have been concerned, there has in most periods been a clear tendency to regard this as the cardinal issue. Comparatively much less attention has been devoted to the more precise questions of how, and how much, criminals should be punished for their respective wrong-doings. This may, of course, be due to several reasons.

Recent Work on Intrinsic Value brings together for the first time many of the most important and influential writings on the topic of intrinsic value to have appeared in the last half-century. During this period, inquiry into the nature of intrinsic value has intensified to such an extent that at the moment it is one of the hottest topics in the field of theoretical ethics. The contributions to this volume have been selected in such a way that all of the fundamental questions concerning the nature of intrinsic value are treated in depth and from a variety of viewpoints. These questions include how to understand the concept of intrinsic value, what sorts of things can have intrinsic value, and how to compute intrinsic value. The editors have added an introduction that ties these questions together and places the contributions in context, and they have also provided an extensive bibliography. The result is a comprehensive, balanced, and detailed picture of current thinking about intrinsic value, one that provides an indispensable backdrop against which future writings on the topic may be assessed.

This book is an exploration of what it takes for an event to count as an action. I first became interested in this topic nearly a decade ago while working on a different topic. I kept coming across philosophers making claims about the nature of action that seemed false or at least dubious to me. As a consequence I turned to the philosophy of action directly, to get to the heart of the matter. I have wrestled with this territory ever since. I hope that, with this book, I have finally earned the intuitions that put me at odds with the philosophers I was originally reading. This book develops ideas in Part Two of my doctoral dissertation, which I wrote at Queen’s University in Kingston, Ontario, Canada. I loved being at Queen’s, for both professional and personal reasons. My thanks go to the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada for financial support as a doctoral candidate. Steve Leighton and Ronald de Sousa were readers for my dissertation. They provided some early and invaluable challenges to the ideas developed here. My deepest debt of gratitude is owed to David Bakhurst, my supervisor. I learned a lot from David; this book would not be the same without his help.

Responsibility and Punishment, Third Edition presents a clear-headed defense of retributivism against several long-standing criticisms. In the end, a viable version of retributivism emerges as one which withstands more criticism than competing theories of responsibility and punishment. Extending the problem of wrong doing to collectives and compensation, Corlett explores the matter of reparations for past wrongs in the case of the crimes committed against Native Americans by the United States Government. No other philosophical work on responsibility and punishment exhibits this breadth of scope, as it delves deeply into particular concerns with retributivism, responsibility, and certain areas of compensation. Academicians and professionals in ethics, moral, social, political, and legal philosophy are likely to benefit from this analytical treatment of responsibility and punishment.

SÉVERINE DENEULIN, MATHIAS NEBEL AND NICHOLAS SAGOVSKY TRANSFORMING UNJUST STRUCTURES The Capability Approach THE CAPABILITY APPROACH Structural injustice has traditionally been the concern of two major academic disciplines: economics and philosophy. The dominant model of economics has long been that of neo-classical economics. For neo-classical economists, human we- being is to be assessed by the availability of disposable income or according to goods consumed; it is measured by the levels of utility achieved in the consumption of commodities. Social order is fashioned by the ways consumers maximise their 1 well-being and enterprises maximise their profits. A core assumption is that all 2 commodities are commensurable: they can all be measured according to a single 3 numerical covering value, which is their price. Within this neo-classical paradigm, justice is achieved when the utility level of someone cannot be increased without 4 another person seeing his or her utility level decrease. The dominant paradigm of neo-classical economics was strongly challenged when development and welfare economist Amartya Sen received the Nobel Prize for Economics in 1998. His work offered an alternative to the neo-classical evaluation of human well-being in the utility/commodity space. The underlining philosophical intuition behind Sen’s work is that the standard of living lies in the living and not in the consumption of commodities. In searching for an alternative measure of human well-being, Sen devised his capability approach.

Freedom of the sort implicated in acting freely or with free will is important to the truth of different sorts of moral judgment, such as judgments of moral responsibility and those of moral obligation. Little thought, however, has been invested into whether appraisals of good or evil presuppose free will. This important topic has not commanded the attention it deserves owing to what is perhaps a prevalent assumption that freedom leaves judgments concerning good and evil largely unaffected. The central aim of this book is to dispute this assumption by arguing for the relevance of free will to the truth of two sorts of such judgment: welfare-ranking judgments or judgments of personal well-being (when is one's life intrinsically good for the one who lives it?), and world-ranking judgments (when is a possible world intrinsically better than another?). The book also examines free will’s impact on the truth of such judgments for central issues in moral obligation and in the free will debate. This book should be of interest to those working on intrinsic value, personal well-being, moral obligation, and free will.

Levinas’s ethical metaphysics is essentially a meditation on what makes ethical agency possible – that which enables us to act in the interest of another, to put the well-being of another before our own. This line of questioning found its inception in and drew its inspiration from the mass atrocities that occurred during the Second World War. The Holocaust , like the Cambodian genocide, or those in Rwanda and Srebrenica, exemplifies what have come to be known as the ‘never again’ situations. After these events, we looked back each time, with varying degrees of incomprehension, horror, anger and shame, asking ourselves how we could possibly have let it all happen again. And yet, atrocity crimes are still rampant. After Rwanda (1994) and Bosnia-Herzegovina (1992–1995), came Kosovo (1999) and Darfur (2003). In our present-day world , hate crimes motivated by racial, sexual, or other prejudice, and mass hate such as genocide and terror, are on the rise (think, for example, of Burma, Zimbabwe, Sri Lanka and North Korea). A critical revaluation of the conditions of possibility of ethical agency is therefore more necessary than ever. This volume is committed to the possibility of ‘never again’. It is dedicated to all the victims – living and dead – of what Levinas calls the ‘sober, Cain-like coldness’ at the root of all crime against humanity , as much as every singular crime against another human being .

Responsibility and Punishment, Third Edition presents a clear-headed defense of retributivism against several long-standing criticisms. In the end, a viable version of retributivism emerges as one which withstands more criticism than competing theories of responsibility and punishment. Extending the problem of wrong doing to collectives and compensation, Corlett explores the matter of reparations for past wrongs in the case of the crimes committed against Native Americans by the United States Government. No other philosophical work on responsibility and punishment exhibits this breadth of scope, as it delves deeply into particular concerns with retributivism, responsibility, and certain areas of compensation. Academicians and professionals in ethics, moral, social, political, and legal philosophy are likely to benefit from this analytical treatment of responsibility and punishment.

This book provides new perspectives on endurance sport and how it contributes to a  good and sustainable life in times of climate change, ecological disruption and inconvenient truths. It builds on a continental philosophical tradition, i.e. the philosophy of among others Peter Sloterdijk,  but also on “ecosophy” and American pragmatism to explore the idea of sport as a voluntary attempt to overcome unnecessary obstacles. Since ancient times, human beings have been involved in practices of the Self in order to work on themselves and improve themselves, for instance by strengthening their physical condition and performance through sport. In the contemporary world, millions of individuals engage in endurance sports such as running, swimming and cycling, to get or keep themselves in shape. This study focuses on the ethical dimension of long-distance sport, notably cycling, as a way to become better citizens, but also to contribute to a more sustainable society and healthier planet. Dominant world-views are challenged and an alternative vision is presented. Discourse analysis and conceptual analysis are combined with phenomenology and self-observations of a dedicated practitioner of endurance sport. This book is a great source for philosophers, sport philosophers, environmental philosophers, sport scientists,  policy makers, sport journalists, and endurance sport practitioners.

This book revitalizes the relevance of the ideas of Henri Bergson (1859-1941) for current developments in exact sciences.  It explores the relevance of Bergson's thought for contemporary philosophical reflections on three of the most important scientific research areas of today, namely physics, the life sciences and the neurosciences. It does so on the basis of the three interrelated topics of time, life and memory. Henri Bergson (1859-1941) was one of the most widely read philosophers of his era. The European public was seeking for answers to questions of the soul and the nature of life and fitting within a historical niche between intellectual rationalism and intuitive spiritualism, his writings drew much attention. This work focuses on the relevance of his philosophy for developments in exact sciences today. The discussion of  physics in relation to the abstract and the concrete, the life sciences in relation to concepts of life in relation tonew and emerging biotechnology, and the neurosciences in relation to the dual nature of human identity,  focuses on one main topic: time. Time, isolated from experience, as the measure of the events in the universe in modern physics; time as the measure of emergent systems in evolution as the backdrop of the theory of evolution in biology; time in relation to memory and imagination in neuropsychological accounts of memory. The author thus discusses the ideas of Henri Bergson as a basis to unveil time as a living process, rather than as an instrument for the measure of events. This view forms the basis of a novel approach to the philosophy of technology. An exciting book for academics interested in the interplay between hard sciences and philosophy.

This book revitalizes the relevance of the ideas of Henri Bergson (1859-1941) for current developments in exact sciences.  It explores the relevance of Bergson's thought for contemporary philosophical reflections on three of the most important scientific research areas of today, namely physics, the life sciences and the neurosciences. It does so on the basis of the three interrelated topics of time, life and memory. Henri Bergson (1859-1941) was one of the most widely read philosophers of his era. The European public was seeking for answers to questions of the soul and the nature of life and fitting within a historical niche between intellectual rationalism and intuitive spiritualism, his writings drew much attention. This work focuses on the relevance of his philosophy for developments in exact sciences today. The discussion of  physics in relation to the abstract and the concrete, the life sciences in relation to concepts of life in relation tonew and emerging biotechnology, and the neurosciences in relation to the dual nature of human identity,  focuses on one main topic: time. Time, isolated from experience, as the measure of the events in the universe in modern physics; time as the measure of emergent systems in evolution as the backdrop of the theory of evolution in biology; time in relation to memory and imagination in neuropsychological accounts of memory. The author thus discusses the ideas of Henri Bergson as a basis to unveil time as a living process, rather than as an instrument for the measure of events. This view forms the basis of a novel approach to the philosophy of technology. An exciting book for academics interested in the interplay between hard sciences and philosophy.

This book addresses the topic of 'being bound' from a philosophical and a sociological perspective. It examines several ways in which we are bound. We are bound to acknowledge the truth and to follow laws; we are bound to others and to the world. Who we are is partly defined by those bonds, regardless of whether we live up to them – or even of whether we acknowledge them. Puzzling questions arise from the fact that we are bound, such as: How are those bonds binding? Wherein lies their normative character? A venerable philosophical tradition, particularly since Kant, has provided an account of normativity that crucially appeals to such notions as “self-legislation.” But can our normative bonds be properly understood in these essentially first-personal terms? Many argue that our social condition resists any account of those bonds that fails to acknowledge the perspectives of the second and the third person.The first part of the book explores these themes from a historical perspective in the tradition of transcendental philosophy (Kant, Fichte, Hegel, Husserl and Heidegger); it examines the phenomenon of “being bound”, i.e., why and how we are bound. The second part of the book offers a sociological analysis of social bonds that is both historical and systematic. Based on sociological approaches to “solidarity” and “reflexivity”, it explores the way in which the phenomenon of “being bound” manifests through the concept of a “social relation”.

This book addresses the topic of 'being bound' from a philosophical and a sociological perspective. It examines several ways in which we are bound. We are bound to acknowledge the truth and to follow laws; we are bound to others and to the world. Who we are is partly defined by those bonds, regardless of whether we live up to them – or even of whether we acknowledge them. Puzzling questions arise from the fact that we are bound, such as: How are those bonds binding? Wherein lies their normative character? A venerable philosophical tradition, particularly since Kant, has provided an account of normativity that crucially appeals to such notions as “self-legislation.” But can our normative bonds be properly understood in these essentially first-personal terms? Many argue that our social condition resists any account of those bonds that fails to acknowledge the perspectives of the second and the third person.The first part of the book explores these themes from a historical perspective in the tradition of transcendental philosophy (Kant, Fichte, Hegel, Husserl and Heidegger); it examines the phenomenon of “being bound”, i.e., why and how we are bound. The second part of the book offers a sociological analysis of social bonds that is both historical and systematic. Based on sociological approaches to “solidarity” and “reflexivity”, it explores the way in which the phenomenon of “being bound” manifests through the concept of a “social relation”.

This Open Access book builds on the experiences of one of the largest European projects in the domain of responsible Research and Innovation: NewHoRRIzon. It highlights the potential of and opportunity in responsible R&I to conduct innovation in a socially responsible way. Employing the methodology of Social Labs, the book analyses responsible R&I from an experience-based viewpoint and further explores the application of responsible R&I beyond scholarly and industrial interests. The contributors analyze the current European R&I landscape, provide reflection and reconceptualization of its core concepts, and project future challenges in relation to responsible R&I. The book complements the readers' line of work by providing insights on how responsible R&I can be applied by the audience, for example, in their decision-making processes.

This Open Access book builds on the experiences of one of the largest European projects in the domain of responsible Research and Innovation: NewHoRRIzon. It highlights the potential of and opportunity in responsible R&I to conduct innovation in a socially responsible way. Employing the methodology of Social Labs, the book analyses responsible R&I from an experience-based viewpoint and further explores the application of responsible R&I beyond scholarly and industrial interests. The contributors analyze the current European R&I landscape, provide reflection and reconceptualization of its core concepts, and project future challenges in relation to responsible R&I. The book complements the readers' line of work by providing insights on how responsible R&I can be applied by the audience, for example, in their decision-making processes.