NATO Science Partnership Subseries: 1 – serie

The surplus of plutonium in the world is both an important security issue, and a fact with implications for nuclear energy and environmental policy internationally. The two perspectives are inextricably intertwined in considering options for dealing with the plutonium surplus. It was for this reason that two research programmes at the Royal Institute of International Affairs - respectively on Energy and Environment, and on International Security - jointly approached NATO with a view to organising a work­ shop on the issue. It was most welcome then to learn that the NATO Science Programe was already supporting plans for a workshop on the issue, initiated by Richard Garwin, and we were pleased to accept the resulting invitation to host that workshop. DrGarwin prepared the initial agenda and established contacts and initial approaches to many of the participants; we were able to develop the agenda further and extend participation in some complementary ways. The result was a most lively and broad-ranging internation­ al and inter-disciplinary discussion. As the hosts, the RIIA was also given lead responsibility for producing the pro­ ceedings of the workshop as a publication for NATO. Many of the papers to the work­ shop are more technical than usually involved in a workshop at the Royal Institute. Yet this is an area in which the policy options are unusually dependent upon a good under­ standing of the technical issues. which themselves are often a matter of dispute.

MOX fuel, a mixture of weapon-grade plutonium and natural or depleted uranium, may be used to deplete a portion of the world's surplus of weapon-grade plutonium. A number of reactors currently operate in Europe with one-third MOX cores, and others are scheduled to begin using MOX fuels in both Europe and Japan in the near future. While Russia has laboratory-scale MOX fabrication facilities, the technology remains under study. No fuels containing plutonium are used in the US The 25 presentations in this book give an overview of MOX technology.

This Report contains a Consensus Report and the papers submitted to the April 6 -10, 1995 NATO Advanced Research Workshop on Strategic Stability In The Post-Cold War World And The Future Of Nuclear Disarmament, held in Washington D. C. , United States Of America of at The Airlie Conference Center. The workshop was sponsored by the NATO Division Scientific and Environmental Affairs as part of its ongoing outreach programme to widen and deepen scientific contacts between NATO member countries and the Cooperation Partner countries of the former Warsaw Treaty Organization. The participants recognize that the collapse of the former Soviet Union has left a conceptual vacuum in the definition of a new world order. Never before have the components of world order all changed so rapidly, so deeply, or so globally. As Henry Kissinger points out, the emergence of the new world order will have answered three fundamental questions:" What are the basic units of the international order? What are their means of interacting? and What are the goals on behalf of which they interact? " The main question is whether the establishment and maintenance of an international system will turn out to be a conscious design, or the outgrowth of a test of strength. The concept of a planning framework that could shape or govern these interactions is emerging and may now be at hand. Capturing this emerging framework is the thrust of this NATO-sponsored Advanced Research Workshop.

In the immediate term, plutonium recovered from dismantled nuclear warheads will have to be stored securely, under international safeguards where possible. One of the principal alternatives for the disposition of this plutonium is to blend it with high-level waste as it is vitrified for final disposal in a geologic repository. The high radioactivity of the resulting product provides self-shielding and ensures that the Pu cannot be separated without the development of highly sophisticated technology. This third NATO ARW on the disposal of weapons-grade plutonium discusses the non-reactor disposition option, presenting a thorough evaluation of the pros and cons. In broad terms, the workshop presents an exchange of information on waste vitrification, including technical feasibility as well as the necessary stringent safeguards. It discusses the different approaches to the optimum techniques and credible alternatives for immobilizing transuranics and fission products for disposal. It introduces new disposal techniques, in particular matrix immobilization followed by deep borehole disposal.It assesses the implications of safeguarding requirements and identifies common areas in which defined research tasks can be initiated in co-operative partnership.

A comprehensive, up-to-date review of the physics and applications of a major class of laser, the most important example of which is the copper vapour laser. A collection of 50 papers written by the world's leaders in the field. Papers cover: the early history of pulsed metal vapour lasters; the plasma kinetics and excitation mechanisms of self terminating and recombination metal vapour lasers; beam quality issues for applications; frequency harmonic generation for mid-UV applications; high-precision processing of metals, ceramics, glasses and plastics using metal vapour lasers; applications in medicine, including oncology and dermatology; applications in science such as spectroscopy and mass spectrometry. A practical source of information on the physics, engineering and applications of metal vapour lasers. Audience: scientists, teachers and graduate researchers working in the fields of gas lasers, laser optics, gas discharges, optoelectronics and laser applications in industry, science and medicine.

FRANCIS W. HOLM Science Applications International Corporation 7102 Meadow Lane, Chevy Chase, MD 20815 The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) sponsored an Advanced Research Workshop (ARW) in Warsaw, Poland on April 24-25, 1995, to collect and study information on alternative and supplemental demilitarization technologies. The conference included experienced scientists and engineers, who delivered presentations and provided written reports oftheir findings. Countries describing their technologies included: Poland (pre-processing, thermal oxidation, and instrumentation), Russia (molten salt oxidation, plasma, catalytic oxidation, supertoxicants, molten metal, fluid bed reactions, and hydrogenation), Germany (supercritical water oxidation and detoxification), the United Kingdom (electrochemical oxidation), the United States (wet air oxidation, detoxification and biodegradation), and the Czech Republic (biodegradation). The technologies identified for assessment at the workshop are alternatives to incineration technology for chemical warfare agent destruction. Treatment of metal parts and explosive or energetic material were considered as a secondary issue. The treatment of dunnage and problems associated with decontamination, while recognized as an element of demilitarization, received only limited discussion. The alternative technologies are grouped into three categories based on process bulk operating temperature: low (O-200°C), medium (200-600°C), and high (600-3,500°C). Reaction types considered include hydrolysis, oxidation, electrochemical, hydrogenation, and pyrolysis. These categories represent a broad spectrum of processes, some of which have been studied only in the laboratory and some of which are in commercial use for destruction of hazardous andtoxic wastes. Some technologies have been developed and used for specific commercial applications.

This volume summarises the materials presented at the NATO Advanced Research Workshop on Sea-Dumped Chemical Munitions, held in Kaliningrad (Moscow Region), Russia, in January 1995. The conference was sponsored by the NATO Division of Scientific and Environmental Affairs in the framework of its outreach programme to develop co-operation between NATO member countries and the Cooperation Partner countries in the area of disarmament technologies. The problem of the ecological threat posed by chemical weapons (CW) dumped in the seas after the Second World War deserves considerable international attention: the amount of these weapons, many of them having been captured from the German Army, is assessed at more than three times as much as the total chemical arsenals reported by the United States and Russia. They were disposed of in the shallow depths of North European seas - areas of active fishing - in close proximity to densely populated coastlines, with no consideration of the long-term consequences. The highly toxic material have time and again showed up, for instance when retrieved occasionally in the fishing nets, attracting local media coverage only. Nevertheless, this issue has not yet been given adequate and comprehensive scientific analysis, the sea-disposed munitions are not covered by either the Chemical Weapons Convention or other arms control treaties. In fact, the problem has been neglected for a long time on the international level. Only recently were official data made available by the countries which admitted conducting dumping operations.

The end of the Cold War has led to an acceleration in the decommissioning of the world's nuclear submarine fleet. Russian vessels, in particular, are being taken rapidly out of service and this surge of vessels has in many cases far exceeded the capacity of the available decommissioning facilities in Russia. Severe problems exist in areas such as the storage of submarines awaiting defuelling, storage and transport of spent nuclear fuel, the handling of radioactive wastes, and the dismantling and disposal of major submarine components. The magnitude and complexity of such problems, many of them revealed here to the public for the first time, are laid bare in some detail, with a discussion of the associated environmental impact, especially in the Arctic and the western Pacific. Solutions to these problems are proposed.

The world situation has witnessed dramatic changes in the recent past, and defence-related science and technology are coming under increasing pressure to demonstrate their ability to contribute added value to national and international economies. But defence conversion is complicated by the absence of tested principles and there is no formal training to facilitate the conversion process. As a result, such factors as long-term implications for defence together with a broad range of issues related to economic, political and social questions are not being adequately addressed. Governments and industries are searching for optimum strategies to guide the defence conversion process without benefit of either historical precedents as models or a complete understanding of the process itself. This book identifies and studies the elements of successful defence conversion strategies through a systematic analysis of the factors influencing them and the common features of specific national efforts. The book reflects a combination of theory and practical experience. national strategies are explored that stimulate the conversion of defence technologies to industrial capacity, global economic growth and stability, the preservation and enhancement of defence technology options, and the ability to capitalize on unique economic, political and social opportunities afforded by defense technology conversion.The nations of the former Soviet Union present a particular problem. In Russia, for instance, from 1990 to 1993 there was a 47% decline in industrial production and a 38% decrease in GNP. This clearly needs immediate action, but there are difficulties with the conversion processes, technology transfer and implementation of dual-use strategies. While many of these issues are generic to the process, there are national and cultural difficulties. At a time of unprecedented global political and economic instability, the collective knowledge and experience of NATO and its Cooperation Partners will be essential to the successful conversion of defense production capabilities to economic tools that can contribute to universal economic equilibrium and prosperity.

The safe destruction and dismantling of chemical, nuclear and conventional weapons is of fundamental importance to the security of a number of countries represented in this volume. Expertise in the field is not confined to one country or organization: all can benefit from each other. There is an ever present danger of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction: approximately two dozen countries have ongoing programmes to develop or acquire such weapons, and many are also gaining the capability to build air-surface delivery systems. But much can be done to prevent proliferation by reducing leakage of materials and know-how and by solving the problems of the destruction of surplus weapons systems, which has now come to be a key issue.

Purpose ofthe Workshop In the spirit of enhancing developments in science and technology by facilitating international scientific cooperation, the Science Committee of NATO is sponsoring AR W's in several selected priority areas. The objective of this workshop was to discuss what microbial mediated problems have been experienced in the area of nuclear waste management and spent fuel storage. Long term storage of high-level wastes in repositories is just starting in some countries. However, low and medium level wastes have been stored for several decades. In the area of spent fuel interim, storage has been extended at many locations far beyond the intended time. It was a priority of the workshop to examine and discuss what deleterious effects have been observed under these storage conditions or under conditions used in simulated trial tests for predicting material performance under the storage conditions. For example, one chronic problem that was discussed was possibility that microbial influenced corrosion (MIC) could be taking place in the wet storage of spent fuel thereby initiating or accelerating the process of corrosion. Another discussion in the area of waste forms, focused on the presence ofbiofilms which may be breaking down the structure of the waste form and thereby jeopardizing its integrity. The meeting focused on discussing the observations and data collected relating to problems encountered in the storage of these types of wastes, and sharing this information with others that have not monitored their facilities for similar problems.

FRANCIS W. HOLM 7102 Meadow Lane, Chevy Chase, MD 20815 The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) sponsored an Advanced Research Workshop (ARW) in Prague, Czech Republic, on 1-2 July 1996, to collect and study information on mobile alternative and supplemental demilitarization technologies and to report these fmdings. The mobile, or transportable, technologies identified for assessment at the workshop are alternatives to incineration technology for destruction of munitions, chemical warfare agent, and associated materials and debris. Although the discussion focused on the treatment of metal parts and explosive or energetic material, requirements for decontamination of other materials were discussed. The mobile alternative technologies are grouped into three categories based on process bulk operating temperature: low (0-200 C), medium (200-600 C), and high (600- 3,500 C). Reaction types considered include hydrolysis, biodegradation, electrochemical oxidation, gas-phase high-temperature reduction, stearn reforming, gasification, sulfur reactions, solvated electron chemistry, sodium reactions, supercritical water oxidation, wet air oxidation, and plasma torch technology. These categories represent a broad spectrum of processes, some of which have been studied only in the laboratory and some of which are in commercial use for destruction of hazardous and toxic wastes. Some technologies have been developed and used for specific commercial applications; however, in all cases, research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT &E) is necessary to assure that each technology application is effective for destroying chemical warfare materiel.

One of the major problems associated with the disposal of chemical weapons is that the agents have degraded over time, some quite seriously. Detecting and identifying the products of this decomposition are necessary prerequisites to the safe, complete and environmentally benign destruction of stockpiled weapons. This text presents and discusses both basic and novel techniques in a variety of areas of analytical chemistry which are relevant to achieving the ultimate destruction of chemical weapons. Presentations address sample collection and preparation, mass spectrometry, chromatographic techniques, NMR, and air monitoring techniques. The work seeks to show that analytical methods do exist to effectively support the destruction of chemical munitions. While further research is needed, the book provides a baseline for further advances in the field.

This is a survey of different approaches adopted by Eastern and Western countries for the disposal of surplus ammunition. Incineration and other techniques for the disposal of high explosives, gun and rocket propellants are introduced and discussed in relation to environmental and safety requirements. Proposals for and examples of the re-use of military explosives in commercial applications are given. Topics discussed range from the conversion of energetic systems into chemical raw materials to the new development of energetic systems with special features for commercial use (such as producing artificial diamonds by detonation, self-propagating high-temperature synthesis, fire extinguishing, and other methods).

Hitherto the disposal of munitions was mostly concerned with obsolete stocks, but the political developments in the states of the former Soviet Union have necessitated the disposal of vast quantities of current and obsolete stocks. Obviously, open burning/open detonation cannot be used on such a large scale, not least for environmental considerations. There are two main technical problems associated with the disposal of munitions on the scale required. First, the materials are not simple wastes or rubbish. Their handling, storage, packaging and transportation are subject to very rigid regulation, and justifiably so, for obvious reasons. Second, they are very valuable goods, for which a high price has been paid by the holding states' economic systems. Mere destruction would mean the irretrievable loss of the value invested. But therein lies the problem. Goods like steel or brass scrap can easily be reclaimed, but hypergols and other rocket fuels (for instance) represent a true chemical challenge, while, under certain conditions, explosives may be diverted to civilian use. This, in summary, is the problem that the present book deals with: the two-pronged attack involving demilitarization and recycling technologies.

600 km giving insight into the 3D structure of the upper mantle. These data are confronted with the requirements of the CTBT for 3D regional seismic models of the lithosphere-asthenosphere system. The two primary purposes of the present work are, first, to present these seismic observations on super long-range profiles in digitised format, using peaceful nuclear explosions (PNE) in the former USSR, and, second, to present the joint thoughts of experts from the deep seismic sounding (DSS) and the comprehensive test ban treaty (CTBT) communities. Implications for petrological and other earth science disciplines are presented. Audience: The CTBT community and earth scientists interested in the 3D structure of the lithosphere-asthenosphere system.

Significant amounts of liquid and solid radioactive waste have been generated in Russia during the production of nuclear weapons, and there is an urgent need to find suitable ways to manage these wastes in a way that protects both the current population and future generations. This book contains contributions from pure and applied scientists and other representatives from Europe, North America, and Russia, who are, or have been, actively involved in the field of radioactive waste management and disposal. First-hand experience of specific problems associated with defence-related wastes in the USA and the Russian Federation is presented, and current plans are described for the disposal of solid wastes arising from civilian nuclear power production programmes in other countries, including Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Germany and the UK. The book provides a good insight into ongoing research at local and national level within Russia, devoted to the safe disposal of defence-related radioactive waste. It also demonstrates how existing expertise and technology from civilian nuclear waste management programmes can be applied to solving the problems created by nuclear defence programmes. Contributions address methods of immobilisation, site selection methodology, site characterisation techniques and data interpretation, the key elements of safety/performance assessments of planned deep (geological) repositories for radioactive waste, and radionuclide transport modelling. Concerns associated with certain specific nuclear waste disposal concepts and repository sites are also presented.

More than ten million "poison gas" shells, mortar bombs and so forth, lie hidden in Europe, many of them relics from World War I. Some were fired and failed to detonate, others were abandoned in old ammunition dumps. Most retain their load of chemical warfare (CW) agents. They are turned up daily in the course of farming and construction. Many European nations have permanent departments concerned with their collection and destruction. Old munitions, when discovered, are usually heavily corroded and difficult to identify. Is it a CW munition? Or an explosive? If CW, what agent does it contain? Once identified, one has to select a destruction method. Some of the methods that have been proposed are less than perfect, and are often complicated by the presence of extraneous chemicals, either mixed with the CW agents during manufacture or formed over decades in the ground. Of particular interest should be the insiders' reports on the German CW programmes of both World Wars, and the current status of Russian chemical armaments.

With the end of the Cold War, new opportunities for interaction have opened up between the United States and the countries of the Former Soviet Union. Many of these important initiatives involve the US Department of Energy (DOE) and the Ministry of the Russian Federation for Atomic Energy (MINA TOM). Currently, collaboration is under way which involves reactor safety, the disposition of fissile materials from the weapons program, radioactive waste disposal, and the safety of nuclear warheads. Another fruitful area of interchange resulted from the radiochemical storage tank accident at the site of the Siberian Chemical Compound at Tomsk-7 in 1993. DOE and MINATOM agreed to meet and exchange information about the accident for the purposes of improving safety. A meeting on the Tomsk tank accident was held in Hanford, Washington in 1993, followed by a second meeting in st. Petersburg, Russia in 1994 in which the agenda expanded to include radiochemical processing safety. A third exchange took place in 1995 in Los Alamos, New Mexico, and additional papers were presented on nonreactor nuclear safety. Following a planning session in 1996 in Seattle, Washington, it was decided to hold a fourth technical exchange on the broader subject of nuclear materials safety management. Through a grant from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Disarmament Programme, the meeting took place on March 17- 21, 1997, in Amarillo, Texas as a NATO Advanced Research Workshop (ARW) through grant no. DISRM 961315.

The development, production, stockpiling and use in war of biological and toxin weapons (BTW) are prohibited by international law. However, conversion of BTW facilities has not been dealt with in the existing, open literature on conversion. This is partly due to the fact that BTW programmes to a large degree involve dual-use activities and it is thus difficult to differentiate them form defensive and civilian activities involving pathogenic biological agent and toxins. It is thus also difficult to assess whether or not a BTW facility has actually been converted. This text discuss general aspects of conversion and describe the conversion of former facilities in Germany, the UK, USA, Russia, and Kazakhstan.

The development, production, stockpiling and use in war of biological and toxin weapons are prohibited by international law. Although not explicitly stated, the two treaties outlawing such activities, the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention of 1972, prohibit the continuation of activities previously performed in Biological and Toxin Weapons facilities not justified for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes. Because conversion and other means of cessation of former BTW facilities are not explicitly addressed in the treaties mentioned above the problems involved in conversion ofBTW facilities have thus far only been discussed marginally in the open literature. In times of increased awareness of the danger of biological and toxin warfare (including the increased danger of terrorist use of biological and toxin weapons) it seemed necessary to us to invite experts from different parts of the world to discuss the pros and cons of conversion and the problems involved. It also became obvious to us that the conversion of former BTW facilities should be discussed with respect to the necessity of peaceful internatioual cooperation in areas related to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. An additional reason to discuss matters of peaceful cooperation is that cooperation is explictly requested by Article X of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention.

FRANCIS W. HOLM 30 Agua Sarca Road, Placitas, New Mexico 1. Overview The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) sponsored an Advanced Research in Prague, Czech Republic, on October 13-15, 1997, to collect and Workshop (ARW) study information on effluents from alternative demilitarization technologies and to report on these fmdings. The effluents, orprocess residues, identified for assessment at the workshop are generated by systems that have been proposed as alternatives to incineration technology for destruction of munitions, chemical warfare agent, and associated materials and debris. The alternative technologies analyzed are grouped into three categories based on process bulk operating temperature: low (0-200 C), medium (200-600 C), and high (600-3,500 C). Reaction types considered include hydrolysis, biodegradation, electrochemical oxidation, gas-phase high-temperature reduction, steam reforming, gasification, sulfur reactions, solvated electron chemistry, sodium reactions, supercritical water oxidation, wet air oxidation, and plasma torch technology. These ofprocesses, some of which have been studied categories represent a broad spectrum only in the laboratory and some of which are in commercial use for destruction of hazardous and toxic wastes. Some technologies have been developed and used for specific commercial applications; however, in all cases, research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) is necessary to assure that each technology application is effective for destroying chemical warfare materiel. Table 1 contains a list of more than 40 technologies from a recent report for the U.S. Army [1]. Many ofthe technologies in Table 1 are based on similar principles.

FRANCIS W. HOLM 30 Agua Sarca Road, Placitas, New Mexico 1. Overview The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) sponsored an Advanced Research in Prague, Czech Republic, on October 13-15, 1997, to collect and Workshop (ARW) study information on effluents from alternative demilitarization technologies and to report on these fmdings. The effluents, orprocess residues, identified for assessment at the workshop are generated by systems that have been proposed as alternatives to incineration technology for destruction of munitions, chemical warfare agent, and associated materials and debris. The alternative technologies analyzed are grouped into three categories based on process bulk operating temperature: low (0-200 C), medium (200-600 C), and high (600-3,500 C). Reaction types considered include hydrolysis, biodegradation, electrochemical oxidation, gas-phase high-temperature reduction, steam reforming, gasification, sulfur reactions, solvated electron chemistry, sodium reactions, supercritical water oxidation, wet air oxidation, and plasma torch technology. These ofprocesses, some of which have been studied categories represent a broad spectrum only in the laboratory and some of which are in commercial use for destruction of hazardous and toxic wastes. Some technologies have been developed and used for specific commercial applications; however, in all cases, research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) is necessary to assure that each technology application is effective for destroying chemical warfare materiel. Table 1 contains a list of more than 40 technologies from a recent report for the U.S. Army [1]. Many ofthe technologies in Table 1 are based on similar principles.

The "VOLGA" conferences, hosted in odd-numbered years by the Department of Theoretical and Experimental Reactor Physics of the Moscow Engineering Physics Institute (MEPhI), are some of the most prestigious technical meetings held in Russia. Traditionally, these conferences present the opportunity for reactor physicists from around the world to gather at MEPhI's holiday camp on the banks of the Volga river (near Tver) to exchange ideas and explore innovative concepts related to nuclear power development. In 1997, NATO became involved in the "VOLGA" meetings for the first time by co-sponsoring "VOLGA97" as an advanced research workshop. This workshop broke with tradition a bit in that the venue was moved from MEPhI's holiday camp to a location nearer Moscow. The workshop program was effectively organized in order to cover a broad range of topics relating to the theme of the meeting. Generally, the papers concerned safety­ related questions associated with utilizing both weapons-grade and reactor-grade plutonium in the nuclear fuel cycle, including facility requirements, licensing issues, proliferation risks, and a variety of advanced concepts for alternative fuel cycles. The program contained a total of ninety-nine papers presented in five days of sessions.

The "VOLGA" conferences, hosted in odd-numbered years by the Department of Theoretical and Experimental Reactor Physics of the Moscow Engineering Physics Institute (MEPhI), are some of the most prestigious technical meetings held in Russia. Traditionally, these conferences present the opportunity for reactor physicists from around the world to gather at MEPhI's holiday camp on the banks of the Volga river (near Tver) to exchange ideas and explore innovative concepts related to nuclear power development. In 1997, NATO became involved in the "VOLGA" meetings for the first time by co-sponsoring "VOLGA97" as an advanced research workshop. This workshop broke with tradition a bit in that the venue was moved from MEPhI's holiday camp to a location nearer Moscow. The workshop program was effectively organized in order to cover a broad range of topics relating to the theme of the meeting. Generally, the papers concerned safety­ related questions associated with utilizing both weapons-grade and reactor-grade plutonium in the nuclear fuel cycle, including facility requirements, licensing issues, proliferation risks, and a variety of advanced concepts for alternative fuel cycles. The program contained a total of ninety-nine papers presented in five days of sessions.

A great number of nuclear submarines are due to be decommissioned before the year 2000. The political decisions surrounding the disposal of nuclear compartments, radioactive wastes and spent fuel differ appreciably between the countries that own the boats. The decision makers involved thus need help in comparing and assessing alternative options for the decommissioning of their nuclear submarine fleets. The present volume offers such assistance, with its discussions of the risks associated with long-term water storage of the boats, radioactive and chemical contamination, spent fuel and waste management, and handling and recycling reactor compartments.

A great number of nuclear submarines are due to be decommissioned before 2000. The political decisions surrounding the disposal of nuclear compartments, radioactive wastes and spent fuel differ appreciably between the countries that own the boats. The decision makers involved thus need help in comparing and assessing alternative options for the decommissioning of their nuclear submarine fleets. The present volume offers such assistance, with its discussions of the risks associated with long-term water storage of the boats, radioactive and chemical contamination, spent fuel and waste management, and handling and recycling reactor compartments.

Besides its obvious destructive potential, military R&D also serves to protect human lives, equipment and facilities against the effects of weapons. Concepts have therefore been developed that improve safety of stationary and mobile facilities against pressure waves, thermal radiation and fire. Effective, fast fire extinguishing equipment has been designed for tank compartments and motors. Closed buildings are demolished and landmines are removed with gas and dust explosions. Stringent safety requirements have been developed for the production of ammunition and explosives. Military and related industries have accumulated a vast knowledge and sophisticated experience that are very valuable in a variety of civil applications. The knowledge is based on theoretical and experimental research work, the origin of which sometimes dates back many centuries. It has often been classified and therefore has remained unknown to the civilian population, until now.

Besides its obvious destructive potential, military R&D also serves to protect human lives, equipment and facilities against the effects of weapons. Concepts have therefore been developed that improve safety of stationary and mobile facilities against pressure waves, thermal radiation and fire. Effective, fast fire extinguishing equipment has been designed for tank compartments and motors. Closed buildings are demolished and landmines are removed with gas and dust explosions. Stringent safety requirements have been developed for the production of ammunition and explosives. Military and related industries have accumulated a vast knowledge and sophisticated experience that are very valuable in a variety of civil applications. The knowledge is based on theoretical and experimental research work, the origin of which sometimes dates back many centuries. It has often been classified and therefore has remained unknown to the civilian population, until now.