Off the Fence: Morality, Politics and Society – serie

A critical examination of how value-neutral policy fails patients with anorexia nervosa, and what anorexia can teach us about liberal autonomy.Reconsidering and reframing autonomy through the lived experiences of individuals with anorexia nervosa, Relational Agents and Autonomy challenges our current perspectives on personal agency, especially in medical settings. The central question this book poses revolves around the widely accepted but inadequately examined "value-neutral" conception of autonomy. Value-neutral perspectives claim to have an objective view of individual decisions by considering them as purely private and isolated matters, without recognizing the broader frameworks – moral, social, historical, and cultural – encompassing the decision-maker.The heart of this book lies in the powerful narratives of individuals grappling with anorexia that invite readers to reconsider their deeply held understandings of personal autonomy. It offers a detailed exploration of self-respect, self-worth, self-trust, relational responsibility, and dialogical accountability as these intersect with the autonomy of individuals in a healthcare setting. Bringing together clinical data, philosophical theory and legal doctrine, and probing current ethical and legal assumptions, it shines a light on the conceptual and practical challenges associated with understanding and treating this complex disorder. Challenging the traditionally accepted view of the human agent as an independent, private entity, this book contends that autonomy is not a mere characteristic of an isolated individual, but is dynamically shaped and constituted by a broad range of factors, from interpersonal relationships, societal norms, and dialogical capacities, to cultural contexts, personal histories and wider narratives.

A critical examination of how value-neutral policy fails patients with anorexia nervosa, and what anorexia can teach us about liberal autonomy. Reconsidering and reframing autonomy through the lived experiences of individuals with anorexia nervosa, Relational Agents and Autonomy challenges our current perspectives on personal agency, especially in medical settings. The central question this book poses revolves around the widely accepted but inadequately examined "e;value-neutral"e; conception of autonomy. Value-neutral perspectives claim to have an objective view of individual decisions by considering them as purely private and isolated matters, without recognizing the broader frameworks moral, social, historical, and cultural encompassing the decision-maker. The heart of this book lies in the powerful narratives of individuals grappling with anorexia that invite readers to reconsider their deeply held understandings of personal autonomy. It offers a detailed exploration of self-respect, self-worth, self-trust, relational responsibility, and dialogical accountability as these intersect with the autonomy of individuals in a healthcare setting. Bringing together clinical data, philosophical theory and legal doctrine, and probing current ethical and legal assumptions, it shines a light on the conceptual and practical challenges associated with understanding and treating this complex disorder. Challenging the traditionally accepted view of the human agent as an independent, private entity, this book contends that autonomy is not a mere characteristic of an isolated individual, but is dynamically shaped and constituted by a broad range of factors, from interpersonal relationships, societal norms, and dialogical capacities, to cultural contexts, personal histories and wider narratives.

A critical examination of how value-neutral policy fails patients with anorexia nervosa, and what anorexia can teach us about liberal autonomy. Reconsidering and reframing autonomy through the lived experiences of individuals with anorexia nervosa, Relational Agents and Autonomy challenges our current perspectives on personal agency, especially in medical settings. The central question this book poses revolves around the widely accepted but inadequately examined "e;value-neutral"e; conception of autonomy. Value-neutral perspectives claim to have an objective view of individual decisions by considering them as purely private and isolated matters, without recognizing the broader frameworks moral, social, historical, and cultural encompassing the decision-maker. The heart of this book lies in the powerful narratives of individuals grappling with anorexia that invite readers to reconsider their deeply held understandings of personal autonomy. It offers a detailed exploration of self-respect, self-worth, self-trust, relational responsibility, and dialogical accountability as these intersect with the autonomy of individuals in a healthcare setting. Bringing together clinical data, philosophical theory and legal doctrine, and probing current ethical and legal assumptions, it shines a light on the conceptual and practical challenges associated with understanding and treating this complex disorder. Challenging the traditionally accepted view of the human agent as an independent, private entity, this book contends that autonomy is not a mere characteristic of an isolated individual, but is dynamically shaped and constituted by a broad range of factors, from interpersonal relationships, societal norms, and dialogical capacities, to cultural contexts, personal histories and wider narratives.

Challenging widespread misunderstandings, this book shows that central to key enlightenment texts was the practice of estranging taken-for-granted prejudices by adopting the perspective of Others.The enlightenment’s key progenitors, led by Montesquieu, Voltaire and Diderot, were more empiricist than rationalist, and more critical than utopian. Moreover, each was an artful exponent of the ‘proto-postmodernist’ practice of asking Europeans to review what they considered unquestionable through the eyes of Others: Persians, women, Tahitians, Londoners, natives and naïves, the blind, and even imaginary extra-terrestrials. This book aims to show that this self-estrangement, as a means to gain critical distance from one’s taken-for-granted assumptions, was central to the enlightenment, and remains vital for critical and constructive sociopolitical thinking today.

Challenging widespread misunderstandings, this book shows that central to key enlightenment texts was the practice of estranging taken-for-granted prejudices by adopting the perspective of Others.The enlightenment’s key progenitors, led by Montesquieu, Voltaire and Diderot, were more empiricist than rationalist, and more critical than utopian. Moreover, each was an artful exponent of the ‘proto-postmodernist’ practice of asking Europeans to review what they considered unquestionable through the eyes of Others: Persians, women, Tahitians, Londoners, natives and naïves, the blind, and even imaginary extra-terrestrials. This book aims to show that this self-estrangement, as a means to gain critical distance from one’s taken-for-granted assumptions, was central to the enlightenment, and remains vital for critical and constructive sociopolitical thinking today.

Recent innovations in digital technologies are fundamentally transforming the world of work. A digital gig economy is emerging that threatens to displace traditional labour relations based on legally regulated labour contracts. Companies like Uber, Deliveroo, or Amazon Mechanical Turk rely increasingly on ‘independent contractors’ who earn piece-rate wages by completing tasks sent to them via their smartphones. This development understandably pushes workers to desire more autonomy, but what would workers’ autonomy mean in the digital age? This book argues that the digital gig economy undermines workers’ autonomy by putting digital technology in charge of workers’ surveillance, leading to exploitation, alienation, and exhaustion. To secure a more sustainable future of work, digital technologies should instead be transformed into tools that support human development instead of subordinating it to algorithmic control. The best guarantee for human autonomy is a politics that transforms digital platforms into convivial tools that obey the rhythm of human life.

As is obvious to the casual newspaper reader, the debt-saddled student, the increasingly precarious university teaching force, the reactionary politician, and the budget-constrained administrator, the entire system of higher education is in crisis. This book brings necessary clarity to contentious debates about the state and future of the university by reconstructing the institution’s history around the theme of crisis. Since its origins in medieval Bologna, the university has been a site where humanity has worked out many of the thorniest questions of individual and collective purpose, often in what were described as crisis conditions. This book is not just a history of the university or a survey of contemporary debates, though. It is also an impassioned defence of the university as a privileged institution through which threats to collective self-governance are most acutely felt and from which strategies for its rehabilitation can be most fruitfully developed.

As is obvious to the casual newspaper reader, the debt-saddled student, the increasingly precarious university teaching force, the reactionary politician, and the budget-constrained administrator, the entire system of higher education is in crisis. This book brings necessary clarity to contentious debates about the state and future of the university by reconstructing the institution’s history around the theme of crisis. Since its origins in medieval Bologna, the university has been a site where humanity has worked out many of the thorniest questions of individual and collective purpose, often in what were described as crisis conditions. This book is not just a history of the university or a survey of contemporary debates, though. It is also an impassioned defence of the university as a privileged institution through which threats to collective self-governance are most acutely felt and from which strategies for its rehabilitation can be most fruitfully developed.

The academic boycott of Israel, a branch of the pro-Palestinian Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) campaign, is one of the richest—and most divisive—topics in the politics of knowledge today. In Boycott Theory and the Struggle for Palestine, Nick Riemer addresses the most fundamental questions raised by the call to sever ties with Israeli universities, and offers fresh arguments for doing so. More than a narrow study of the boycott campaign, the book details how academic BDS relates to a range of live controversies in progressive politics on questions such as disruptive protest, silencing and free speech, the real-world consequences of intellectual work, the rise of the far right, and the nature of grassroots campaigning. Written for open-minded readers, the book presents the fullest justification for the academic boycott yet given, considering BDS efforts on campuses around the world. The opening chapters explore the fundamentals of the academic boycott campaign, detailing the conditions on the ground in Palestinian and Israeli higher education and analyzing debates over the boycott and its adoption or resistance in the west. The later chapters contextualize the boycott with respect to broader questions about the links between theory and practice in political change. Directly rebutting the arguments of BDS’s opponents, Boycott Theory and the Struggle for Palestine demonstrates the political and intellectual soundness of a controversial and often misrepresented campaign. In defending an original view of the differences between reflecting on politics and doing it in the specific context of the liberation of Palestine, the book’s arguments will have a resonance for many wider debates beyond the context of either universities or the Middle East.

The academic boycott of Israel, a branch of the pro-Palestinian Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) campaign, is one of the richest—and most divisive—topics in the politics of knowledge today. In Boycott Theory and the Struggle for Palestine, Nick Riemer addresses the most fundamental questions raised by the call to sever ties with Israeli universities, and offers fresh arguments for doing so. More than a narrow study of the boycott campaign, the book details how academic BDS relates to a range of live controversies in progressive politics on questions such as disruptive protest, silencing and free speech, the real-world consequences of intellectual work, the rise of the far right, and the nature of grassroots campaigning. Written for open-minded readers, the book presents the fullest justification for the academic boycott yet given, considering BDS efforts on campuses around the world. The opening chapters explore the fundamentals of the academic boycott campaign, detailing the conditions on the ground in Palestinian and Israeli higher education and analyzing debates over the boycott and its adoption or resistance in the west. The later chapters contextualize the boycott with respect to broader questions about the links between theory and practice in political change. Directly rebutting the arguments of BDS’s opponents, Boycott Theory and the Struggle for Palestine demonstrates the political and intellectual soundness of a controversial and often misrepresented campaign. In defending an original view of the differences between reflecting on politics and doing it in the specific context of the liberation of Palestine, the book’s arguments will have a resonance for many wider debates beyond the context of either universities or the Middle East.

In recent decades social cohesion has emerged as a major concern of states, policymakers and researchers. Social cohesion is represented as a desirable policy goal and as the basis for everything from economic growth to individual well-being. At the same time, it is increasingly presented as a single substance, which can be measured, tracked, and compared across diverse societies. But why should we think of the complex ways in which we can live well together in terms of a single substance? Social Cohesion Contested challenges this way of thinking, suggesting that social cohesion has become a buzzword that obscures more than it illuminates.Dan Swain and Petr Urban trace the rise of the concept through the policy agendas of transnational and international bodies, and analyze the reactions of social researchers to the demands of policymakers for a clear and operationalizable concept. They argue that the term is frequently used in a way that assumes broad understanding and agreement, while in practice it is subject to contradictory definitions and often loaded with various implicit and explicit values, which become masked behind a veneer of scientific authority and normative legitimacy. The more that social cohesion is treated as a single substance with a clear and uncontroversial meaning, the more it narrows the space for debate and contestation around both the policies adopted in its name and the understanding of the social on which it rests. In contrast, if social cohesion is to mean anything it ought to be understood explicitly as a contested concept, and actively subject to contestation. The book thus provides not only a critique of a popular concept, but an example of engaged philosophical criticism of social research and policy.

In recent decades social cohesion has emerged as a major concern of states, policymakers and researchers. Social cohesion is represented as a desirable policy goal and as the basis for everything from economic growth to individual well-being. At the same time, it is increasingly presented as a single substance, which can be measured, tracked, and compared across diverse societies. But why should we think of the complex ways in which we can live well together in terms of a single substance? Social Cohesion Contested challenges this way of thinking, suggesting that social cohesion has become a buzzword that obscures more than it illuminates.Dan Swain and Petr Urban trace the rise of the concept through the policy agendas of transnational and international bodies, and analyze the reactions of social researchers to the demands of policymakers for a clear and operationalizable concept. They argue that the term is frequently used in a way that assumes broad understanding and agreement, while in practice it is subject to contradictory definitions and often loaded with various implicit and explicit values, which become masked behind a veneer of scientific authority and normative legitimacy. The more that social cohesion is treated as a single substance with a clear and uncontroversial meaning, the more it narrows the space for debate and contestation around both the policies adopted in its name and the understanding of the social on which it rests. In contrast, if social cohesion is to mean anything it ought to be understood explicitly as a contested concept, and actively subject to contestation. The book thus provides not only a critique of a popular concept, but an example of engaged philosophical criticism of social research and policy.

Drone warfare represents one of the most pressing moral and political problems of contemporary military ethics. Since the beginning of the American drone program in the late twentieth century, drone technologies have been used to conduct remote extrajudicial assassinations, to violate national sovereignty, and to conduct intrusive surveillance in contravention of international human rights norms, among other controversial uses. Today, military drones are used by dozens of military forces. As such, these technologies pose urgent questions which problematize well-established ways of thinking about central aspects of the ethics of warfare, such as justice, sovereignty, battlefield trauma, the political and physical limits of conflict, and, perhaps most prominently of all, the legitimacy of military violence. Though some of these concerns are well-worn, their central role in – and reconfiguration by – drone warfare means that they deserve serious reconsideration.Kill Box investigates this urgent conceptual territory through readings of the popular cultural productions that have emerged as a part of these debates, and reveals the ways in which narrative texts have been an integral part of the framing of these political and philosophical conversations. Examining well-known single-issue drone texts, such as Eye in the Sky, Good Kill, and The Drone Eats with Me, alongside lesser known texts, such as pulp novels, genre sci-fi, and Netflix thrillers, this new book shows us the surprisingly versatile and elastic ways in which drone discourse continues to be co-constituted by narrative entertainment.

Drone warfare represents one of the most pressing moral and political problems of contemporary military ethics. Since the beginning of the American drone program in the late twentieth century, drone technologies have been used to conduct remote extrajudicial assassinations, to violate national sovereignty, and to conduct intrusive surveillance in contravention of international human rights norms, among other controversial uses. Today, military drones are used by dozens of military forces. As such, these technologies pose urgent questions which problematize well-established ways of thinking about central aspects of the ethics of warfare, such as justice, sovereignty, battlefield trauma, the political and physical limits of conflict, and, perhaps most prominently of all, the legitimacy of military violence. Though some of these concerns are well-worn, their central role in – and reconfiguration by – drone warfare means that they deserve serious reconsideration.Kill Box investigates this urgent conceptual territory through readings of the popular cultural productions that have emerged as a part of these debates, and reveals the ways in which narrative texts have been an integral part of the framing of these political and philosophical conversations. Examining well-known single-issue drone texts, such as Eye in the Sky, Good Kill, and The Drone Eats with Me, alongside lesser known texts, such as pulp novels, genre sci-fi, and Netflix thrillers, this new book shows us the surprisingly versatile and elastic ways in which drone discourse continues to be co-constituted by narrative entertainment.

In this fascinating and timely book, Maren Behrensen facilitates a conversation between philosophy and the ‘practitioners’ of identity. What makes a person the same person over time? This question has been studied throughout the history of philosophy. Yet philosophers have never fully engaged with the ‘practitioners’ of identity, namely technology developers, lawyers, politicians, sociologists and applied ethicists. The book offers an answer to the metaphysical question of personal identity and tries to show how this question is of immediate relevance to the various practices of identity management – particularly in the fields of administration, counter-terrorism activities, and gender reassignment. Behrensen argues that identity documents and other markers of identity (such as biometric samples) are not merely representations of, but actually help constitute, personal identity. The metaphysical fact of personal identity lies in these supposedly ‘external’ features. The book goes on to focus on issues relating to ‘trust’ and ‘security’, terms central to the ethics of new technologies and in work on new identity management technologies.

In this fascinating and timely book, Maren Behrensen facilitates a conversation between philosophy and the ‘practitioners’ of identity. What makes a person the same person over time? This question has been studied throughout the history of philosophy. Yet philosophers have never fully engaged with the ‘practitioners’ of identity, namely technology developers, lawyers, politicians, sociologists and applied ethicists. The book offers an answer to the metaphysical question of personal identity and tries to show how this question is of immediate relevance to the various practices of identity management – particularly in the fields of administration, counter-terrorism activities, and gender reassignment. Behrensen argues that identity documents and other markers of identity (such as biometric samples) are not merely representations of, but actually help constitute, personal identity. The metaphysical fact of personal identity lies in these supposedly ‘external’ features. The book goes on to focus on issues relating to ‘trust’ and ‘security’, terms central to the ethics of new technologies and in work on new identity management technologies.

In this fascinating and timely book, Maren Behrensen facilitates a conversation between philosophy and the ‘practitioners’ of identity. What makes a person the same person over time? This question has been studied throughout the history of philosophy. Yet philosophers have never fully engaged with the ‘practitioners’ of identity, namely technology developers, lawyers, politicians, sociologists and applied ethicists. The book offers an answer to the metaphysical question of personal identity and tries to show how this question is of immediate relevance to the various practices of identity management – particularly in the fields of administration, counter-terrorism activities, and gender reassignment. Behrensen argues that identity documents and other markers of identity (such as biometric samples) are not merely representations of, but actually help constitute, personal identity. The metaphysical fact of personal identity lies in these supposedly ‘external’ features. The book goes on to focus on issues relating to ‘trust’ and ‘security’, terms central to the ethics of new technologies and in work on new identity management technologies.

Does recognition of the basic human right to subsistence imply that the needy are morally permitted to take and use other people’s property to get out of their plight? Should we respect the exercise of this right of necessity in a variety of scenarios – from street pickpocketing and petty theft to illegal squatting and encamping? In this concise and accessible book, Alejandra Mancilla addresses these complex and controversial moral questions. The book presents a historical account of the concept of the right of necessity—from the medieval writings of Christian canonists and theologians to seventeenth century natural law theory. The author then goes on to ground this right in a minimal conception of basic human rights, and proposes some necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for its exercise. She confronts the main objections that may be posed against this principle and ultimately concludes that the exercise of this right should be considered as a trigger to secure a minimum threshold of welfare provisions for everyone, everywhere.

Does recognition of the basic human right to subsistence imply that the needy are morally permitted to take and use other people’s property to get out of their plight? Should we respect the exercise of this right of necessity in a variety of scenarios – from street pickpocketing and petty theft to illegal squatting and encamping? In this concise and accessible book, Alejandra Mancilla addresses these complex and controversial moral questions. The book presents a historical account of the concept of the right of necessity—from the medieval writings of Christian canonists and theologians to seventeenth century natural law theory. The author then goes on to ground this right in a minimal conception of basic human rights, and proposes some necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for its exercise. She confronts the main objections that may be posed against this principle and ultimately concludes that the exercise of this right should be considered as a trigger to secure a minimum threshold of welfare provisions for everyone, everywhere.

Does recognition of the basic human right to subsistence imply that the needy are morally permitted to take and use other people’s property to get out of their plight? Should we respect the exercise of this right of necessity in a variety of scenarios – from street pickpocketing and petty theft to illegal squatting and encamping? In this concise and accessible book, Alejandra Mancilla addresses these complex and controversial moral questions. The book presents a historical account of the concept of the right of necessity—from the medieval writings of Christian canonists and theologians to seventeenth century natural law theory. The author then goes on to ground this right in a minimal conception of basic human rights, and proposes some necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for its exercise. She confronts the main objections that may be posed against this principle and ultimately concludes that the exercise of this right should be considered as a trigger to secure a minimum threshold of welfare provisions for everyone, everywhere.

This book critically examines "just liberal violence": forms of direct and structural violence that others may be "justly" subjected to. Michael Neu focusses on liberal defences of torture, war and sweatshop labour, respectively, and argues that each of these defences fails and that all of them fail for similar reasons. Liberal defences of violence share several blind spots, and it is the task of this book to reveal them. Neu offers a unifying perspective that reveals the three kinds of defence of violence under investigation as being essentially one of a kind. He demonstrates that each of these defences suffers from serious and irreparable intellectual defects and articulates these defects in a synthesised critique. The book goes on to accuse liberal defenders of being complicit in contemporary structures and practices of violence, and highlights the implications of this argument for moral and political philosophers who spend their professional lives thinking about morality and politics.

This book critically examines "just liberal violence": forms of direct and structural violence that others may be "justly" subjected to. Michael Neu focusses on liberal defences of torture, war and sweatshop labour, respectively, and argues that each of these defences fails and that all of them fail for similar reasons. Liberal defences of violence share several blind spots, and it is the task of this book to reveal them. Neu offers a unifying perspective that reveals the three kinds of defence of violence under investigation as being essentially one of a kind. He demonstrates that each of these defences suffers from serious and irreparable intellectual defects and articulates these defects in a synthesised critique. The book goes on to accuse liberal defenders of being complicit in contemporary structures and practices of violence, and highlights the implications of this argument for moral and political philosophers who spend their professional lives thinking about morality and politics.

This book critically examines "just liberal violence": forms of direct and structural violence that others may be "justly" subjected to. Michael Neu focusses on liberal defences of torture, war and sweatshop labour, respectively, and argues that each of these defences fails and that all of them fail for similar reasons. Liberal defences of violence share several blind spots, and it is the task of this book to reveal them. Neu offers a unifying perspective that reveals the three kinds of defence of violence under investigation as being essentially one of a kind. He demonstrates that each of these defences suffers from serious and irreparable intellectual defects and articulates these defects in a synthesised critique. The book goes on to accuse liberal defenders of being complicit in contemporary structures and practices of violence, and highlights the implications of this argument for moral and political philosophers who spend their professional lives thinking about morality and politics.

Complicity argues that all existing modes of cultural critique are regarded as legitimate and productive if and only if they are complicit with the very ideologies and values that the criticism sets out to undermine. Through philosophical, literary and theoretical analysis, Thomas Docherty shows how easy it has been for criticism to become essentially an act of political collaboration with existing governmental power. The book explores the various ways in which, both historically and theoretically, critical activity has become complicit with the over-arching social and political norms that it aims to undermine. Philosophically, ethically and politically, criticism’s fundamental impulse is too often intrinsically negated. In extreme political form, this places criticism in line with collaborationist activity. Docherty then finds a productive way out of the double-bind in which criticism has traditionally found itself, through an idea of criticism as a mode of ‘reserve’, a mode of commitment that eschews fundamentalism of all kinds.

Complicity argues that all existing modes of cultural critique are regarded as legitimate and productive if and only if they are complicit with the very ideologies and values that the criticism sets out to undermine. Through philosophical, literary and theoretical analysis, Thomas Docherty shows how easy it has been for criticism to become essentially an act of political collaboration with existing governmental power. The book explores the various ways in which, both historically and theoretically, critical activity has become complicit with the over-arching social and political norms that it aims to undermine. Philosophically, ethically and politically, criticism’s fundamental impulse is too often intrinsically negated. In extreme political form, this places criticism in line with collaborationist activity. Docherty then finds a productive way out of the double-bind in which criticism has traditionally found itself, through an idea of criticism as a mode of ‘reserve’, a mode of commitment that eschews fundamentalism of all kinds.

Complicity argues that all existing modes of cultural critique are regarded as legitimate and productive if and only if they are complicit with the very ideologies and values that the criticism sets out to undermine. Through philosophical, literary and theoretical analysis, Thomas Docherty shows how easy it has been for criticism to become essentially an act of political collaboration with existing governmental power. The book explores the various ways in which, both historically and theoretically, critical activity has become complicit with the over-arching social and political norms that it aims to undermine. Philosophically, ethically and politically, criticism’s fundamental impulse is too often intrinsically negated. In extreme political form, this places criticism in line with collaborationist activity. Docherty then finds a productive way out of the double-bind in which criticism has traditionally found itself, through an idea of criticism as a mode of ‘reserve’, a mode of commitment that eschews fundamentalism of all kinds.

This book sets out the most influential theories of democracy (liberal-egalitarian, deliberative, and cosmopolitan) and argues that they fail to adequately comprehend the cause of politically meaningful inequality on the one hand and the security state on the other. The private and exclusive control of that which all need to survive, realize, and enjoy life, and their exploitation to increase the wealth of a small mostly white and male ruling class is the cause of both growing inequality and the instability and political violence that legitimates the growth of the security state. Jeff Noonan contends that the inequality and increasingly totalitarian practice of current systems of democracy proves that democratic ideals cannot be fully realized in existing institutions. These institutions are bound up with an economic system based upon private and exclusive control of the resources and wealth everyone needs in order to enjoy a meaningful life as socially self-conscious agents. However, this fact does not mean that democratic values are wrong, only that their realization demands a different set of social structures and institutions. Noonan goes on to explore alternative sets of individual motivations, goals, and values from those that define liberal-capitalism.

This book sets out the most influential theories of democracy (liberal-egalitarian, deliberative, and cosmopolitan) and argues that they fail to adequately comprehend the cause of politically meaningful inequality on the one hand and the security state on the other. The private and exclusive control of that which all need to survive, realize, and enjoy life, and their exploitation to increase the wealth of a small mostly white and male ruling class is the cause of both growing inequality and the instability and political violence that legitimates the growth of the security state. Jeff Noonan contends that the inequality and increasingly totalitarian practice of current systems of democracy proves that democratic ideals cannot be fully realized in existing institutions. These institutions are bound up with an economic system based upon private and exclusive control of the resources and wealth everyone needs in order to enjoy a meaningful life as socially self-conscious agents. However, this fact does not mean that democratic values are wrong, only that their realization demands a different set of social structures and institutions. Noonan goes on to explore alternative sets of individual motivations, goals, and values from those that define liberal-capitalism.

This book sets out the most influential theories of democracy (liberal-egalitarian, deliberative, and cosmopolitan) and argues that they fail to adequately comprehend the cause of politically meaningful inequality on the one hand and the security state on the other. The private and exclusive control of that which all need to survive, realize, and enjoy life, and their exploitation to increase the wealth of a small mostly white and male ruling class is the cause of both growing inequality and the instability and political violence that legitimates the growth of the security state. Jeff Noonan contends that the inequality and increasingly totalitarian practice of current systems of democracy proves that democratic ideals cannot be fully realized in existing institutions. These institutions are bound up with an economic system based upon private and exclusive control of the resources and wealth everyone needs in order to enjoy a meaningful life as socially self-conscious agents. However, this fact does not mean that democratic values are wrong, only that their realization demands a different set of social structures and institutions. Noonan goes on to explore alternative sets of individual motivations, goals, and values from those that define liberal-capitalism.