Paolo Diego Bubbio – författare

This thought-provoking study explores the philosophical resources provided by Hegel and Heidegger to grasp the nature of the “I” and combines those resources in a theoretical analysis of “I-hood” in its connection with nature and history, experience and myth.The “I” has a fleeting, almost elusive character in the philosophies of Hegel and Heidegger. Yet, both philosophers strive to make sense of what it means to be an “I”. Their respective theories, though seemingly divergent, offer remarkable insights into the nature of the “I” and its relationship to the world. Through meticulous examination, this book explores the parallel journeys of Hegel and Heidegger, tracing their respective paths towards a comprehensive conception of identity beyond the subject/object dichotomy. Moreover, this study goes beyond being an exploration of Hegel’s and Heidegger’s conceptions of the self by actively employing their insights to chart a path towards a novel understanding of “I-hood”.Hegel, Heidegger, and the Quest for the “I” will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working on Hegel, Heidegger, history of European philosophy, and contemporary theories of subjectivity and personal identity. Offering a fresh perspective on the work of these two seminal thinkers, the book contributes to the ongoing dialogue on the nature of the self and its place in the world.

This thought-provoking study explores the philosophical resources provided by Hegel and Heidegger to grasp the nature of the “I” and combines those resources in a theoretical analysis of “I-hood” in its connection with nature and history, experience and myth.The “I” has a fleeting, almost elusive character in the philosophies of Hegel and Heidegger. Yet, both philosophers strive to make sense of what it means to be an “I”. Their respective theories, though seemingly divergent, offer remarkable insights into the nature of the “I” and its relationship to the world. Through meticulous examination, this book explores the parallel journeys of Hegel and Heidegger, tracing their respective paths towards a comprehensive conception of identity beyond the subject/object dichotomy. Moreover, this study goes beyond being an exploration of Hegel’s and Heidegger’s conceptions of the self by actively employing their insights to chart a path towards a novel understanding of “I-hood”.Hegel, Heidegger, and the Quest for the “I” will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working on Hegel, Heidegger, history of European philosophy, and contemporary theories of subjectivity and personal identity. Offering a fresh perspective on the work of these two seminal thinkers, the book contributes to the ongoing dialogue on the nature of the self and its place in the world.

This volume explores the relationship between justice and freedom in Hegel’s practical philosophy, with a particular focus on the pivotal concept of reciprocal recognition. The contributors analyze the intersubjective relations between individuals and institutions through the lens of Hegel and demonstrate how his account of justice and freedom can be applied to address pressing issues in political philosophy.Despite extensive scrutiny of the concept of justice by political philosophers, Hegel’s unique account has been notably overlooked. What sets Hegel apart is his emphasis on the inseparable link between justice and freedom. Freedom is inextricably tied to an account of just social relations and institutions, while justice itself is intertwined with a robust endorsement of freedom. The chapters comprising this volume examine three crucial dimensions of Hegel’s framework for freedom and justice. First, the contributors address how Hegel’s distinctive integration of freedom and justice sheds new light on the nature of his practical philosophy. Second, they relate Hegel’s theory to other prominent accounts of justice, including Rawlsian forms of Kantian constructivism, Habermas’ neo‑Kantian discourse theory, republican views, neo‑Aristotelian accounts, and critical theory approaches. Finally, the contributors apply Hegel’s reconstructed theory of justice to ongoing debates encompassing criminal justice, distributive justice, global justice, environmental justice, and issues related to racial and gender justice, as well as populism.Justice and Freedom in Hegel will appeal to scholars and advanced students engaged in research on Hegel’s practical philosophy, 19th‑century philosophy, and political philosophy.

This volume explores the relationship between justice and freedom in Hegel’s practical philosophy, with a particular focus on the pivotal concept of reciprocal recognition. The contributors analyze the intersubjective relations between individuals and institutions through the lens of Hegel and demonstrate how his account of justice and freedom can be applied to address pressing issues in political philosophy.Despite extensive scrutiny of the concept of justice by political philosophers, Hegel’s unique account has been notably overlooked. What sets Hegel apart is his emphasis on the inseparable link between justice and freedom. Freedom is inextricably tied to an account of just social relations and institutions, while justice itself is intertwined with a robust endorsement of freedom. The chapters comprising this volume examine three crucial dimensions of Hegel’s framework for freedom and justice. First, the contributors address how Hegel’s distinctive integration of freedom and justice sheds new light on the nature of his practical philosophy. Second, they relate Hegel’s theory to other prominent accounts of justice, including Rawlsian forms of Kantian constructivism, Habermas’ neo‑Kantian discourse theory, republican views, neo‑Aristotelian accounts, and critical theory approaches. Finally, the contributors apply Hegel’s reconstructed theory of justice to ongoing debates encompassing criminal justice, distributive justice, global justice, environmental justice, and issues related to racial and gender justice, as well as populism.Justice and Freedom in Hegel will appeal to scholars and advanced students engaged in research on Hegel’s practical philosophy, 19th‑century philosophy, and political philosophy.

This book offers new critical perspectives on the relationship between the notions of speculation, logic and reality in Hegel’s thought as basis for his philosophical account of nature, history, spirit and human experience. The systematic functions of logic and pure thought are explored in their concrete forms and processual progression from subjective spirit to philosophy of right, society, the notion of habit, the idea of work, art, religion and science. Engaging the relation between the Logic and its realisations, this book shows the internal tension that inhabits Hegel’s philosophy at the intersection of logical (conceptual) speculation and concrete (interpretative) analysis. The investigation of this tension allows for a hermeneutical approach that demystifies the common view of Hegel’s idealism as a form of abstract thought, while allowing for a new assessment of the importance of speculation for a concrete understanding of the world.

This book offers new critical perspectives on the relationship between the notions of speculation, logic and reality in Hegel’s thought as basis for his philosophical account of nature, history, spirit and human experience. The systematic functions of logic and pure thought are explored in their concrete forms and processual progression from subjective spirit to philosophy of right, society, the notion of habit, the idea of work, art, religion and science. Engaging the relation between the Logic and its realisations, this book shows the internal tension that inhabits Hegel’s philosophy at the intersection of logical (conceptual) speculation and concrete (interpretative) analysis. The investigation of this tension allows for a hermeneutical approach that demystifies the common view of Hegel’s idealism as a form of abstract thought, while allowing for a new assessment of the importance of speculation for a concrete understanding of the world.

An examination of the philosophical notion of sacrifice from Kant to Nietzsche.In this book, Paolo Diego Bubbio offers an alternative to standard philosophical accounts of the notion of sacrifice, which generally begin with the hermeneutic and postmodern traditions of the twentieth century, starting instead with the post-Kantian tradition of the nineteenth century. He restructures the historical development of the concept of sacrifice through a study of Kant, Solger, Hegel, Kierkegaard, and Nietzsche, and shows how each is indebted to Kant and has more in common with him than is generally acknowledged. Bubbio argues that although Kant sought to free philosophical thought from religious foundations, he did not thereby render the role of religious claims philosophically useless. This makes it possible to consider sacrifice as a regulative and symbolic notion, and leads to an unorthodox idea of sacrifice: not the destruction of something for the sake of something else, but rather a kenotic emptying, conceived as a withdrawal or a "making room" for others.

An examination of the philosophical notion of sacrifice from Kant to Nietzsche.In this book, Paolo Diego Bubbio offers an alternative to standard philosophical accounts of the notion of sacrifice, which generally begin with the hermeneutic and postmodern traditions of the twentieth century, starting instead with the post-Kantian tradition of the nineteenth century. He restructures the historical development of the concept of sacrifice through a study of Kant, Solger, Hegel, Kierkegaard, and Nietzsche, and shows how each is indebted to Kant and has more in common with him than is generally acknowledged. Bubbio argues that although Kant sought to free philosophical thought from religious foundations, he did not thereby render the role of religious claims philosophically useless. This makes it possible to consider sacrifice as a regulative and symbolic notion, and leads to an unorthodox idea of sacrifice: not the destruction of something for the sake of something else, but rather a kenotic emptying, conceived as a withdrawal or a "making room" for others.

Argues that Hegel's conception of God and the self holds the key to overcoming subjectivism in both philosophy of religion and metaphysics.God and the Self in Hegel proposes a reconstruction of Hegel's conception of God and analyzes the significance of this reading for Hegel's idealistic metaphysics. Paolo Diego Bubbio argues that in Hegel's view, subjectivism-the tenet that there is no underlying "true" reality that exists independently of the activity of the cognitive agent-can be avoided, and content can be restored to religion, only to the extent that God is understood in God's relation to human beings, and human beings are understood in their relation to God. Focusing on traditional problems in theology and the philosophy of religion, such as the ontological argument for the existence of God, the Trinity, and the "death of God," Bubbio shows the relevance of Hegel's view of religion and God for his broader philosophical strategy. In this account, as a response to the fundamental Kantian challenge of how to conceive the mind-world relation without setting mind over and against the world, Hegel has found a way of overcoming subjectivism in both philosophy and religion.

Argues that Hegel's conception of God and the self holds the key to overcoming subjectivism in both philosophy of religion and metaphysics.God and the Self in Hegel proposes a reconstruction of Hegel's conception of God and analyzes the significance of this reading for Hegel's idealistic metaphysics. Paolo Diego Bubbio argues that in Hegel's view, subjectivism-the tenet that there is no underlying "true" reality that exists independently of the activity of the cognitive agent-can be avoided, and content can be restored to religion, only to the extent that God is understood in God's relation to human beings, and human beings are understood in their relation to God. Focusing on traditional problems in theology and the philosophy of religion, such as the ontological argument for the existence of God, the Trinity, and the "death of God," Bubbio shows the relevance of Hegel's view of religion and God for his broader philosophical strategy. In this account, as a response to the fundamental Kantian challenge of how to conceive the mind-world relation without setting mind over and against the world, Hegel has found a way of overcoming subjectivism in both philosophy and religion.

The interdisciplinary French-American thinker René Girard (1923-2015) has been one of the towering figures of the humanities in the last half-century. The title of René Girard’s first book offered his own thesis in summary form: romantic lie and novelistic truth [mensonge romantique et vérité romanesque]. And yet, for a thinker whose career began by an engagement with literature, it came as a shock to some that, in La Conversion de l’art, Girard asserted that the novel may be an “outmoded” form for revealing humans to themselves. However, Girard never specified what, if anything, might take the place of the novel. This collection of essays is one attempt at answering this question, by offering a series of analyses of films that aims to test mimetic theory in an area in which relatively little has so far been offered. Does it make any sense to talk of vérité filmique?In addition, Mimetic Theory and Film is a response to the widespread objection that there is no viable “Girardian aesthetics.” One of the main questions that this collection considers is: can we develop a genre-specific mimetic analysis (of film), and are we able to develop anything approaching a “Girardian aesthetic”? Each of the contributors addresses these questions through the analysis of a film.

The interdisciplinary French-American thinker René Girard (1923-2015) has been one of the towering figures of the humanities in the last half-century. The title of René Girard’s first book offered his own thesis in summary form: romantic lie and novelistic truth [mensonge romantique et vérité romanesque]. And yet, for a thinker whose career began by an engagement with literature, it came as a shock to some that, in La Conversion de l’art, Girard asserted that the novel may be an “outmoded” form for revealing humans to themselves. However, Girard never specified what, if anything, might take the place of the novel. This collection of essays is one attempt at answering this question, by offering a series of analyses of films that aims to test mimetic theory in an area in which relatively little has so far been offered. Does it make any sense to talk of vérité filmique?In addition, Mimetic Theory and Film is a response to the widespread objection that there is no viable “Girardian aesthetics.” One of the main questions that this collection considers is: can we develop a genre-specific mimetic analysis (of film), and are we able to develop anything approaching a “Girardian aesthetic”? Each of the contributors addresses these questions through the analysis of a film.

Intellectual Sacrifice and Other Mimetic Paradoxes is an account of Paolo Diego Bubbio’s twenty-year intellectual journey through the twists and turns of Girard’s mimetic theory. The author analyzes philosophy and religion as “enemy sisters” engaged in an endless competitive struggle and identifies the intellectual space where this rivalry can either be perpetuated or come to a paradoxical resolution. He goes on to explore topics ranging from arguments for the existence of God to mimetic theory’s post-Kantian legacy, political implications, and capacity for identifying epochal phenomena, such as the crisis of the self, in popular culture. Bubbio concludes by advocating for an encounter between mimetic theory and contemporary philosophical hermeneutics—an encounter in which each approach benefits and is enriched by the resources of the other. The volume features a previously unpublished letter by René Girard on the relationship between philosophy and religion.

In Over-Measure in Kant, Hegel, and Shakespeare: Putting the Principles Into Play, four Shakespeare plays become the experiential-dramatic playground where operations of “principled virtues” and their informing categories are meticulously tested.Jennifer Ann Bates begins with Hegel’s logic of measure and Shakespeare’s Measure for Measure, showing essential measure is indeterminable. She then combines Kant’s Pure Principles of the Understanding with Shakespearean Roman tragedy, exploring principles of measure through over-measure. Bookended by Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, she investigates over-measures of quantity in Antony and Cleopatra, quality in Titus Andronicus, and relation and modality in Julius Caesar.She turns to Kant for epistemic measures that make experience possible, highlighting his warnings against exceeding those limits. Putting Kant’s Principles into play produces “principled virtues,” which are epistemic principles made practical and differ from Kant’s Doctrine of Virtues, not just from Aristotle’s virtues. Read through Shakespeare’s plays, principled virtues are tragic: they miss the mark, and they are executed in both senses. The reason is that their over-measures are not grasped dialectically. The author finds a solution in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, which she calls his book of over-measures. In it, Hegel reveals the necessity of overmeasures in experience, thus providing the measure for measure.

Resituating Kant's work within the Western modern historical tradition provides insight into the originality of his views against the background of pervasive intellectual discussions in the 18th century.Catalina González embeds essential aspects of Kant's epistemology, metaphysics, morals, and aesthetics into philosophical debates and discussions that, although central to modernity, have not been sufficiently explored by Kantian scholarship. These contexts include disputes between skeptics and anti-skeptics, debates over deism and natural theology, controversies about animal minds, discussions on the foundations of morality, and aesthetic conversations regarding the sublime.The book's historical perspective is further supplied by a set of methodological reflections drawn from the heterogeneous field of studies of “intellectual history.” It intertwines insights from the Cambridge School of Political Thought or the German Begriffsfgeschichte, and from a wide variety of historians of philosophy, with the analysis of Kant’s texts and Kantian scholarship to provide a novel and rigorous account of the historical formation of specific aspects of Kant's thought.

What is the scope and justification of Hegel’s Science of Logic? What is the meaning of his identification of Logic and metaphysics? What is his relation to traditional metaphysics and to Kant’s philosophy?Offering a unique and innovative reading of Hegel’s metaphysics, this book provides in-depth and original textual analysis of portions of Hegel’s text. It combines a “historical” approach to Hegel’s text with conceptual and meta-metaphysical awareness of the different notions of “metaphysics” at play in the contemporary landscape, not only to produce a more faithful understanding of what Hegel exactly meant by metaphysics, but also to assess whether Hegel could give a contribution to contemporary issues. Elena Tripaldi also demonstrates that Hegel’s metaphysics consists of a peculiar form of ontological monism, in which the ontological consistency of particulars is not only preserved but exalted.

In order to solve the perceptual time-gap problem, this book embraces Idealism and acknowledges the existence of sense-data at the root of perceiving physical objects.Of all the multiple arguments for introducing sense-data as objects of sensory awareness, the Time-Gap Argument remains persistently puzzling. Since the Middle Ages, scholars have wondered about phenomena such as the light we see from stars far away, and the time-gap problem has resisted a definitive solution. Examining most of the arguments advanced since the beginning of the twentieth century both for and against the admission of sense-data, Mykolas J. Drunga argues that the problem cannot be solved by denying that the things we see must exist at the time we see them or by claiming we can see deeply into the past. Instead, we will solve it by realizing that what keeps the universe in existence is an eternal spirit. This radical conclusion, in conversation with the Idealist philosophers Leibniz and Berkeley, requires taking a first indispensable step––acknowledging the existence of sense-data at the root of perceiving physical objects. Drunga vindicates a Direct Realist Subjective Idealism, which alone allows perception of the world to be both possible and understandable. If Subjective Idealism is thus a necessary condition for the possibility and intelligibility of sensory perception, we thereby have a strong proof of Idealism’s truth. Ultimately, to be just is to perceive (to be on the way toward coming to know something) or to be perceived (to be on the way toward becoming known to someone).

Kant’s critical philosophy emerged within a philosophical landscape ripe for change, and it provided an unprecedented blueprint for how to scientifically, ethically, and spiritually reconcile subjective experience within the unique realities of modernity. Nevertheless, Kant’s critical system encountered numerous challenges along its path toward influence. Drawing upon key texts from the Golden Age of philosophical scholarship from Kant to Hegel, Kant and the Path of German Idealism illuminates the trajectory of Kant’s critical foundation as it was initially received, developed, and ostensibly usurped. What emerges from Daniel Patrick Kelly’s reading of this philosophical period is the fundamental centrality of Kant’s discursive account of cognition. Kelly contends that the early and steady erosion of the Kantian discursive foundation—which is theoretically central to the strength, integrity, and applicability of the Kantian system—was largely due to persistent Neo-Spinozist developments, misunderstandings of Kant’s radical ideas, and the inability of Kant himself to sufficiently defend and further explicate his epistemology. This book also examines the revisionist developments of the immanent systems of Kant’s German Idealist successors, presenting their systematic efforts as cautionary tales in their coice to reject Kant’s epistemic wisdom.

The German philosopher Karl Jaspers was moved by the possibilities of global understanding throughout his life and penetrated it more deeply than any other thinker before him. Anton Hügli argues that Jaspers' petition to not proclaim a new doctrine,—but to continue thinking along the path taken by the great philosophers of the past,—is itself an expression of his unconditional will to communicate. The limits of communication that Jaspers shows us are not accidental psychological and sociological obstacles to understanding, but limits that we humans encounter as humans: we want to communicate what cannot be communicated. Instead of an understanding based on a truth that can be understood by all, there is a struggle between the powers of faith. How we can communicate with one another and work for peace and unity in the world? This ultimate question requires a twofold clarification: on the one hand, of the nature of the objects that have always been considered inexpressible, the human’s individual existence and God as the ultimate One, and on the other hand, of the faculty in us that allows us to think things that cannot be thought.

Do we really need philosophy? The present collection of jargon-free essays aims at answering the question of why philosophy matters. Each essay considers the central question (Why Philosophy?) from different angles: the unavoidability of doing philosophy, the practical consequences of philosophy, philosophy as a therapy for the whole person, the benefits of philosophy for improving public policy, etc.