Legislative Politics and Policy Making – serie

The House and the Senate floors are the only legislative forums where all members of the U.S. Congress participate and each has a vote. Andrew J. Taylor explores why floor power and floor rights in the House are more restricted than in the Senate and how these restrictions affect the legislative process. After tracing the historical development of floor rules, Taylor assesses how well they facilitate a democratic legislative process—that is, how well they facilitate deliberation, transparency, and widespread participation.Taylor not only compares floor proceedings between the Senate and the House in recent decades; he also compares recent congressional proceedings with antebellum proceedings. This unique, systematic analysis reveals that the Senate is generally more democratic than the House—a somewhat surprising result, given that the House is usually considered the more representative and responsive of the two. Taylor concludes with recommendations for practical reforms designed to make floor debates more robust and foster representative democracy.

The institutional development of American legislatures, beginning with the first colonial assembly of 1619, has been marked by continuity as well as change. Peverill Squire draws upon a wealth of primary sources to document this institutional history. Beginning with the ways in which colonial assemblies followed the precedents of British institutions, Squire traces the fundamental ways they evolved to become distinct. He next charts the formation of the first state legislatures and the Constitutional Congress, describes the creation of territorial and new state legislatures, and examines the institutionalization of state legislatures in the nineteenth century and their professionalization since 1900. With his conclusion, Squire discusses the historical trajectory of American legislatures and suggests how they might further develop over the coming decades. While Squire's approach will appeal to historians, his focus on the evolution of rules, procedures, and standing committee systems, as well as member salaries, legislative sessions, staff, and facilities, will be valuable to political scientists and legislative scholars.

Each of the past few election cycles has featured at least one instance of "primarying," a challenge to an incumbent on the grounds that he or she is not sufficiently partisan. For many observers, such races signify an increasingly polarized electorate and an increasing threat to moderates of both parties.In Getting Primaried, Robert G. Boatright shows that primary challenges are not becoming more frequent; they wax and wane in accordance with partisan turnover in Congress. The recent rise of primarying corresponds to the rise of national fundraising bases and new types of partisan organizations supporting candidates around the country. National fundraising efforts and interest group–supported primary challenges have garnered media attention disproportionate to their success in winning elections. Such challenges can work only if groups focus on a small number of incumbents.Getting Primaried makes several key contributions to congressional scholarship. It presents a history of congressional primary challenges over the past forty years, measuring the frequency of competitive challenges and distinguishing among types of challenges. It provides a correction to accounts of the link between primary competition and political polarization. Further, this study offers a new theoretical understanding of the role of interest groups in congressional elections.

In Ambition, Competition, and Electoral Reform, Jamie L. Carson and Jason M. Roberts present an original study of U.S. congressional elections and electoral institutions for 1872-1944 from a contemporary political science perspective. Using data on late nineteenth and early twentieth century congressional elections, the authors test the applicability in a historical context of modern political science theories, assess the effects of institutional reforms, and identify the factors that shape the competitiveness of elections. They present several key findings: the strategic politicians theory is applicable in an era without candidate-centered campaigns; there was an incumbency advantage prior to the full development of candidate-centered campaigns; institutional reforms have had a significant effect on elections; and the degree of electoral competition frequently correlates with elected officials' responsiveness to citizens.

Erik J. Engstrom offers a historical perspective on the effects of gerrymandering on elections and party control of the U.S. national legislature. Aside from the requirements that districts be continuous and, after 1842, that each select only one representative, there were few restrictions on congressional districting. Unrestrained, state legislators drew and redrew districts to suit their own partisan agendas. With the rise of the “one-person, one-vote” doctrine and the implementation of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, however, redistricting became subject to court oversight.Engstrom evaluates the abundant cross-sectional and temporal variation in redistricting plans and their electoral results from all the states, from 1789 through the 1960s, to identify the causes and consequences of partisan redistricting. His analysis reveals that districting practices across states and over time systematically affected the competitiveness of congressional elections, shaped the partisan composition of congressional delegations, and, on occasion, determined party control of the House of Representatives.

Although the U.S. Constitution requires that the House of Representatives and the Senate pass legislation in identical form before it can be sent to the president for final approval, the process of resolving differences between the chambers has received surprisingly little scholarly attention. Hong Min Park, Steven S. Smith, and Ryan J. Vander Wielen document the dramatic changes in intercameral resolution that have occurred over recent decades, and examine the various considerations made by the chambers when determining the manner in which the House and Senate pursue conciliation. Politics Over Process demonstrates that partisan competition, increasing party polarization, and institutional reforms have encouraged the majority party to more creatively restructure post-passage processes, often avoiding the traditional standing committee and conference processes altogether.

The party whips are essential components of the U.S. legislative system, responsible for marshalling party votes and keeping House and Senate party members in line. In The Whips, C. Lawrence Evans offers a comprehensive exploration of coalition building and legislative strategy in the U.S. House and Senate, ranging from the relatively bipartisan, committee-dominated chambers of the 1950s to the highly polarized congresses of the 2000s. In addition to roll call votes and personal interviews with lawmakers and staff, Evans examines the personal papers of dozens of former leaders of the House and Senate, especially former whips. These records allowed Evans to create a database of nearly 1,500 internal leadership polls on hundreds of significant bills across five decades of recent congressional history.The result is a rich and sweeping understanding of congressional party leaders at work. Since the whips provide valuable political intelligence, they are essential to understanding how coalitions are forged and deals are made on Capitol Hill.

In recent Congresses, roughly half of the members of the U.S. House of Representatives served in whip organizations and on party committees. According to Scott R. Meinke, rising electoral competition and polarization over the past 40 years have altered the nature of party participation. In the 1970s and 1980s, the participation of a wide range of members was crucial to building consensus. Since then, organizations responsible for coordination in the party have become dominated by those who follow the party line. At the same time, key leaders in the House use participatory organizations less as forums for internal deliberations over policy and strategy than as channels for exchanging information with supporters outside Congress, and broadcasting sharply partisan campaign messages to the public.

David Mayhew’s 1974 thesis on the “electoral connection” and its impact on legislative behavior is the theoretical foundation for research on the modern U.S. Congress. Mayhew contends that once in office, legislators pursue the actions that put them in the best position for reelection. Carson and Sievert examine how electoral incentives shaped legislative behavior throughout the nineteenth century by looking at patterns of turnover in Congress; the renomination of candidates; the roles of parties in recruiting candidates and their broader effects on candidate competition; and, finally by examining legislators’ accountability. The results have wide-ranging implications for the evolution of Congress and the development of legislative institutions over time.

Gendered Vulnerability examines the factors that make women politicians more electorally vulnerable than their male counterparts. These factors combine to convince women that they must work harder to win elections—a phenomenon that Jeffrey Lazarus and Amy Steigerwalt term “gendered vulnerability.” Since women feel constant pressure to make sure they can win reelection, they devote more of their time and energy to winning their constituents’ favor. Lazarus and Steigerwalt examine different facets of legislative behavior, finding that female members do a better job of representing their constituents than male members.

For three years while serving as a senior adviser to Rep. Henry A. Waxman (D-CA), chairman of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce—one of the most powerful committees in Congress—Bruce C. Wolpe kept a diary, a senior staffer’s look at how committees develop and promote legislation. With its insider’s view of the rough-and-tumble politics of cap-and-trade, healthcare reform, tobacco, oversight, and the debt ceiling agreement, The Committee uniquely melds the art of politics and policymaking with the theory and literature of political science. The authors engage with the important questions that political science asks about committee power, partisanship, and the strategies used to build winning policy coalitions both in the Committee and on the floor of the House. In this new edition, the authors revisit the relationship between the executive and Congress in the wake of the sweeping changes wrought by the Trump administration, as well as thoughts about how that relationship will change again as President Biden faces a 117th Congress that is strikingly similar to Obama’s 111th. The insider politics and strategies about moving legislation in Congress, from internal and external coalition building to a chairman’s role in framing policy narratives, will captivate both novice and die-hard readers of politics.

Campaign contributions are widely viewed as a corrupting influence but most scholarly research concludes that they have marginal impact on legislative behavior. Lynda W. Powell shows that contributions have considerable influence in some state legislatures but very little in others. Using a national survey of legislators, she develops an innovative measure of influence and delineates the factors that explain this great variation across the 99 U.S. state legislative chambers.Powell identifies the personal, institutional, and political factors that determine how much time a legislator devotes to personal fundraising and fundraising for the caucus. She shows that the extent of donors' legislative influence varies in ways corresponding to the same variations in the factors that determine fundraising time. She also confirms a link between fundraising and lobbying with evidence supporting the theory that contributors gain access to legislators based on donations, Powell's findings have important implications for the debate over the role of money in the legislative process.

This study of the influence minority parties wield is both a major work of political science scholarship and a timely examination of an issue with real consequences for the functioning of democratic legislatures and the creation of legislation.Challenging conventional assumptions that the majority party dominates the legislature, Jennifer Hayes Clark investigates precisely the ways in which—and under what conditions—members of the minority party successfully pursue their interests. For this study, Clark collects fine-grained data from both the U.S. Congress and state legislatures to get a close look at three key points in the legislative process: committee assignments, bill cosponsorship, and roll-call votes. She finds that minority party members are not systematically excluded throughout the policymaking process. Indeed, their capacity to shape legislative decision-making is enhanced when party polarization is low, when institutional prerogatives are broadly dispersed rather than centralized, and when staff resources are limited. Under these conditions, bipartisanship bill cosponsorship and voting coalitions are also more prevalent.With the sharp increase of partisan polarization in state legislatures and in Congress, it is essential to understand how and when a minority party can effectively represent constituents.

For three years while serving as a senior adviser to Rep. Henry A. Waxman (D-CA), chairman of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce—one of the most powerful committees in Congress—Bruce C. Wolpe kept a diary, a senior staffer’s look at how committees develop and promote legislation. With its insider’s view of the rough-and-tumble politics of cap-and-trade, healthcare reform, tobacco, oversight, and the debt ceiling agreement, The Committee uniquely melds the art of politics and policymaking with the theory and literature of political science. The authors engage with the important questions that political science asks about committee power, partisanship, and the strategies used to build winning policy coalitions both in the Committee and on the floor of the House. The insider politics and strategies about moving legislation in Congress, from internal and external coalition building to a chairman’s role in framing policy narratives, will captivate both novice and die-hard readers of politics.

Most everyone, voters, political scientists, even lawmakers, think Congress is dysfunctional. Instead of solving problems, Democrats and Republicans spend their time playing politics. These days Capitol Hill seems more a place to bicker, not to pass laws. The reality is more complicated. Yes, sometimes Congress is broken. But sometimes it is productive. What explains this variation? Why do Democrats and Republicans choose to legislate or score political points? And why do some issues become so politicized they devolve into partisan warfare, while others remain safe for compromise?Losing to Win answers these questions through a novel theory of agenda-setting. Unlike other research that studies bills that become law, Jeremy Gelman begins from the opposite perspective. He studies why majority parties knowingly take up dead-on-arrival (DOA) bills, the ideas everyone knows are going to lose. In doing so, he argues that congressional parties’ decisions to play politics instead of compromising, and the topics on which they choose to bicker, are strategic and predictable. Gelman finds that legislative dysfunction arises from a mutually beneficial relationship between a majority party in Congress, which is trying to win unified government, and its allied interest groups, which are trying to enact their policies. He also challenges the conventional wisdom that DOA legislation is political theater. By tracking bills over time, Gelman shows that some former dead-on-arrival ideas eventually become law. In this way, ideas viewed as too extreme or partisan today can produce long-lasting future policy changes.Through his analysis, Gelman provides an original explanation for why both parties pursue the partisan bickering that voters find so frustrating. He moves beyond conventional arguments that our discordant politics are merely the result of political polarization. Instead, he closely examines the specific circumstances that give rise to legislative dysfunction. The result is a fresh, straightforward perspective on the question we have all asked at some point, “Why can’t Democrats and Republicans stop fighting and just get something done?”

Because the constitutional separation of powers often leads to delay or obstruction rather than coordinated policymaking, U.S. presidents are increasingly acting unilaterally to move policy. With the issuance of executive orders, signing statements, and policy memoranda, unilateralism has become a defining feature of the American presidency. Can Congress effectively use checks and balances to counter presidential unilateralism? Strategic Responsiveness takes a theoretically developed and empirically oriented approach— situated within legal and historical contexts—to explore the system of separated powers. The authors find that Congress is not as weak as many perceive it to be and show how members of Congress often anticipate individualized policy loss and choose to respond. These policy struggles shape the constitutional order as surely as broad, statutory constraints might. While the aggrandizement of the presidency and the usurpation of congressional control are not countered, ordinary policy losses are. For members and senators, presidential overreach is fine as long as the policy wins continue, but policy losses may motivate members to reassert congressional prerogatives in policymaking through increased oversight. Strategic Responsiveness reveals how profoundly important policy-level disputes are in the politics of maintaining a particular constitutional order.

Since the 1920s, the roll call voting record has influenced American politics. Using recorded votes, candidates attack electoral opponents, interest groups attempt to drum up financial or electoral support for their preferred candidates, scholars test theories of legislative behavior, and the media characterizes the ideological leanings of Congress. Despite this, there has not been a systematic attempt to document the changing usage of the roll call record. Michael S. Lynch and Anthony J. Madonna have undertaken a massive, multiyear data collection effort that culminated in four new datasets covering from 1905 to the contemporary period. Using data on approximately 120,000 amendments, 60,000 roll call votes, 2,000 important enactments, and 8,000 special rules from 1905 to 2015, the authors demonstrate how the roll call recording system has evolved. Consistent with the Founders’ skepticism of the impact of recorded voting in Congress, Broken Record shows that the contemporary roll call voting record includes far more meaningless position-taking and procedural roll call votes than it did during earlier congresses. The book argues that the removal of practical barriers to roll calls, internal changes to legislative procedures, and increased electoral competitiveness have led to more roll call votes on proposals sponsored by more extreme members. In addition to policy making being more difficult, increased roll call voting has played a substantial role in artificially increasing observed levels of polarization. This book argues that solving polarization requires a more nuanced set of solutions than simply replacing legislators; it will require increased public education about how Congress operates and specific procedural reforms.

After a period of relative calm in congressional elections prior to 2006, America has experienced a series of highly competitive, volatile national elections. Since then, at least one of the US House, US Senate, and presidency has flipped party control—often with a large House or Senate seat swing—with the exception of the 2012 election. In Waves of Discontent, Jacob F. H. Smith argues that a pervasive feeling of displeasure in the American public has caused this increase in electoral volatility. Conducting statistical analyses of a wide array of surveys, Smith found that these feelings of displeasure translate to lower turnout among voters from the president’s party and a higher percentage of independents voting for the other party. Subsequently, he conducted a content analysis of New York Times articles to look at the connection between unrest in American society and seat swings in congressional elections, even before the existence of polling. Examining the consequences of volatility in congressional elections reveals that political amateurs are more likely to win in wave years than in normal years. Based on this data, Smith presents a new theory about the policy process—the policy doom loop—in which frustration among voters at both the inability of Congress to pass policy and anger at policies that actually do pass results in even more churn in congressional elections. Waves of Discontent offers some suggestions to promote constructive policymaking efforts in Washington to reduce frustration in the electorate.

Among the most common features of the modern US Congress is its partisanship, a deeply felt political divide that sometimes seems to be each side’s primary motivator. In Congress we have seen heated disagreements, a tendency to blame the opposing party for any bad outcome, and attempts to undermine the other side’s successes. For those watching Congress, it is easy to assume everyone on Capitol Hill participates equally in framing issues as pitting Democrats versus Republicans. Yet in Posting for Power, Jeremy Gelman and Steven Wilson show that partisanship varies a great deal among legislators: it is motivated by reelection and promotion-seeking considerations, and it comes with no substantial legislative or electoral consequences. In the US Congress, lawmakers regularly choose to bicker for political gain, whether or not they disagree on issues. By classifying millions of social media posts as partisan or not, Gelman and Wilson quantify a legislator’s partisan intensity through the time and effort they spend supporting their party and bickering with the opposition. The authors argue that the partisan personas politicians create are both a home style, to help them win reelection, and hill style, to help them become politically influential by showing off as good team players. Bringing together a wide range of data on leadership races, elections, voting records, cosponsorship patterns, and lawmaking outcomes, they demonstrate the nearly consequence-free way that legislators strategically deploy partisanship to impress their copartisans and voters. Gelman and Wilson closely examine what motivates members to differ so much in developing this part of their public personas and offer clear recommendations for how to turn down the partisan heat on Capitol Hill.

Winning presidential elections isn’t just about the ballot box; it is shaped by the rules of the “apportionment game.” Shifting Seats uncovers the gritty history of how politicians fought for greater legislative influence and how those decisions determined control of Congress—and sometimes the presidency. Moving beyond abstract debates, Keith L. Dougherty takes readers inside high-stakes bargaining from the Founding era, the Antebellum period, and post–Civil War struggles over representation. Within these periods, Dougherty models how legislators manipulated the building blocks of apportionment—including metrics, ratios, House sizes, and rounding methods—to maximize their state’s proportion of seats. He explains how a 1920s stalemate fixed the House’s size at 435 members and created the automatic system in use today. Bridging the gap between political history and formal theory, the book identifies the long-term mechanisms that stabilize or disrupt distributions of power. Further, it shows how different apportionment methods could have flipped some presidential elections. By connecting these clashes to our current polarized climate, Shifting Seats explains why some apportionment rules endure while others fail, revealing the hidden mechanics that continue to dictate the balance of power in Washington today.

This study of the influence minority parties wield is both a major work of political science scholarship and a timely examination of an issue with real consequences for the functioning of democratic legislatures and the creation of legislation.Challenging conventional assumptions that the majority party dominates the legislature, Jennifer Hayes Clark investigates precisely the ways in which—and under what conditions—members of the minority party successfully pursue their interests. For this study, Clark collects fine-grained data from both the U.S. Congress and state legislatures to get a close look at three key points in the legislative process: committee assignments, bill cosponsorship, and roll-call votes. She finds that minority party members are not systematically excluded throughout the policymaking process. Indeed, their capacity to shape legislative decision-making is enhanced when party polarization is low, when institutional prerogatives are broadly dispersed rather than centralized, and when staff resources are limited. Under these conditions, bipartisanship bill cosponsorship and voting coalitions are also more prevalent.With the sharp increase of partisan polarization in state legislatures and in Congress, it is essential to understand how and when a minority party can effectively represent constituents.

Most everyone, voters, political scientists, even lawmakers, think Congress is dysfunctional. Instead of solving problems, Democrats and Republicans spend their time playing politics. These days Capitol Hill seems more a place to bicker, not to pass laws. The reality is more complicated. Yes, sometimes Congress is broken. But sometimes it is productive. What explains this variation? Why do Democrats and Republicans choose to legislate or score political points? And why do some issues become so politicized they devolve into partisan warfare, while others remain safe for compromise?Losing to Win answers these questions through a novel theory of agenda-setting. Unlike other research that studies bills that become law, Jeremy Gelman begins from the opposite perspective. He studies why majority parties knowingly take up dead-on-arrival (DOA) bills, the ideas everyone knows are going to lose. In doing so, he argues that congressional parties’ decisions to play politics instead of compromising, and the topics on which they choose to bicker, are strategic and predictable. Gelman finds that legislative dysfunction arises from a mutually beneficial relationship between a majority party in Congress, which is trying to win unified government, and its allied interest groups, which are trying to enact their policies. He also challenges the conventional wisdom that DOA legislation is political theater. By tracking bills over time, Gelman shows that some former dead-on-arrival ideas eventually become law. In this way, ideas viewed as too extreme or partisan today can produce long-lasting future policy changes.Through his analysis, Gelman provides an original explanation for why both parties pursue the partisan bickering that voters find so frustrating. He moves beyond conventional arguments that our discordant politics are merely the result of political polarization. Instead, he closely examines the specific circumstances that give rise to legislative dysfunction. The result is a fresh, straightforward perspective on the question we have all asked at some point, “Why can’t Democrats and Republicans stop fighting and just get something done?”

This book examines the role of minority party status on politicians’ engagement in electoral politics. Jacob Smith argues that politicians are more likely to be engaged in electoral politics when they expect their party to be in the majority in Congress after the next election and less likely when they anticipate their party will be in the minority. This effect is particularly likely to hold true in recent decades where parties disagree on a substantial number of issues. Politicians whose party will be in the majority have a clear incentive to engage in electoral politics because their preferred policies have a credible chance of passing if they are in the majority. In contrast, it is generally difficult for minority party lawmakers to get a hearing on—much less advance—their preferred policies, particularly when institutional rules inside Congress favor the majority party. Instead, minority party lawmakers spend most of their time fighting losing battles against policy proposals from the majority party. Minority Party Misery examines the consequences of the powerlessness that politicians feel from continually losing battles to the majority party in Congress. Its findings have important consequences for democratic governance, as highly qualified minority party politicians may choose to leave office due to their dismal circumstances rather than continue to serve until their party eventually reenters the majority.

Because the constitutional separation of powers often leads to delay or obstruction rather than coordinated policymaking, U.S. presidents are increasingly acting unilaterally to move policy. With the issuance of executive orders, signing statements, and policy memoranda, unilateralism has become a defining feature of the American presidency. Can Congress effectively use checks and balances to counter presidential unilateralism? Strategic Responsiveness takes a theoretically developed and empirically oriented approach— situated within legal and historical contexts—to explore the system of separated powers. The authors find that Congress is not as weak as many perceive it to be and show how members of Congress often anticipate individualized policy loss and choose to respond. These policy struggles shape the constitutional order as surely as broad, statutory constraints might. While the aggrandizement of the presidency and the usurpation of congressional control are not countered, ordinary policy losses are. For members and senators, presidential overreach is fine as long as the policy wins continue, but policy losses may motivate members to reassert congressional prerogatives in policymaking through increased oversight. Strategic Responsiveness reveals how profoundly important policy-level disputes are in the politics of maintaining a particular constitutional order.

Since the 1920s, the roll call voting record has influenced American politics. Using recorded votes, candidates attack electoral opponents, interest groups attempt to drum up financial or electoral support for their preferred candidates, scholars test theories of legislative behavior, and the media characterizes the ideological leanings of Congress. Despite this, there has not been a systematic attempt to document the changing usage of the roll call record. Michael S. Lynch and Anthony J. Madonna have undertaken a massive, multiyear data collection effort that culminated in four new datasets covering from 1905 to the contemporary period. Using data on approximately 120,000 amendments, 60,000 roll call votes, 2,000 important enactments, and 8,000 special rules from 1905 to 2015, the authors demonstrate how the roll call recording system has evolved. Consistent with the Founders’ skepticism of the impact of recorded voting in Congress, Broken Record shows that the contemporary roll call voting record includes far more meaningless position-taking and procedural roll call votes than it did during earlier congresses. The book argues that the removal of practical barriers to roll calls, internal changes to legislative procedures, and increased electoral competitiveness have led to more roll call votes on proposals sponsored by more extreme members. In addition to policy making being more difficult, increased roll call voting has played a substantial role in artificially increasing observed levels of polarization. This book argues that solving polarization requires a more nuanced set of solutions than simply replacing legislators; it will require increased public education about how Congress operates and specific procedural reforms.

After a period of relative calm in congressional elections prior to 2006, America has experienced a series of highly competitive, volatile national elections. Since then, at least one of the US House, US Senate, and presidency has flipped party control—often with a large House or Senate seat swing—with the exception of the 2012 election. In Waves of Discontent, Jacob F. H. Smith argues that a pervasive feeling of displeasure in the American public has caused this increase in electoral volatility. Conducting statistical analyses of a wide array of surveys, Smith found that these feelings of displeasure translate to lower turnout among voters from the president’s party and a higher percentage of independents voting for the other party. Subsequently, he conducted a content analysis of New York Times articles to look at the connection between unrest in American society and seat swings in congressional elections, even before the existence of polling. Examining the consequences of volatility in congressional elections reveals that political amateurs are more likely to win in wave years than in normal years. Based on this data, Smith presents a new theory about the policy process—the policy doom loop—in which frustration among voters at both the inability of Congress to pass policy and anger at policies that actually do pass results in even more churn in congressional elections. Waves of Discontent offers some suggestions to promote constructive policymaking efforts in Washington to reduce frustration in the electorate.

Among the most common features of the modern US Congress is its partisanship, a deeply felt political divide that sometimes seems to be each side’s primary motivator. In Congress we have seen heated disagreements, a tendency to blame the opposing party for any bad outcome, and attempts to undermine the other side’s successes. For those watching Congress, it is easy to assume everyone on Capitol Hill participates equally in framing issues as pitting Democrats versus Republicans. Yet in Posting for Power, Jeremy Gelman and Steven Wilson show that partisanship varies a great deal among legislators: it is motivated by reelection and promotion-seeking considerations, and it comes with no substantial legislative or electoral consequences. In the US Congress, lawmakers regularly choose to bicker for political gain, whether or not they disagree on issues. By classifying millions of social media posts as partisan or not, Gelman and Wilson quantify a legislator’s partisan intensity through the time and effort they spend supporting their party and bickering with the opposition. The authors argue that the partisan personas politicians create are both a home style, to help them win reelection, and hill style, to help them become politically influential by showing off as good team players. Bringing together a wide range of data on leadership races, elections, voting records, cosponsorship patterns, and lawmaking outcomes, they demonstrate the nearly consequence-free way that legislators strategically deploy partisanship to impress their copartisans and voters. Gelman and Wilson closely examine what motivates members to differ so much in developing this part of their public personas and offer clear recommendations for how to turn down the partisan heat on Capitol Hill.

Winning presidential elections isn’t just about the ballot box; it is shaped by the rules of the “apportionment game.” Shifting Seats uncovers the gritty history of how politicians fought for greater legislative influence and how those decisions determined control of Congress—and sometimes the presidency. Moving beyond abstract debates, Keith L. Dougherty takes readers inside high-stakes bargaining from the Founding era, the Antebellum period, and post–Civil War struggles over representation. Within these periods, Dougherty models how legislators manipulated the building blocks of apportionment—including metrics, ratios, House sizes, and rounding methods—to maximize their state’s proportion of seats. He explains how a 1920s stalemate fixed the House’s size at 435 members and created the automatic system in use today. Bridging the gap between political history and formal theory, the book identifies the long-term mechanisms that stabilize or disrupt distributions of power. Further, it shows how different apportionment methods could have flipped some presidential elections. By connecting these clashes to our current polarized climate, Shifting Seats explains why some apportionment rules endure while others fail, revealing the hidden mechanics that continue to dictate the balance of power in Washington today.

Representation is integral to the study of legislatures, yet virtually no attention has been given to how representative assemblies developed and what that process might tell us about how the relationship between the representative and the represented evolved. The Rise of the Representative corrects that omission by tracing the development of representative assemblies in colonial America and revealing they were a practical response to governing problems, rather than an imported model or an attempt to translate abstract philosophy into a concrete reality. Peverill Squire shows there were initially competing notions of representation, but over time the pull of the political system moved lawmakers toward behaving as delegates, even in places where they were originally intended to operate as trustees. By looking at the rules governing who could vote and who could serve, how representatives were apportioned within each colony, how candidates and voters behaved in elections, how expectations regarding their relationship evolved, and how lawmakers actually behaved, Squire demonstrates that the American political system that emerged following independence was strongly rooted in colonial-era developments.