Nijhoff International Philosophy Series – serie

Roman Ingarden's very extensive philosophical work in metaphysics, ontology, epistemology, and aesthetics con­ tinues to attract increasing attention both in Poland and in North America. Further work left uncompleted at his death is appearing. Major bibliographies of his work as well as of studies about his work are now in print. Ingar­ den's scattered articles on various questions in philosophy are being collected. And conferences devoted to his work are now held regularly. These diverse activities might suggest a similar diver­ sity in Ingarden's philosophical legacy. But such a sugges­ tion would be misleading. For interest in Ingarden's work has continued to centre on the one area which is arguably at the core of his achievement, namely the complex prob­ lems of aesthetics. In this field Ingarden seemed to pull together his various interests in ontology and epistemology especially. Here he brought those interests to focus on a set of issues that would occupy him creatively throughout the vicissitudes of his long and difficult scholarly life. More­ over, aesthetics is also the field where Ingarden perhaps most succeeded in orchestrating the many themes he owed to his phenomenological training while finally transposing the central issues into something original, something dis­ tinctively his own that philosophers can no longer identify as merely phenomenological. Ingarden's aesthetics not surprisingly has captured the interest today of many scholars in different fields.

This book is dedicated to the memory of Professor Henryk Mehlberg, primarily because I want to recall his name to readers in the West; for, although Professor Mehlberg was the foremost Polish philosopher in the field of philosophy of time-in that version which is related to twentieth­ century physics-his fundamental work concerning time was published in English 43 years after its original publication (cf. Mehlberg, 1980). I am deeply indebted to Henryk Mehlberg. For two years after the Second World War, I was his student at Wroclaw University (where he lectured on philosophy and mathematical logic). At that time, I developed, under his influence, a long-life fascination with the philosophy of time, and was taught by him how to approach these problems effectively. My research in this field has resulted in three books. The first, Prop­ erties of Time, published (in Polish) in 1970, concerns the topological properties and properties of symmetry (homogeneity and anisotropy) of time. The second, The Nature of Time, published (in Polish) in 1975, looks at possible definitions of time within both theories of relativity. The present book is the third, originally published (in Polish) in 1979; it concerns philosophical problems of past, present, and future and is here presented in English to reach a wider audience.

What is aesthetic value? A property in an object? An experience of a perceiving person? An ideal object existing in a mysterious sphere, inaccessible to normal cognition? Does it appear in one form only, or in many forms, perhaps infinitely many? Is it something constant, immutable, or rather something susceptible to change, depending on the individual, the cultural milieu, or the epoch? Is a rational defence of aesthetic value judgements possible, or is any discussion of this topic meaningless? The above questions arise out of the most complicated philosophic problems. Volumes have been written on each of them. The discussions which continue over the centuries, the plurality of views and suggested solutions, indicate that all issues are controversial and contestable. Each view can adduce some arguments supporting it; each has some weaknesses. Another source of difficulty is the vagueness and ambiguity of the language in which the problems are discussed. This makes it hard to understand the ideas of particular thinkers and sometimes makes it impossible to decide whether different formulations express the actual divergence of views or only the verbal preferences of their authors. Let us add that this imperfection does not simply spring from inaccuracy on the part of scholars, but also results from the complexity of the problems themselves. The matter is further complicated by important factors of a social character.

Tadeusz Kotarbinski is one of towering figures in contemporary Polish philosophy. He was a great thinker, a great teacher, a great organizer of philosophical and scientific life (he was, among others, the rector of the Uni versi ty of t6dz, the president of the Polish Academy of Sciences, and the president of the International Institute of Philosophy), and, last but not least, a great moral authority. He died at the age of 96 on October 3, 1981. Kotarbinski was active in almost all branches of philosophy. He made many significant contributions to logic, semantics, ontology, epistemology, history of philosophy, and ethics. He created a new field, namely praxiology. Thus, using an ancient distinction, he contributed to theoretical as well as practical philoso~hy. Kotarbinski regarded praxiology as his major philosophical "child". Doubtless, praxiology belongs to practical philosophy. This collection, howewer, is mainly devoted to Kotarbinski' s theoretical philosophy. Reism - Kotarbinski' s fundamental idea of ontology and semantics - is the central topic of most papers included here; even Pszczolowski' s essay on praxiology considers its ontological basis. ,Only two papers, namely that of Zarnecka-Bialy and that of Wolenski, are not linked with reism. However, both fall under the general label "Kotarbinski: logic, semantics and ontology". The collection partly consists of earlier published papers.

This book views the history of philosophy and logic from 1837 to 1939 from the perspective of the cradle of modern exact philosophy - Central Europe. In a series of case studies, it illuminates the developments in this region, most notably in Austria and Poland, examining thinkers such as Bolzano, Brentano, Meinong, Husserl, Twardowski, Lesniewski, and Tarski, as well as the logicians like Frege and Russell to whom they bore a close resemblance. The book challenges established views about the history of philosophy and logic in Europe, and shows the vitality of the Central European tradition.

Philosophy flourished in Australia after the war. There was spectacular growth in both the number of departments and the number of philosophers. On top of this philosophy spread beyond the philosophy departments. Serious studies, and interest in philosophy is now common in faculties as diverse as law, science and education. Neither is this development merely quantitative, the Australian researcher has come of age and contributes widely to international debates. At least one movement originated in Australia. This makes the study of philosophy in Australia timely, evidenced by the number of articles concerned with this area that begin to appear in international journals. In Australia itself there is growing interest in the history of the country's philosophical development. There are discussions in conferences and meetings: the matter is now the subject of courses.

This text aims to provide an extensive and detailed philosophic analysis of the phenomenon of the comic. The author examines existing theories of the comic, from Aristotle to date, and classifies them, as well as advancing his own definition of the comic as a broadly understood deviation from the norm, which takes into account not only the deviation from an objectively existing norm, but the subjective sense of the normal as well. The author also provides a taxonomy of previous analyses of this subject, and discusses the major techniques of evoking the comic. The final part of the book deals with the social aspects of the comic and discusses the social role of humour mockery, satire and irony. He elaborates on the educational, integrating, punitive, and therapeutic aspects of various forms of comic activities. This text is based on material drawn from a range of sources. The author does not limit the scope of his analysis to the philosophical and the aesthetic aspects of the comic, but takes into account its extra-aesthetic occurences and applications as presented by psychologists, cultural anthropologists, sociologists, theoreticians and historians of literature, film and music.This study should be of interest to students of literary criticism, theatre and film studies, educational theory, psychology and theory of augmentation, as well as to aestheticians and philosophers of art.

This book presents the very latest research on the medieval use of sophisms in logical and grammatical investigation by twenty-three of the leading experts in Europe and beyond. Important insights into the genre of sophismatic treatises have been gained only very recently, and the organisation of the European Symposium on this topic in 1990 led to a concentration of research and evaluation of insights. The papers are divided into three groups: one covers textual study and analysis of the role of sophisms in the medieval curriculum; another deals with grammatical sophisms; and the third covers particular logical sophisms, from 'Man is the worthiest of creatures' and problems in the theory of reference to the Liar paradox and the work of William of Ockham.

Issues surrounding the status and nature of 'nonexistent objects' constitute one of philosophy's oldest and densest thickets. In this book Perszyk takes his readers surefootedly through this thicket, informed both historically and at the level of contemporary discussion of relevant themes. His main aim is to develop a 'bundle' or 'set of properties' interpretation of Meinong's theory of nonexistent objects (as opposed to a set of properties neo-Meinongian metaphysics), and to defend this nonstandard interpretation against competing views in both the philosophical and scholarly literature on Meinong. The Meinong who emerges is neither the hero nor the villain his friends and foes have commonly led us to believe. This clearly written book is a valuable addition both to the literature on Meinong and to contemporary metaphysics of modality. It is written for students and professionals interested in these, and related, areas.

The general view of Russell's work amongst philosophers has been that repeat­ edly, during his long and distinguished career, crucial changes of mind on fun­ damental points were significant enough to cause him to successively adopt a diversity of radically new philosophical positions. Thus Russell is seen to have embraced and then abandoned, amongst others, neo-Hegelianism, Platonic re­ alism, phenomenalism and logical atomism, before settling finally on a form of neutral monism that philosophers have generally found to be incredible. This view of Russell is captured in C. D. Broad's famous remark that "Mr. Russell pro­ duces a different system of philosophy every few years . . . " (Muirhead, 1924: 79). Reflecting this picture of Russell continually changing his position, books and papers on Russell's philosophy have typically belonged to one of two kinds. Either they have concentrated on particular periods of his thought that are taken to be especially significant, or, accepting the view of his successive conversion to dis­ tinctly different philosophical positions, they have provided some account of each of these supposedly disconnected periods of his thought. While much good work has been done on Russell's philosophy, this framework has had its limitations, the main one being that it conceals the basic continuity behind his thought.

This book argues that we would be very foolish to abandon the sense of justice that lies at the core of the social democratic approach to political life. The book challenges the view that the liberal tradition is best characterized by its embrace of key values, such as freedom, autonomy, self-realization, and with the importance accorded to the virtue of tolerance. A competing social democractic/Rawlsian understanding of liberalism is presented and compared with major rival ideological orientations on both the left and the right of the political spectrum. By reviewing a variety of opinions by writers who are critical of liberalism, as well as debates within the tradition itself, the author shows that: (a) writers to the left of liberalism offer no feasible alternative that offers guidance in dealing with the problems we must face in modern societies; (b) writers to the right on the political spectrum often postulate circumstances in which justice towards individuals need no longer be regarded as an issue.The author shows that both these orientations will lead to a crisis of legitimacy in modern circumstances and this may tempt communities to abandon democracy in order to secure order. This book may be used in most courses on political philosophy and ideology.

This text provides a picture of both the life and thought of Franz Brentano and his main pupils. The volume is divided into three sections, presenting: a detailed reconstruction of Brentano's life and contributions to philosophy; separate studies of Brentano's most important students (von Ehrenfels, Husserl, Marty, Meinong, Stumpf, and Twardowski); separate studies of the main philosophical problems or areas of Brentano's writings.

Formal ontology combines two ideas, one originating with Husserl, the other with Frege: that of ontology of the formal aspects of all objects, irrespective of their particular nature, and ontology pursued by employing the tools of modern formal disciplines, notably logic and semantics. These two traditions have converged. This volume aims to illustrate that through the application of formal methods the ancient discipline of ontology may be put on a firm methodological basis. The essays illuminate the nature of ontology and its relation to other areas, in language, logic and everyday life, but also demonstrate that common issues from the analytical and phenomenological traditions may be discussed without ideological barriers.

In the period between the two World Wars, Stanislaw Lesniewski, a prominent Polish logician, created his system of the foundations of mathematics, a system comprising three deductive theories: protothetic, ontology, and mereology. Lesniewski initiated his research programme in the foundations of mathematics in 1914 with his studies on a general theory of sets (to be later renamed "mereology"). The construction of ontology in the period between 1919 and 1921 marked the next step in the formation of Lesniewski's system. In order to combine mereology and ontology into a logically rigorous system, he constructed protothetic - the system of "first principles". Lesniewski's system of the foundations of mathematics was the "most thorough, original, and philosophically significant attempt to provide a logically secure foundation for the whole of mathematics" (Z. Jordan). This volume is a collection of the major contributions to protothetic, and includes the protothetic bibliography.

Dieser Buchtitel ist Teil des Digitalisierungsprojekts Springer Book Archives mit Publikationen, die seit den Anfängen des Verlags von 1842 erschienen sind. Der Verlag stellt mit diesem Archiv Quellen für die historische wie auch die disziplingeschichtliche Forschung zur Verfügung, die jeweils im historischen Kontext betrachtet werden müssen. Dieser Titel erschien in der Zeit vor 1945 und wird daher in seiner zeittypischen politisch-ideologischen Ausrichtung vom Verlag nicht beworben.

This book contains the definitive statement of Franz Brentano's views on meta­ physics. It is made up of essays which were dictated by Brentano during the last ten years of his life, between 1907 and 1917. These dictations were assembled and edited by Alfred Kastil and first published by the Felix Meiner Verlag in 1933 under the title Kategorienlehre. Kastil added copious notes to Brentano's text. These notes have been included, with some slight omissions, in the present edition; the bibliographical references have been brought up to date. Brentano's approach to philosophy is unfamiliar to many contemporay readers. I shall discuss below certain fundamental points which such readers are likely to find the most difficult. I believe that once these points are properly understood, then what Brentano has to say will be seen to be of first importance to philosophy. THE PRIMACY OF THE INTENTIONAL To understand Brentano's theory of being, one must realize that he appeals to what he calls inner perception for his paradigmatic uses of the word "is". For inner perception, according to Brentano, is the source of our knowledge of the nature of being, just as it is the source of our knowledge of the nature of truth and of the nature of good and evil. And what can be said about the being of things that are not apprehended in inner perception can be understood only by analogy with what we are able to say about ourselves as thinking subjects.

In its attempt to come to grips with the nature of the human mind idealism employs such terms as "pure self," "transcendental apperception," "pure con­ sciousness" and so on. What do these terms mean? What do they refer to? Pro­ visionally, at least, the following answer could be satisfying: such and similar expressions are purported to capture a very special quality of human mind, a quality due to which man is not simply a part of nature, but a being capable of knowing and acting according to principles governing the spiritual realm. In the first chapter of the present study the author attempts to bring the idea of "pure Ego" down to earth. By analyzing Kant's concept of pure appercep­ tion - the ancestor of all similar notions in the history of modern and contem­ porary idealism - the author concludes that certain functions and capacities attributed to pure apperception by Kant himself imply the rejection of the idealistic framework and the necessity to "naturalize" the idea of pure self. In other words - and Kant's claims to the contrary notwithstanding - pure ap­ perception cannot be conceived as superimposed upon man viewed as a part of nature, as a feeling and a sensing being. The referent, as it were, of the expres­ sion "pure self' turns out to be something much more familiar to us - a human organism, with all its needs, drives and dispositions.

or their surfaces can be translated without remainder into descriptions of ob­ jects that are neither material objects or surfaces of any material object. All of these claims have historically conspired to discredit Direct Realism. But Direct Realism can accommodate all of the premises of the three argu­ ments without admitting any of their conclusions. Inferential perceptual knowl­ edge assumes a kind of knowledge that is not inferential. Without this assump­ tion, we are given a vicious infinite regress. But this is compatible with the fact that any case of non-inferential knowledge has a material objeCt as its object. The fact ofinfallible perceptual awareness fails to discredit DireCt Realism for similar reasons. Infallibility is a characteristic, not of the objects which we perceive, but rather of the acts by which we perceive them. And this permits an object of such awareness to be either material or something other than material. It does not fol­ low from the fact of infallibility that the objects of awareness must be other than material objects. And, finally, the fact of translatability shows at most that we either can or must simultaneously perceive material objects and entities which are not material objects. It does not show that the perception of the one is the same as the perception of the other. The entire argument rests, as we shall learn, on an illicit assimilation of the notions of sameness and equivalence.

The present book was written some twenty years ago but it has not lost its topicality, for it contains an important re-assessment of the relations of two main­ streams of contemporary philosophy - the Analytical and the Dialectic. Adherents and critics of these traditions tend to assurnethat they are diametrically opposed, that their roots, concerns and approaches contradict each other, and that no reconciliation is possible. In contradistinction Russell derives both traditions from the common root of the dissatisfaction with the arguments against speculative philosophy. These according to the author leave a lacuna - certain elementsof our Weltanschaaung have been removed, but they cannot be removed without replacement lest we have an incomplete world view, so incomplete in fact that it cannot be viable. According to Russell part of this vacuum is taken up by the analytical tradition but this tradition is not capable of taking up the remainder of it. That portion of the vacant space is however taken up by the dialectical tradi­ tion, which in turn cannot itself handle the whole of the problem. Thus the two reactions to the demise of speculative philosophy appear to be complementary in at least this sense. But the author goes further, for according to hirn the analytical arguments themselves clearly point to the emergence of dialectical problems, and the dialectical problems themselves need some such background to arise.

JOHN WISDOM AND THE BREADTH OF PHILOSOPHY hham Dhman 1. THE ESSAYS IN THIS VOLUME The essays following the two pieces by John Wisdom have all been written by philosophers who are former students or friends of Wisdom or who have a high regard for his work. Their contributions were all written with him in mind and to be discussed at a conference honouring his work. This conference was held in August 1983 at Trinity College, Cambridge, of which Wisdom has been a fellow since 1935. Wisdom is a master of discursive reasoning and one of his distinctive contributions in philosophy has been to examine its various forms and their interconnections, particularly the form it takes in philosophical inquiry and the way it advances our understanding there. His concern to bring out the links between all that is abstract in such reasoning and the concrete and particular is well known and represented in many of the essays in this volume. But Wisdom has also a deep appreciation of the kind of understanding that is advanced non-discursively. As he puts it in the first piece in this volume: However skilled a good critic 'I am sure that much of what makes "Hamlet" "Hamlet" will run between his fingers'. He has himself advanced our understanding on many questions in philosophy in this way, not simply by what he has said, but also by what he has suggested 'between the lines'.

Although Sir Karl Popper's contributions to a number of diverse areas of philosophy are widely appreciated, serious criticism of his work has tended to focus on his philosophy of the natural sciences. This volume contains twelve critical essays on Popper's contribution to what we have called the 'human sciences' , a category broad enough to include not only Popper's views on the methods of the social sciences but also his views on the relation of mind and body, Freud's psychology, and the status of cultural objects. Most of our contributors are philosophers whose own work stands outside the Popperian framework. We hope that this has resulted in a volume whose essays confront not merely the details of Popper's argu­ ments but also the very presuppositions of his thinking. With one exception, the essays appear here for the first time. The exception is L.J. Cohen's paper, which is a revised and considerably expanded ver­ sion of a paper first published in the British Journalfor the Philosophy of Science for June 1980. We would like to thank Loraine Hawkins and Jane Hogg for their editorial assistance and June O'Donnell for typing various manuscripts and all the correspondence which a volume of essays entails.

Broad gave a course of lectures on the subject, intended primarily for Part I of the Moral Sciences Tripos, every academic year from 1933 - 34 up to and in­ cluding 1952 - 53 (except that he did not lecture on Ethics in 1935 - 36).

Although Sir Karl Popper's contributions to a number of diverse areas of philosophy are widely appreciated, serious criticism of his work has tended to focus on his philosophy of the natural sciences. This volume contains twelve critical essays on Popper's contribution to what we have called the 'human sciences' , a category broad enough to include not only Popper's views on the methods of the social sciences but also his views on the relation of mind and body, Freud's psychology, and the status of cultural objects. Most of our contributors are philosophers whose own work stands outside the Popperian framework. We hope that this has resulted in a volume whose essays confront not merely the details of Popper's argu­ ments but also the very presuppositions of his thinking. With one exception, the essays appear here for the first time. The exception is L.J. Cohen's paper, which is a revised and considerably expanded ver­ sion of a paper first published in the British Journalfor the Philosophy of Science for June 1980. We would like to thank Loraine Hawkins and Jane Hogg for their editorial assistance and June O'Donnell for typing various manuscripts and all the correspondence which a volume of essays entails.