PSI Reports – serie

As the War in Iraq continues to rage, many in the White House, State Department, Department of Defense, and outside government are left to wonder if it was possible to foresee the difficulty the United States is currently having with Sunni nationalists and Islamic extremists. Recent American military experience offers significant insight into this question. With the fog of the Cold War finally lifting and clarity returning to the nature of conflict, the dominance of asymmetry in the military experience of the United States is all too evident.Lebanon (1982-1984), Somalia (1992-1994), and Afghanistan (2001-2004) offer recent and relevant insight into successes and failures of American attempts to fight adversaries utilizing asymmetric conflict to combat the United States when it intervened in these three states. The results illustrate the difficulty of engaging adversaries unwilling to wage a conventional war and the need for improved strategic and tactical doctrine.It is easy, Lowther writes, for Americans to forget the lessons of past conflicts as the politics of the present dominate…. His purpose here is to highlight some of history's recent lessons so that we may move forward with an awareness of what experience offers.

An unprecedented description of the critical energy situation throughout Asia, this book examines the energy resources, naval forces, and national strategies of the nations of that vast landmass, set against the priorities and resources of the United States. Energy security in Asia is crucial to the continued economic growth and hence the national security of the region's nations. Providing such security requires a combination of naval, political, and economic policies. Despite dramatic news coverage to the contrary, Cole's research reveals that the nations of the region-of which the United States must be counted-are in fact acting more together than apart in striving to ensure the security of scarce energy resources they all require.No issue in today's international environment is more important than energy security. Even the North Korean nuclear development program must be taken as a subset of this subject. As the United States, the United Kingdom, and other nations have done in past decades, the People's Republic of China is striving to establish proprietorship of energy resources throughout their lifecycle, from recovery from the ground to sale in the market place. This important book demonstrates the vacuity of that paradigm, illustrating the multilateral nature of energy security.

On September 30, 1965, six of Indonesia's highest ranking generals were killed in an effort by President Sukarno to crush an alleged coup. The events of that were part of a rapidly growing power struggle pro and anti-communist factions. The elimination of the generals, however, did little to increase and preserve Sukarno's power, though, and he was stripped of the presidency in 1967. Hunt's work is a unique and original examination of the events that culminated on that night in September, 1965. It is the first detailed account of the Indonesian Coup that reveals the previously unknown workings of the PKI's ultra-secret Special Bureau, a clandestine organization within the Communist Party that may be the prototype of other similar entities that flourished around the world in the mid-50's and 60s. No such expose of secret communist organizations committed to covert killings of the top military or political leaders of the country has ever been published. She establishes beyond any doubt that the PKI, under Chairman Aidit's direction, using the capabilities of a secret organization within the PKI that only Aidit and a handful of trusted high-level members of the Communist Party even knew about, and, most importantly, acting with President Sukarno's full knowledge and approval, planned and then-dramatically-failed to execute a bold plan to kill the top leadership of the Army and proclaim a new socialist state under President Sukarno's leadership with PKI Chairman Aidit as his proclaimed successor. At the time of the coup, government analysts as well as non-government scholars were of two minds. Some, like the group at Cornell University, were convinced that the PKI (Indonesian Communist Party) had not been involved, that the coup was the action mid-level army officers against the top leadership. That was the official line at the time. Others were convinced that the PKI alone had planned and executed the coup in its long-held desire to remove the pro-U.S. army leadership. No one at the time saw the hand of Indonesia's world-famous President Sukarno in the affair.

Allen examines the maritime counterproliferation activities of nations participating in the Proliferation Security Initiative, as set out in their Statement of Interdiction Principles. He explains the framework for conducting maritime interception activities, examines the importance of intelligence to PSI operations, and assesses the legal issues raised by those operations.The threat of WMD use by terrorist groups and rogue regimes has added new urgency to global security discussions. Responses to the dangers posed by WMD include the nonproliferation regime, safeguards for WMD materials while in transit, export controls, treaties on terrorism, Security Council resolutions, and the new Protocol to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation.The existing nonproliferation regime will never, by itself, provide an adequate level of security. As a result, risk management strategies must include layered counterproliferation activities and consequence management. Counterproliferation measures may include maritime interdictions. The Proliferation Security Initiative, a cooperative undertaking launched in 2003, provides a framework for those interdictions. The framework was formalized in the Statement of Interdiction Principles.After providing an overview of the threats posed by WMD proliferation, this book surveys the nonproliferation regime and counterproliferation measures states have adopted to supplement it. It next provides an overview of maritime interception operations and the intelligence issues surrounding them, before turning to the laws governing such operations. It then examines each of the actions described in the PSI Statement of Interdiction Principles to assess their compliance with applicable laws. Finally, it looks at the laws that establish the responsibility of states for taking unwarranted counterproliferation actions against vessels.

Schwab's work is five-part analysis of US policy and strategy in the Persian Gulf from 1990-2003. He begins the work by analyzing the prominence of the Persian Gulf in US global strategic thinking during the last decade of the Cold War. By that time, gulf oil had secured a paramount place in the minds of the Reagan and Bush administrations. Part two dissects the relationship that individuals and regional governments in the Persian Gulf shared with the US. Here, Schwab also examines US perceptions of those entities and demonstrates how they helped shape the policies of the US and define the status of those nations in the eyes of US policymakers. When Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in 1990, the paradigm shifted dramatically. Part three examines US decision-making in the period immediately after that invasion. Schwab demonstrates that while forging a broad coalition to turn back Iraq was a significant diplomatic achievement, the international determination that defined the conflict in 1990-1991 eroded and gave way to a cumbersome policy of containment. That policy ultimately resulted in the dissolution of the coalition forged by the first Bush administration and burdened his successors as they struggled to achieve the longstanding goal of creating stability throughout the region. Part four explores the efforts of the Clinton and second Bush administrations in the Gulf. Saddam was one of the primary concerns of the Clinton administration, but so too were al-Qaeda, North Korea, China, and especially Yugoslavia. Indeed, his was the first administration to truly attempt to deal with these kinds of problems in a post-Cold War world. Despite their differences, there was a tremendous amount of continuity in the policies pursued by Clinton and George W. Bush. September 11 changed that, however, as Schwab chronicles in part five. In that section he explores how the current administration's adoption of a more proactive strategy of retaliation and preventative war has given rise to a new national security regime increasingly designed to fight asymmetric war while eliminating perceived threats to our national security and interests.Schwab's work is five-part analysis of US policy and strategy in the Persian Gulf from 1990-2003. He begins the work by analyzing the prominence of the Persian Gulf in US global strategic thinking during the last decade of the Cold War. By that time, gulf oil had secured a paramount place in the minds of the Reagan and Bush administrations. Part two dissects the relationship that individuals and regional governments in the Persian Gulf shared with the US. Here, Schwab also examines US perceptions of those entities and demonstrates how they helped shape US policy and define the status of those nations in the eyes of US policymakers. When Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in 1990, the paradigm shifted dramatically. Part three examines US decision-making in the period immediately after that invasion. Schwab demonstrates that while forging a broad coalition to turn back Iraq was a significant diplomatic achievement, the international determination that defined the conflict in 1990-1991 eroded and gave way to a cumbersome policy of containment. That policy ultimately resulted in the dissolution of the coalition forged by the first Bush administration and burdened his successors as they struggled to achieve the longstanding goal of creating stability throughout the region. Part four explores the efforts of the Clinton and second Bush administrations in the Gulf. Saddam was one of the primary concerns of the Clinton administration, but so too were al-Qaeda, North Korea, China, and especially Yugoslavia. Indeed, his was the first administration to truly attempt to deal with these kinds of problems in a post-Cold War world. Despite their differences, there was a tremendous amount of continuity in the policies pursued by Clinton and George W. Bush. September 11 changed that, however, as Schwab chronicles in part five. In that section he explores how the current administration's adoption of a more proactive strategy of retaliation and preventative war has given rise to a new national security regime increasingly designed to fight asymmetric war while eliminating perceived threats to our national security and interests.

Schwab's work is five-part analysis of US policy and strategy in the Persian Gulf from 1990-2003. He begins the work by analyzing the prominence of the Persian Gulf in US global strategic thinking during the last decade of the Cold War. By that time, gulf oil had secured a paramount place in the minds of the Reagan and Bush administrations. Part two dissects the relationship that individuals and regional governments in the Persian Gulf shared with the US. Here, Schwab also examines US perceptions of those entities and demonstrates how they helped shape the policies of the US and define the status of those nations in the eyes of US policymakers. When Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in 1990, the paradigm shifted dramatically. Part three examines US decision-making in the period immediately after that invasion. Schwab demonstrates that while forging a broad coalition to turn back Iraq was a significant diplomatic achievement, the international determination that defined the conflict in 1990-1991 eroded and gave way to a cumbersome policy of containment. That policy ultimately resulted in the dissolution of the coalition forged by the first Bush administration and burdened his successors as they struggled to achieve the longstanding goal of creating stability throughout the region. Part four explores the efforts of the Clinton and second Bush administrations in the Gulf. Saddam was one of the primary concerns of the Clinton administration, but so too were al-Qaeda, North Korea, China, and especially Yugoslavia. Indeed, his was the first administration to truly attempt to deal with these kinds of problems in a post-Cold War world. Despite their differences, there was a tremendous amount of continuity in the policies pursued by Clinton and George W. Bush. September 11 changed that, however, as Schwab chronicles in part five. In that section he explores how the current administration's adoption of a more proactive strategy of retaliation and preventative war has given rise to a new national security regime increasingly designed to fight asymmetric war while eliminating perceived threats to our national security and interests.Schwab's work is five-part analysis of US policy and strategy in the Persian Gulf from 1990-2003. He begins the work by analyzing the prominence of the Persian Gulf in US global strategic thinking during the last decade of the Cold War. By that time, gulf oil had secured a paramount place in the minds of the Reagan and Bush administrations. Part two dissects the relationship that individuals and regional governments in the Persian Gulf shared with the US. Here, Schwab also examines US perceptions of those entities and demonstrates how they helped shape US policy and define the status of those nations in the eyes of US policymakers. When Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in 1990, the paradigm shifted dramatically. Part three examines US decision-making in the period immediately after that invasion. Schwab demonstrates that while forging a broad coalition to turn back Iraq was a significant diplomatic achievement, the international determination that defined the conflict in 1990-1991 eroded and gave way to a cumbersome policy of containment. That policy ultimately resulted in the dissolution of the coalition forged by the first Bush administration and burdened his successors as they struggled to achieve the longstanding goal of creating stability throughout the region. Part four explores the efforts of the Clinton and second Bush administrations in the Gulf. Saddam was one of the primary concerns of the Clinton administration, but so too were al-Qaeda, North Korea, China, and especially Yugoslavia. Indeed, his was the first administration to truly attempt to deal with these kinds of problems in a post-Cold War world. Despite their differences, there was a tremendous amount of continuity in the policies pursued by Clinton and George W. Bush. September 11 changed that, however, as Schwab chronicles in part five. In that section he explores how the current administration's adoption of a more proactive strategy of retaliation and preventative war has given rise to a new national security regime increasingly designed to fight asymmetric war while eliminating perceived threats to our national security and interests.

Since its partition in the 1950s, the Korean peninsula has directly or indirectly shaped the broader security relations between regional powerhouses, and the recent test of a nuclear weapon by the North Korean regime has heightened tensions across the world. This study draws upon contributions from a diverse array of experts who offer their perspectives on the region's complex network of alliances and hostilities. The authors discuss the future of the region, the potential for military conflict and a new arms race, and the ways to maintain peace and stability.Since its partition in the 1950s, the Korean peninsula has directly or indirectly shaped the broader security relations between regional powerhouses, while the recent test of a nuclear weapon by the North Korean regime has heightened tensions across the world. Japan, feeling increasingly threatened by the North Korean regime and China's extravagant military expenditures, has begun questioning Article IX in its Constitution that renounces war and the maintenance of armed forces. Its neighbors, still haunted by Japanese atrocities during World War II, are fearful of a new nuclear arms race in the region. The United States, for its part, has adopted unprecedented hard-line policies in response to 9/11, going so far as to condemn North Korea as part of an axis of evil. It has strengthened its alliance with Japan and alienated its long-time strategic partner South Korea. Add to this the economic entanglements of each of these countries both with each other and with the rest of the world, and the regional security issues become even more paramount.This study makes sense of these complex alliances and frictions and offers an array of perspectives on the future of the region, the potential for military conflict and a new arms race, and the ways to maintain peace and stability. Topics include big power rivalries, South Korea's sunshine policy, anti-Americanism, and emerging nationalisms.

Since its partition in the 1950s, the Korean peninsula has directly or indirectly shaped the broader security relations between regional powerhouses, and the recent test of a nuclear weapon by the North Korean regime has heightened tensions across the world. This study draws upon contributions from a diverse array of experts who offer their perspectives on the region's complex network of alliances and hostilities. The authors discuss the future of the region, the potential for military conflict and a new arms race, and the ways to maintain peace and stability.Since its partition in the 1950s, the Korean peninsula has directly or indirectly shaped the broader security relations between regional powerhouses, while the recent test of a nuclear weapon by the North Korean regime has heightened tensions across the world. Japan, feeling increasingly threatened by the North Korean regime and China's extravagant military expenditures, has begun questioning Article IX in its Constitution that renounces war and the maintenance of armed forces. Its neighbors, still haunted by Japanese atrocities during World War II, are fearful of a new nuclear arms race in the region. The United States, for its part, has adopted unprecedented hard-line policies in response to 9/11, going so far as to condemn North Korea as part of an axis of evil. It has strengthened its alliance with Japan and alienated its long-time strategic partner South Korea. Add to this the economic entanglements of each of these countries both with each other and with the rest of the world, and the regional security issues become even more paramount.This study makes sense of these complex alliances and frictions and offers an array of perspectives on the future of the region, the potential for military conflict and a new arms race, and the ways to maintain peace and stability. Topics include big power rivalries, South Korea's sunshine policy, anti-Americanism, and emerging nationalisms.

In the brief experience the world has had during the post-9/11 era, much has been made of the need for sharing intelligence in the war on terror, and a lot of emphasis has been placed on the desirability of interfaith dialogue between Christians and Muslims. But comparatively little attention has been paid to a crucial component of intercultural cooperation on the key global security issues facing the world today: that between and among the United States, Russia, and China. This book examines key security issues of the day from the perspectives of those three powers.From an American perspective, Russia represents an erstwhile enemy of the Cold War era who has the potential to become an ally, while China is poised to become either an enemy, an ally, or an economic rival, depending on whom you listen to. From a Russian perspective, the United States is a former ally during World War II turned Cold War enemy turned lone superpower, with the potential for cooperation and conflict, while China has always embodied both ally and rival, even during the Communist era. To the Chinese, who have had rivalries and cooperative relations with both powers, the United States is currently a valued supplier of both raw materials and a vast market for Chinese goods, while Russia and the United States are rivals in the scramble for influence in the Middle East and elsewhere.With such a complicated history and with a future fraught with all sorts of possibilities, how can these three key powers cooperate in managing and responding to global security threats and terrorism? This book examines key issues of the day, including the threat posed by al Qaeda, WMD, energy security, environmental security, ethnic and religious conflicts, and a nuclear North Korea, from the perspectives of the United States, Russia, and China. Each chapter is written by scholars from at least two of the three countries. In this manner, the book embodies that which it seeks to demonstrate, becoming in itself an artifact of intercultural cooperation in the new international security environment.

Although the score of countries comprising Russia's near abroad (the former non-Russian Soviet republics) and far abroad (the former non-Russian Warsaw Pact states) are behaving with variably increasing independence in their domestic and foreign policies, Russia continues to regard them as remaining within the same core-periphery sphere of influence formerly exerted by the Soviet Union within the same geographic space. Russia misinterprets bids by these countries to adopt liberalizing structural reforms and to join Euro-Atlantic organizations as foreign-inspired and inimical to Russia's security. Whether Russia can learn to recognize that such bids are in fact natural developments of national self-interest will determine whether healthy and mutually beneficial bilateral relations can develop between Russia and the states of her near and far abroad in the 21st century.No previous study of the dynamics of post-Soviet assertive sovereignty has as broad a geographic scope as Eurasia Rising, which considers the whole of Post-Soviet Space: DT Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine DT_ Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania DT Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia DT Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan DT Albania, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia

Although the score of countries comprising Russia's near abroad (the former non-Russian Soviet republics) and far abroad (the former non-Russian Warsaw Pact states) are behaving with variably increasing independence in their domestic and foreign policies, Russia continues to regard them as remaining within the same core-periphery sphere of influence formerly exerted by the Soviet Union within the same geographic space. Russia misinterprets bids by these countries to adopt liberalizing structural reforms and to join Euro-Atlantic organizations as foreign-inspired and inimical to Russia's security. Whether Russia can learn to recognize that such bids are in fact natural developments of national self-interest will determine whether healthy and mutually beneficial bilateral relations can develop between Russia and the states of her near and far abroad in the 21st century.No previous study of the dynamics of post-Soviet assertive sovereignty has as broad a geographic scope as Eurasia Rising, which considers the whole of Post-Soviet Space: DT Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine DT_ Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania DT Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia DT Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan DT Albania, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia

From Chechnya in Russia to Kashmir in India to the Basque region in Spain, secessionist movements remain a serious threat to international security. Despite the importance of this issue, the causes that bring about external military intervention in a secessionist war have not, until now, been adequately addressed. In this book, Dos Santos identifies the conditions that make international military intervention in a secessionist war more or less likely. South Asia, being fraught with secessionist movements—Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Kashmir, and Punjab—provides an ideal laboratory for the examination of this compelling issue. Dos Santos argues that a shift in the balance of power between a secessionist group and its central government will lead to a preventive war on the secessionists by the central government. In turn, a preventive war of this nature may lead to an alliance between the secessionist group and an external power. The stronger the alliance, the greater the chances of an international military intervention.Understanding the conditions under which secessionist movements expand, become secessionist wars, and invite international military intervention on behalf of the secessionists has strong policy implications. It can go a long way toward guiding policymakers who may want to mitigate or avoid these conditions in their states. Dos Santos views both states and secessionist groups as primary actors, and she examines both the distribution of power among states and the balance of power between central government and groups within states.

From Chechnya in Russia to Kashmir in India to the Basque region in Spain, secessionist movements remain a serious threat to international security. Despite the importance of this issue, the causes that bring about external military intervention in a secessionist war have not, until now, been adequately addressed. In this book, Dos Santos identifies the conditions that make international military intervention in a secessionist war more or less likely. South Asia, being fraught with secessionist movements—Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Kashmir, and Punjab—provides an ideal laboratory for the examination of this compelling issue. Dos Santos argues that a shift in the balance of power between a secessionist group and its central government will lead to a preventive war on the secessionists by the central government. In turn, a preventive war of this nature may lead to an alliance between the secessionist group and an external power. The stronger the alliance, the greater the chances of an international military intervention.Understanding the conditions under which secessionist movements expand, become secessionist wars, and invite international military intervention on behalf of the secessionists has strong policy implications. It can go a long way toward guiding policymakers who may want to mitigate or avoid these conditions in their states. Dos Santos views both states and secessionist groups as primary actors, and she examines both the distribution of power among states and the balance of power between central government and groups within states.

The tools of reason offer the best hope for the international community to confront the increasing incidents of hate throughout the world. A historically informed, normative examination of the elements of the crime of genocide provides an excellent case study of how the law, reason's handmaiden, enhances understanding and improves practical ways of dealing with global injustices.How should we confront hate? As political activists, we could resort to fighting hate with hate. As concerned citizens, we could consciously ignore or actively protest hate. As committed educators, we could put the implements and survivors of hate on display. As committed scholars, we could resuscitate the idea of evil. As humanitarian jurists, we could put individual hate-mongers on trial. Part I of this book makes a case for making the maximum use of reason to deal with hate. This means that we should actively debate those who promote hate. Further, as a close look at the history of applying law to incidents of hate and violence illustrates, the courtroom proves to be an excellent place to demonstrate the virtues of applying the tools of reason, not to global evils, but to the grave injustices of the world.In Part II, Simon demonstrates the power of legal analysis in enhancing our understanding of genocide, probably the worst injustice imaginable. A close examination of each purported element of the crime of genocide redirects misguided turns taken by international jurists. Contrary to a more realistic perspective adopted at the Nuremberg trials, jurists have mistakenly modeled international criminal law on national criminal law, which focuses on individual responsibility. However, the cases of grave injustices throughout the 20th century amply demonstrate the primary collective responsibility underlying incidences of genocide. The failure to prosecute criminal organizations for genocide has and will continue to have disastrous results. While the Nuremberg tribunal at least disbanded the responsible Nazi organizations, current war crimes tribunals have allowed organizations responsible for the Rwandan genocide to continue to wreak havoc throughout Central Africa. If the international community cannot forge a common understanding of genocide, then it has little hope of establishing an international legal order or a global ethics.

Formed in the aftermath of WWII and in the face of the emerging threat posed by the Soviet Union, the transformation that has taken place in recent years within NATO has been neither natural nor easy for the multi-national organization or the United States. When the Soviet Union ceased to exist it seemed NATO would disappear too. The rationale for a large American military deployment in Europe, described by President Eisenhower as a temporary move, no longer could be supported. This work documents the transition of the United States relationship with NATO from a focus on the defense of Western Europe to an inclusive military and political organization concerned with the security of all of Europe with the real potential for employment of its military power beyond the European continent. Despite budgeting and economic concerns raised by key members of the U.S. Congress, President George H.W. Bush supported the status quo and was caught completely off guard when the Berlin Wall fell. He and Defense Secretary Dick Cheney had not fully understood the changed strategic environment in Europe but the U.S. Congress did and offered many suggestions. NATO was saved. President Bill Clinton continued to promote the validity of NATO, expanded NATO eastwards, reduced the U.S. troop level in Europe to 100,000, and gave NATO a mission beyond warfare with the peacekeeping task in Bosnia. A new Atlantic relationship had been forged for the post-Cold War period.

This book aims to serve the military profession, and so the national interest, by helping to generate intelligent reform of how the armed forces train, educate, and promote officers who shape our military strategy and write our war plans. Readers will discover the professional and intellectual improvement that wide reading in the masters of historical narrative offers to them. The first chapter, Lessons Not Learned, surveys our strategic documents-and their recent applications-and offers criticism and recommendations. The second chapter, Transformation Ballyhoo, evaluates our current efforts at military transformation and offers an alternative approach to rehabilitating our armed forces. The third chapter, The Brain of An Army, offers ideas on building a first-rate Joint War College. Chapters four through six focus on military campaigns: France 1940; Stalingrad; North Africa, 1940-43. The theme is that moral and intellectual qualities determine the fate of armies in war, and that material and bureaucratic machinery are not nearly so vital as we seem to think nowadays.

This work is a bridge between the failed/weak states' literature and that which examines issues relating to small arms proliferation. Carr investigates the cultural impact of the availability of these easy-to-come-by weapons. This cultural dynamic has a direct, and deadly impact on issues such as arms control, illegal and illicit trading, gun cultures, the nexus between criminality and militia warfare and the social impact of arms proliferation, and the struggle for weak states who attempt to govern. The case studies will appeal to those with regional or comparative interests. Although the tone is academic, the topics and the subject matter will make this book of interest to those outside of the academic community.The work takes the form of alternating chapters in which elements of Kalashnikov enculturation, for example the peculiar forms of aberrant economic activity that exist within Kalashnikov cultures, are paired with chapter-length mini-case studies, such as that dealing with armed gang movements in Jamaica, Papua New Guinea, and Brazil. The whole work is bounded by the contention that under certain conditions heavily weaponized societies create their own milieu, which in turn gives rise to communities that find ways to survive (and sometimes thrive) within an ambiance of chronic insecurity.

Russia is the world's foremost energy superpower, rivaling Saudi Arabia as the world's largest oil producer and accounting for a quarter of the world's exports of natural gas. Russia's energy reserves account for half of the world's probable oil reserves and a third of the world's proven natural gas reserves. Whereas military might and nuclear weapons formed the core of Soviet cold war power, since 1991 the Russian state has viewed its monopolistic control of Russia's energy resources as the core of its power now and for the future. Since 2005, the international news has been filled with Russia's repeated demonstrations of its readiness to use price, transit fees, and supply of gas and oil exports as punitive policy instruments against recalcitrant states that were formerly part of the Soviet Union, striking in turn the Ukraine, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, and Lithuania. Orban reveals for the first time in Power, Energy, and the New Russian Imperialism Russia's readiness to wield the same energy weapon against her neighbors on the west, all of them former Soviet satellite states but now EU and NATO member nations: the three Baltic nations and the five East European nations of Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovenia.Orban shows how the Kremlin since 1991 has systematically used Russian energy companies as players in a concerted neo-mercantilist, energy-based foreign policy designed to further Russia's neo-imperial ambitions among America's key allies in Central East Europe. Her unprecedented analysis is key to predicting Russia's strategic response to American negotiations with Poland and the Czech Republic to host the US missile shield. She also reveals the economic and diplomatic modus operandi by which Russia will increasingly apply its energy clout to shape and coerce the foreign policies of the West European members of the EU, as Russia's contribution to EU gas consumption increases from a quarter today to three-quarters by 2020. Orban proves that Russia's neo-mercantilist energy strategy in East Europe is not at all dependent on the person of Putin, but began under Yeltsin and continues under Medvedev, the former chairman of Gazprom.

Russia is the world's foremost energy superpower, rivaling Saudi Arabia as the world's largest oil producer and accounting for a quarter of the world's exports of natural gas. Russia's energy reserves account for half of the world's probable oil reserves and a third of the world's proven natural gas reserves. Whereas military might and nuclear weapons formed the core of Soviet cold war power, since 1991 the Russian state has viewed its monopolistic control of Russia's energy resources as the core of its power now and for the future. Since 2005, the international news has been filled with Russia's repeated demonstrations of its readiness to use price, transit fees, and supply of gas and oil exports as punitive policy instruments against recalcitrant states that were formerly part of the Soviet Union, striking in turn the Ukraine, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, and Lithuania. Orban reveals for the first time in Power, Energy, and the New Russian Imperialism Russia's readiness to wield the same energy weapon against her neighbors on the west, all of them former Soviet satellite states but now EU and NATO member nations: the three Baltic nations and the five East European nations of Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovenia.Orban shows how the Kremlin since 1991 has systematically used Russian energy companies as players in a concerted neo-mercantilist, energy-based foreign policy designed to further Russia's neo-imperial ambitions among America's key allies in Central East Europe. Her unprecedented analysis is key to predicting Russia's strategic response to American negotiations with Poland and the Czech Republic to host the US missile shield. She also reveals the economic and diplomatic modus operandi by which Russia will increasingly apply its energy clout to shape and coerce the foreign policies of the West European members of the EU, as Russia's contribution to EU gas consumption increases from a quarter today to three-quarters by 2020. Orban proves that Russia's neo-mercantilist energy strategy in East Europe is not at all dependent on the person of Putin, but began under Yeltsin and continues under Medvedev, the former chairman of Gazprom.

You can train men to fight. You can plan for the invasion. But you can't have success on the battlefield if you cannot move the men and material into position. Success is not possible without logistical support and capabilities. The U.S. Army's logistics system began with practically nothing and through numerous conflicts and periods of peace has developed into a first rate supply system capable of supporting the global military commitments of the present day. This work presents the history of U.S. Army logistics as one of evolution, trial and error, and occasionally revolutionary change over a period of two hundred plus years. It is important that logisticians and combat leaders alike understand how the United States Army logistical system developed; the challenges that had to be overcome; and the successes and failures encountered along the way.Creating the U.S. Army in 1775 proved to be easy compared to the task of keeping the army adequately supplied over the short and long term. The availability of resources, industrial capacity, size of the army, geographic scope of operations, organization of the logistics system, competent leadership, congressional support, funding, and new technology have, and continue to impact the logistical system on a daily basis. Each new period of peace or war has brought new challenges and requirements. This work is broken into two key parts. First, to inform the reader on the basic history of U.S. Army Logistics. Second, to identify the key factors that influenced the development of the logistical system.

You can train men to fight. You can plan for the invasion. But you can't have success on the battlefield if you cannot move the men and material into position. Success is not possible without logistical support and capabilities. The U.S. Army's logistics system began with practically nothing and through numerous conflicts and periods of peace has developed into a first rate supply system capable of supporting the global military commitments of the present day. This work presents the history of U.S. Army logistics as one of evolution, trial and error, and occasionally revolutionary change over a period of two hundred plus years. It is important that logisticians and combat leaders alike understand how the United States Army logistical system developed; the challenges that had to be overcome; and the successes and failures encountered along the way.Creating the U.S. Army in 1775 proved to be easy compared to the task of keeping the army adequately supplied over the short and long term. The availability of resources, industrial capacity, size of the army, geographic scope of operations, organization of the logistics system, competent leadership, congressional support, funding, and new technology have, and continue to impact the logistical system on a daily basis. Each new period of peace or war has brought new challenges and requirements. This work is broken into two key parts. First, to inform the reader on the basic history of U.S. Army Logistics. Second, to identify the key factors that influenced the development of the logistical system.

The so-called pacifist clause of the Japanese Constitution (Article 9) binds the Japanese people forever to renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes. Beyond Pacifism argues that Japan must either repeal Article 9, or face a future in which Japan might be compelled to surrender sovereign authority in order to appease one or more of its immediate neighbors. If Japan cannot free itself of the constraints of its constitutional pacifism and choose to become a normal nation, willing and able to defend itself and its interests, it must endure what former Prime Minister Koizumi describes as the peace of slaves.Since 1952 Japan has followed the path of reinterpreting Article 9 in order to work around its pacifist strictures. Many Japanese party leaders—including prime ministers Abe and Koizumi—have called for Article 9 to be revised by the addition of a clause authorizing the use of force for the purpose of self-defense against aggression directed against the Japanese nation. Most foreign commentators and scholars urge Tokyo to continue to work around Article 9 without amendment. By contrast, the author argues that neither reinterpretation nor revision will allow Japan to counter the growing military threats from North Korea and China. Japan's health as a democratic state, contends Middlebrooks, requires an honest re-alignment of its law with its modern national identity, which is normal and no longer poses a militaristic threat to regional stability.

Nigeria's Stumbling Democracy and its Implications for Africa's Democratic Movement is the first book to recount and analyze Nigeria's controversial general elections of April 2007. Because Nigeria's immense and diverse population of 140 million people and its wealth of natural resources make it a microcosm of Africa, Nigerian politics are an ideal case study and bellwether by which to view and understand African politics and the ongoing democratic experiments on the continent. Ten leading scholars of Nigerian and African politics, variously based in Nigeria, the US, and Europe, contribute original chapters commissioned by Professor Okafor to provide an account at once deep and comprehensive of what went wrong with these disputed presidential, federal, and state elections; together with their implications for the future of the democratic movement, both in Nigeria and in Africa as a whole.Although the 2007 general elections resulted in the first-ever handover of political power from one civilian government to another in the history of Nigeria, by which the two-term Christian president Olusegun Obasanjon was succeeded by a Muslim, Alhaji Musa Yar'Adua, they were condemned by internal and international watchdogs for pervasive vote-rigging, violence, intimidation, and fraud which were, as this book documents, perpetrated by and with the connivance of the nation's security forces. The disappointment of continental hopes that these elections might finally break with Nigeria's history of tainted elections has grave repercussions for the democracy movement not only in Nigeria but throughout Africa-as seen in the knock-on effect upon the disastrous general elections in Kenya later the same year.

Nigeria's Stumbling Democracy and its Implications for Africa's Democratic Movement is the first book to recount and analyze Nigeria's controversial general elections of April 2007. Because Nigeria's immense and diverse population of 140 million people and its wealth of natural resources make it a microcosm of Africa, Nigerian politics are an ideal case study and bellwether by which to view and understand African politics and the ongoing democratic experiments on the continent. Ten leading scholars of Nigerian and African politics, variously based in Nigeria, the US, and Europe, contribute original chapters commissioned by Professor Okafor to provide an account at once deep and comprehensive of what went wrong with these disputed presidential, federal, and state elections; together with their implications for the future of the democratic movement, both in Nigeria and in Africa as a whole.Although the 2007 general elections resulted in the first-ever handover of political power from one civilian government to another in the history of Nigeria, by which the two-term Christian president Olusegun Obasanjon was succeeded by a Muslim, Alhaji Musa Yar'Adua, they were condemned by internal and international watchdogs for pervasive vote-rigging, violence, intimidation, and fraud which were, as this book documents, perpetrated by and with the connivance of the nation's security forces. The disappointment of continental hopes that these elections might finally break with Nigeria's history of tainted elections has grave repercussions for the democracy movement not only in Nigeria but throughout Africa-as seen in the knock-on effect upon the disastrous general elections in Kenya later the same year.

This collection of essays by leading scholars from Japan, China, South Korea, and the United States examines how and why bitter historical memories have resurfaced in recent years as freshly virulent and contentious issues between Japan and its neighbors—especially China and South Korea. Moreover, it seeks to identify what set of conditions and what sequence of measures will enable these modern nations to manage, palliate, and exorcise the wrongs of the past in a spirit of reconciliation, so that the dangerous growth of nationalist resentments and revanchism can be checked.Comfort women … the Yasukuni Shrine … the history textbook controversies … The single sorest issue confronting East Asia today is the growing animosity and conflict between Japan and its neighbors—especially China and South Korea—over their respective and collective memories of Japan's pre-1945 militaristic aggression, oppression, and atrocities. Even as East Asia has established itself as one of the most vibrant economic regions of the world, the strident nationalisms that have emerged here in the post-Cold War period have exacerbated historical grievances and heightened the international tensions that separate Japan from China and South Korea, blocking the development of an international system based on comity and cooperation.

This collection of essays by leading scholars from Japan, China, South Korea, and the United States examines how and why bitter historical memories have resurfaced in recent years as freshly virulent and contentious issues between Japan and its neighbors—especially China and South Korea. Moreover, it seeks to identify what set of conditions and what sequence of measures will enable these modern nations to manage, palliate, and exorcise the wrongs of the past in a spirit of reconciliation, so that the dangerous growth of nationalist resentments and revanchism can be checked.Comfort women … the Yasukuni Shrine … the history textbook controversies … The single sorest issue confronting East Asia today is the growing animosity and conflict between Japan and its neighbors—especially China and South Korea—over their respective and collective memories of Japan's pre-1945 militaristic aggression, oppression, and atrocities. Even as East Asia has established itself as one of the most vibrant economic regions of the world, the strident nationalisms that have emerged here in the post-Cold War period have exacerbated historical grievances and heightened the international tensions that separate Japan from China and South Korea, blocking the development of an international system based on comity and cooperation.

Paul explores both how and why U.S. military intervention decisions are made. Pursuit of that inquiry requires the identification of decision participants, thorough examination of the decision making processes they employ, and recognition of several factors that influence intervention decisions: the national interest, legitimacy, and the legacies of previous policies. This book provides chapter length treatment of each of these issues. The research is based on detailed historical case studies for the four U.S. Marines on the beach military interventions in Latin America since World War II: The Dominican Republic (1965), Grenada (1983), Panama (1989), and Haiti (1994). Additional cases (notably Afghanistan and Iraq) enter the discussion when considering findings with broader implications.Of the existing theories of governance that compete to explain government policy making, Paul finds that elite theory provides the best general model for intervention decision making, but that the notions of both pluralist and class theorists contribute to a complete explanation, and sometimes in an unexpected way. Findings also indicate considerable contribution from and constraint by institutional sources. However, far from finding that institutional factors are wholly deterministic, this research offers support for a choice-within-constraints model. Conclusions suggest that top decision-makers (especially the president) enjoy wide latitude in framing the national interest and in choosing where to and where not to intervene.

Did 9/11 revive a North American guns-butter trade-off? Established in the largest administrative overhaul since World War II, the Department of Homeland Security was charged with keeping the United States safe within a wider security community, but confronted the Washington Consensus-based Western Hemisphere free trade movement, beginning with the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and extending to the Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) in 2003, to materialize a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) compact. Whether 9/11 restrictions impeded these trade-related thrusts or not, embracing neoliberalism permitted Canada and Mexico to pursue their own initiatives, such as proposing free-trade to the US—Canada in 1985, Mexico in 1990, but, as during the Cold War, security imperatives ultimately prevailed.This work investigates Canada's and Mexico's Department of Homeland Security responses through three bilateral studies of policy responses along comparative lines, case studies of security and intelligence apparatuses in each of the three countries, and a post-9/11 trilateral assessment. Ultimately, they raise a broader and more critical North American question: Will regional economic integration continue to be trumped by security considerations, as during the Cold War era, and thereby elevate second-best outcomes, or rise above the constraints to reassert the unquenchable post-Cold War thirst for unfettered markets replete with private enterprises, liberal policies, and full-fledged competitiveness?

In the late 1950s, Communists decided that Zanzibar offered them a particular favorable opportunity for expanding their influence.