Studies in Choice and Welfare – serie

This book explores the similarities and differences among national election systems around the globe and sheds light on how election systems are susceptible to gerrymandering, which is the process by which an incumbent or a political party attempts to manipulate the boundaries of electoral districts for their own advantage.

This book explores the similarities and differences among national election systems around the globe and sheds light on how election systems are susceptible to gerrymandering, which is the process by which an incumbent or a political party attempts to manipulate the boundaries of electoral districts for their own advantage.

This book operationalizes the idea of political representation, which is fundamental to modern democracies. Both individual representatives and representative bodies are evaluated using the indices of popularity (the average percentage of the population whose opinion is represented on topical policy issues) and universality (the percentage of issues for which the prevailing public opinion is represented). Viewed as objective functions, these indices can aid in the search for optimal representatives and representative bodies. By replacing the consistency analysis of the social choice axioms with the calculation of the best compromises, the paradoxes of social choice, such as those of Condorcet and Arrow, can be overcome. These indices also form the core of an alternative election method that is aimed at enhancing policy representation — a recent concept of political representation, which is not supported by the conventional voting systems shaped during the American and French Revolutions. This method is tested in a series of election experiments that focus on implementation details. In addition, non-societal applications such as MCDM, finance or traffic control are considered, where the objects that reflect the properties or behavior of other objects are regarded as their “representatives.” Given its scope, the book will appeal to political scientists, economists and operations researchers, as well as to politicians interested in improving democratic performance and electoral system design.

Both individual representatives and representative bodies are evaluated using the indices of popularity (the average percentage of the population whose opinion is represented on topical policy issues) and universality (the percentage of issues for which the prevailing public opinion is represented).

This book includes up-to-date contributions in the broadly defined area of probabilistic analysis of voting rules and decision mechanisms.

This book includes up-to-date contributions in the broadly defined area of probabilistic analysis of voting rules and decision mechanisms.

This volume presents interviews that have been conducted from the 1980s to the present with important scholars of social choice and welfare theory.

This volume presents interviews that have been conducted from the 1980s to the present with important scholars of social choice and welfare theory.

This book presents research on recent developments in collective decision-making. With contributions from leading scholars from a variety of disciplines, it provides an up-to-date overview of applications in social choice theory, welfare economics, and industrial organization. The contributions address, amongst others, topics such as measuring power, the manipulability of collective decisions, and experimental approaches. Applications range from analysis of the complicated institutional rules of the European Union to responsibility-based allocation of cartel damages or the design of webpage rankings. With its interdisciplinary focus, the book seeks to bridge the gap between different disciplinary approaches by pointing to open questions that can only be resolved through collaborative efforts.

This book presents research on recent developments in collective decision-making. The contributions address, amongst others, topics such as measuring power, the manipulability of collective decisions, and experimental approaches.

This book provides a comprehensive mathematical description and analysis of the delegate allocation processes in the US Democratic and Republican presidential primaries, focusing on the role of apportionment methods and the effect of thresholds—the minimum levels of support required to receive delegates.  The analysis involves a variety of techniques, including theoretical arguments, simplicial geometry, Monte Carlo simulation, and examination of presidential primary data from 2004 to 2020. The book is divided into two parts: Part I defines the classical apportionment problem and explains how the implementation and goals of delegate apportionment differ from those of apportionment for state representation in the US House of Representatives and for party representation in legislatures based on proportional representation. The authors then describe how delegates are assigned to states and congressional districts and formally define the delegate apportionment methods usedin each state by the two major parties to allocate delegates to presidential candidates. Part II analyzes and compares the apportionment methods introduced in Part I based on their level of bias and adherence to various notions of proportionality. It explores how often the methods satisfy the quota condition and quantifies their biases in favor or against the strongest and weakest candidates. Because the methods are quota-based, they are susceptible to classical paradoxes like the Alabama and population paradoxes. They also suffer from other paradoxes that are more relevant in the context of delegate apportionment such as the elimination and aggregation paradoxes. The book evaluates the extent to which each method is susceptible to each paradox. Finally, it discusses the appointment of delegates based on divisor methods and notions of regressive proportionality.This book appeals to scholars and students interested in mathematical economics and political science, with an emphasis on apportionment and social choice theory.

This book provides a comprehensive mathematical description and analysis of the delegate allocation processes in the US Democratic and Republican presidential primaries, focusing on the role of apportionment methods and the effect of thresholds—the minimum levels of support required to receive delegates.  The analysis involves a variety of techniques, including theoretical arguments, simplicial geometry, Monte Carlo simulation, and examination of presidential primary data from 2004 to 2020. The book is divided into two parts: Part I defines the classical apportionment problem and explains how the implementation and goals of delegate apportionment differ from those of apportionment for state representation in the US House of Representatives and for party representation in legislatures based on proportional representation. The authors then describe how delegates are assigned to states and congressional districts and formally define the delegate apportionment methods usedin each state by the two major parties to allocate delegates to presidential candidates. Part II analyzes and compares the apportionment methods introduced in Part I based on their level of bias and adherence to various notions of proportionality. It explores how often the methods satisfy the quota condition and quantifies their biases in favor or against the strongest and weakest candidates. Because the methods are quota-based, they are susceptible to classical paradoxes like the Alabama and population paradoxes. They also suffer from other paradoxes that are more relevant in the context of delegate apportionment such as the elimination and aggregation paradoxes. The book evaluates the extent to which each method is susceptible to each paradox. Finally, it discusses the appointment of delegates based on divisor methods and notions of regressive proportionality.This book appeals to scholars and students interested in mathematical economics and political science, with an emphasis on apportionment and social choice theory.

This textbook is Volume 1 of a two-volume set on the axiomatics of economic design.

This textbook is Volume 1 of a two-volume set on the axiomatics of economic design.

This graduate textbook introduces to social choice theory, with a specific focus on elections and fair division, supported by mathematical theories and practical implications. Part I sheds light on the complexity of fair elections, and presents classical results from social choice theory, including May's, Arrow's, and Gibbard-Satterthwaite's theorems, and how they impact the organization of fair elections. They also discuss the measurement of voting power in such elections via the Penrose-Banzhaf index and the Shapley-Shubik index. Besides these more or less classical topics, the authors introduce Balinski and Laraki's transformative Majority Judgment framework.  Moreover, Part I concludes by critically addressing flaws in contemporary Western democracies and proposing an alternative political system.In Part II, the book dissects claims-based and preference-based fair division, explaining that the focus will be on the former. In particular, the focus will be on models that can elaborate on and make precise the thought that `fairness requires that claims are satisfied in proportion to their strength’,  as advocated for in the philosophical literature. The authors scrutinize various formal models, ranging from (weighted) bankruptcy problems to cooperative games, assessing their alignment with this claims-based conception of fairness. Part II concludes with a brief overview of preference-based fair division. This textbook is a crucial resource for graduate and advanced undergraduate students and scholars, bridging the worlds of mathematics, philosophy, political theory, and social justice.

This book offers a comprehensive account of Condorcet domains—structured sets of preference orders in which the pairwise majority relation remains transitive for any odd-numbered group of voters. These domains form the foundation for normatively robust voting procedures and enable strong possibility results in incentive-compatible mechanism design.Well-known examples include single-peaked, single-crossing, and group-separable domains. The study of Condorcet domains bridges multiple disciplines, including economics, political science, mathematics, and computer science, and has seen significant theoretical advances in recent years.This monograph systematically presents these developments, covering both foundational concepts and cutting-edge results. It will be of interest to economists, mathematicians, and scholars in related fields seeking a deep understanding of preference aggregation and its structural underpinnings.“This interdisciplinary book by Clemens Puppe and Arkadii Slinko offers a canonical reference on the mathematical foundations of Condorcet domains. It shows how discrete convexity, median graphs, and permutation lattices play a central role in understanding coherent collective decision-making, and applies the insights to voting systems and incentive compatibility.”— Prof. Hervé Moulin, Adam Smith Business School, University of Glasgow, United Kingdom

This collection of essays honouring Dan Felsenthal and Moshé Machover reconsiders foundational aspects of the measurement of voting power. The specific case of voting power in two-tier systems - for instance the US system and the EU system - is analysed. Furthermore major power indices - Penrose, Banzhaf, Shapley-Shubik and others are revisited.

This book offers a comprehensive overview and critique of the most important political and philosophical interpretations of the basic results of social choice, assessing their plausibility and seeking to identify the links between the theory of social choice and the more traditional issues of political theory and philosophy.

This monograph provides a detailed analysis on fair queueing rules from a normative, a strategic, and a non-cooperative viewpoint. The queueing problem is concerned with the following situation: There is a group of agents who must be served in a facility. The facility can handle only one agent at a time and agents incur waiting costs. The problem is to find the order in which to serve agents and monetary transfers they should receive. The queueing problem has been studied extensively in the recent literature.

This collection of essays honouring Dan Felsenthal and Moshé Machover reconsiders foundational aspects of the measurement of voting power. The specific case of voting power in two-tier systems - for instance the US system and the EU system - is analysed. Furthermore major power indices - Penrose, Banzhaf, Shapley-Shubik and others are revisited. The book proposes new voting procedures and studies well-known procedures and/or apportionment methods either from a technical or historical point of view.

This monograph studies voting procedures based on the probability that paradoxical outcomes like the famous Condorcet Paradox might exist. It is well known that hypothetical examples of many different paradoxical election outcomes can be developed, but this analysis examines factors that are related to the process by which voters form their preferences on candidates that will significantly reduce the likelihood that such voting paradoxes will ever actually be observed. It is found that extreme forms of voting paradoxes should be uncommon events with a small number of candidates. Another consideration is the propensity of common voting rules to elect the Condorcet Winner, which is widely accepted as the best choice as the winner, when it exists. All common voting rules are found to have identifiable scenarios for which they perform well on the basis of this criterion. But, Borda Rule is found to consistently work well at electing the Condorcet Winner, while the other voting rules have scenarios where they work poorly or have a very small likelihood of electing a different candidate than Borda Rule. The conclusions of previous theoretical work are presented in an expository format and they are validated with empirically-based evidence. Practical implications of earlier studies are also developed.

This book offers a comprehensive overview and critique of the most important political and philosophical interpretations of the basic results of social choice, assessing their plausibility and seeking to identify the links between the theory of social choice and the more traditional issues of political theory and philosophy.

This monograph provides a detailed analysis on fair queueing rules from a normative, a strategic, and a non-cooperative viewpoint. The queueing problem is concerned with the following situation: There is a group of agents who must be served in a facility. The facility can handle only one agent at a time and agents incur waiting costs.

This monograph studies voting procedures based on the probability that paradoxical outcomes like the famous Condorcet Paradox might exist.

Social choices, about expenditures on government programs, or about public policy more broadly, or indeed from any conceivable set of alternatives, are determined by politics. This book is a collection of essays that tie together the fields spanned by Jeffrey S. Banks' research on this subject. It examines the strategic aspects of political decision-making, including the choices of voters in committees, the positioning of candidates in electoral campaigns, and the behavior of parties in legislatures. The chapters of this book contribute to the theory of voting with incomplete information, to the literature on Downsian and probabilistic voting models of elections, to the theory of social choice in distributive environments, and to the theory of optimal dynamic decision-making. The essays employ a spectrum of research methods, from game-theoretic analysis, to empirical investigation, to experimental testing.

Kuklys examines how Nobel Prize-winning economist Amartya Sen’s approach to welfare measurement can be put in practice for poverty and inequality measurement in affluent societies such as the UK. Sen argues that an individual’s welfare should not be measured in terms of her income, but in terms what she can actually do or be, her capabilities. In Chapters 1 and 2, Kuklys describes the capability approach from a standard welfare economic point of view and provides a comprehensive literature review of the empirical applications in this area of research. In the remaining chapters, novel econometric techniques are employed to operationalise the concepts of functionings and capability to investigate inequality and poverty in terms of capability in the UK. Kuklys finds that capability measurement is always a useful complement to traditional monetary analysis, and particularly so in the case of capability-deprived disabled individuals.

In this book, different quantitative approaches to the study of electoral systems have been developed: game-theoretic, decision-theoretic, statistical, probabilistic, combinatorial, geometric, and optimization ones. All the authors are prominent scholars from these disciplines. Quantitative approaches offer a powerful tool to detect inconsistencies or poor performance in actual systems. Applications to concrete settings such as EU, American Congress, regional, and committee voting are discussed.

Peter Fishburn has had a splendidly productive career that led to path-breaking c- tributions in a remarkable variety of areas of research. His contributions have been published in a vast literature, ranging through journals of social choice and welfare, decision theory, operations research, economic theory, political science, mathema- cal psychology, and discrete mathematics. This work was done both on an individual basis and with a very long list of coauthors. The contributions that Fishburn made can roughly be divided into three major topical areas, and contributions to each of these areas are identi?ed by sections of this monograph. Section 1 deals with topics that are included in the general areas of utility, preference, individual choice, subjective probability, and measurement t- ory. Section 2 covers social choice theory, voting models, and social welfare. S- tion 3 deals with more purely mathematical topics that are related to combinatorics, graph theory, and ordered sets. The common theme of Fishburn’s contributions to all of these areas is his ability to bring rigorous mathematical analysis to bear on a wide range of dif?cult problems.

This volume brings together papers, which were ?rst presented at the International Conference on Rational Choice, Individual Rights and Non-Welfaristic Normative Economics, held in honour of Kotaro Suzumura at Hitotsubashi University, Tokyo, on 11–13 March 2006, and which have subsequently gone through the usual process of review by referees. We have been helped by many individuals and institutions in organizing the conference and putting this volume together. We are grateful to the authors of this volume for contributing their papers and to the referees who reviewed the papers. We gratefully acknowledge the very generous fundings by the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, Japan, through the grant for the 21st Century Center of Excellence (COE) Program on the Normative Evaluation and Social Choice of Contemporary Economic Systems, and by the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science, through the grant for International Scienti?c Meetings in Japan, and the unstinted effort of the staff of the COE Program at Hitotsubashi University, without which the conference in 2006 would not have been possible. We thank Dr. Martina Bihn, the Editorial Director of Springer-Verlag for economics and business, for her advice and help. Finally, we would like to mention that it has been a great pleasure and privilege for us to edit this volume, which is intended to be a tribute to Kotaro Suzumura’s - mense intellectual contributions, especially in the theory of rational choice, welfare economics, and the theory of social choice. Riverside Prasanta K.