Studies in German Idealism – serie

'0 ~{oc; ~paxuc;, ~ O£ 't£XVll ~a1(pft (Hippokrates) That life is short needs no proof when we are engaged in ambitious projects. When I began this book, almost forty years ago, I did not forsee that its completion would take such a long time, although I was well aware that some of Hegel's texts stubbornly resist a thorough deciphering of their meaning and argumenta­ tion. Having written a dissertation on the young Hegel's moral, political, and religious philosophy (Lejeune Hegel et la vision morale du monde, 1960'), I was asked to teach ethics, social philosophy, and philosophy of law at various universities of The Netherlands. While studying and teaching the classics of ethics and politics, I began to focus on the textbook that Hegel had written for his courses on practical philosophy: Elements of the Philosophy of Right (1820). The first result of my research was a study of the historical and philosophical context of this text (Philosophy and Politics: A Commentary on the Preface to Hegel's Philosophy of Right, 1981/1987), but the interpretation of its content proceeded slowly. While con­ ferences and colloquia occasioned fragments whose traces can be found in the following pages, the ramifications of Hegel's thought and the overwhelming amount of secondary literature demanded a great deal of time and attention and other interests continued to interrupt the project.

'0 ~{oc; ~paxuc;, ~ O£ 't£XVll ~a1(pft (Hippokrates) That life is short needs no proof when we are engaged in ambitious projects. When I began this book, almost forty years ago, I did not forsee that its completion would take such a long time, although I was well aware that some of Hegel's texts stubbornly resist a thorough deciphering of their meaning and argumenta­ tion. Having written a dissertation on the young Hegel's moral, political, and religious philosophy (Lejeune Hegel et la vision morale du monde, 1960'), I was asked to teach ethics, social philosophy, and philosophy of law at various universities of The Netherlands. While studying and teaching the classics of ethics and politics, I began to focus on the textbook that Hegel had written for his courses on practical philosophy: Elements of the Philosophy of Right (1820). The first result of my research was a study of the historical and philosophical context of this text (Philosophy and Politics: A Commentary on the Preface to Hegel's Philosophy of Right, 1981/1987), but the interpretation of its content proceeded slowly. While con­ ferences and colloquia occasioned fragments whose traces can be found in the following pages, the ramifications of Hegel's thought and the overwhelming amount of secondary literature demanded a great deal of time and attention and other interests continued to interrupt the project.

Salomon Maimon (1753-1800), one of the most fascinating characters of eighteenth-century intellectual history, came from a traditional orthodox Jewish community in Eastern Europe to Berlin to seek Enlightenment. Maimon remained an outsider: an 'Ostjude' among the enlightened Jews in Berlin, a freethinker among observant Jews and a Jew among the non-Jews. His autobiography became a classic of autobiographical literature of the Enlightenment. His 'inter-cultural' experience is reflected in his philosophy. Indebted to the Maimonidean as well as to the modern European (notably Kantian) philosophical tradition, he attempted a synthesis of normally exclusive orientations: 'Rational Dogmatism' and 'Empirical Skepticism'. Maimon's importance in the development from Kant to German Idealism has been acknowledged, but the interpretation of his own philosophical position suffered much from this narrow perspective. The essays of leading scholars collected in this volume focus on his synthesis of 'Rational Dogmatism' and 'Empirical Skepticism'.

This book contains the selected proceedings of a conference on Religion in German Idealism which took place in Nij- gen (Netherlands) in January 2000. The conference was - ganized by the Centre of German Idealism, which co-or- nates the research on classical German philosophy in the Netherlands and in Belgium. Generous support of the Dutch Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO) has made this conference possible. A few months after the conference Ludwig died, and this circumstance unexpectedly delayed efforts to bring the proceedings of the conference to p- lished form. We are now happy to present those proce- ings, dedicated to the memory of the founding father of the Centre. It was a great joy to work with Ludwig; it was an even greater joy to be reckoned amongst his friends. It was part of Ludwig’s distinctive charisma that he was able to combine friendship together with collaboration in philo- phical and scholarly work. William Desmond Ernst-Otto Onnasch Paul Cruysberghs ix INTRODUCTION WILLIAM DESMOND, ERNST-OTTO ONNASCHand PAUL CRUYSBERGHS 1 The studies in this book testify to the intimate relation of philosophy and religion in German idealism, a relation not also devoid of tensions, and indeed conflicts. Idealism gave expression to a certain affirmation of the autonomy of p- losophical reason, but this autonomy was one that tried to take into account the importance of religion. Sometimes the results of this claim to autonomy moved towards criticism of religion.

1. Introduction Kant considered the doctrine of transcendental idealism an indisp- sable part of the theory of knowledge presented in the Critique of Pure Reason. My aim in this book is to present a new defense of the coh- ence and plausibility of Kant’s transcendental idealism and its indisp- sability for his theory of knowledge. I will show that the main argument of the Transcendental Aesthetic and the Transcendental Analytic is - fensible independently of some of Kant’s claims which are said to threaten its coherence. I have undertaken an inquiry into the coherence of Kant’s transc- dental idealism for the following reasons. A defense of the coherence of transcendental idealism is required by the existing state of Kantian scholarship. The claim that Kant’s transcendental idealism is incoh- ent has appeared in various forms over the last two centuries. The most powerful and elaborate criticism of Kant’s transcendental idealism is found in Part Four of Strawson’s The Bounds of Sense. Several comm- tators have tried to reestablish its coherence. Although Allison and other commentators have contributed ideas that are valuable for an 1 account of the coherence of Kant’s transcendental idealism, their - guments fall short as a response to the standard objection. Indeed, the claim that Kant’s transcendental idealism is incoherent continues to be the view held by most thinkers. I have limited my goal in this book to establishing the coherence of Kant’s transcendental idealism due to two related reasons.

Hermann Cohen’s philosophy has now, finally, received the recognition it deserves. His thought undoubtedly has all the characteristics of a classic. It faced the great problems of philosophical tradition, with full critical awareness and at the same time, with the capacity to open up new, original routes. It represents one of the last expressions of great systematic thought. The papers collected in this volume deal with different aspects of Cohen’s thought, ethical, political, aesthetic and religious aspectsin particular. However they all represent attempts to follow the ubiquitous presence of certain important themes in Cohen and their capacity for containing meanings that cannot be limited to a single philosophical sphere: themes that are keys to reading unity of inspiration in his thought, which is more deeply imbedded than the exterior architectural unity of his work. The search for the fundamental themes behind Cohen is an important task, if we wish to see this philosopher as a present-day vital point of reference.

Kant is generally conceived to have offered little attention to the fact that we experience the world in and through our bodies. This book argues that this standard image of the great German philosopher is radically wrong. Not only does Kant - throughout his career and in works published before and after the Critique of pure reason - reflect constantly upon the fact that human life is embodied, but the Critique of pure reason itself may be read as a critical reflection aimed at exploring some significant philosophical implications of this fact. Bringing this aspect of Kant's philosophy into focus is important, not only because it sheds new light on our understanding of Kant's work, but also because it is relevant to contemporary discussions in philosophy about embodiment, learning and practice. By taking his philosophy of embodiment into account, the author makes Kant stand out as a true contemporary in new and unexpected ways.

In Hegel’s Idea of the Good Life, Joshua D. Goldstein presents the first book-length study of the development and meaning of Hegel’s account of human flourishing. This volume will be welcomed by philosophers and political theorists seeking to engage with the details of Hegel’s early and mature social thought.By bringing Hegel’s earliest writings into dialogue with his Philosophy of Right, Goldstein argues that Hegel’s mature political philosophy should be understood as a response to his youthful failure to build a sustainable account of the good life upon the foundations of ancient virtue. This study reveals how Hegel’s mature response integrates ancient concerns for the well-ordered life and modern concerns for autonomy in a new, robust conception of selfhood that can be actualized across the full expanse of the modern political community.

The movement of German idealism culminates in the revelation of the re? ective boundaries of theoretical knowledge. The history of the most important intellectual developments thereafter could be described, following a recent remark of Jurgen Habermas, as a his- 1 tory of the de-transcendentalization of the cognizing subject. In this context, the epistemological interpretation proposed in this book must be speci? cally understood. Examining the problem of knowledge in the development of German idealism, it aims not at an epistem- ogy of the Cartesian type, and even less at a formal logical analysis of knowledge which lacks the re? ective element of the devices it employs as "the search for the immutable structures within which knowledge, 2 life, and culture must be contained. " These "structures" do not only condition the process of knowledge, they are themselves conditioned. There is thus an unsurpassable circle in this process, a circle which German idealism brings to the surface and profoundly scrutinizes. Therefore, the task is to re? ectively account for the historical horizons in which cognition arises (being ultimately thereupon dependent), instead of searching for an ultimate Archimedean point for its deduction.Rather than searching for inexplicably transc- dental concepts, this argument points to their determination from within a given Lebenswelt. It does not renounce but rather rede? nes 3 objectivity, by seeing the subject as a coming-to-know-itself totality. 1 J. Habermas, Wahrheit und Rechtfertigung. Philosophische Aufsatze (Frankfurt a. M. : Suhrkamp, 1999), p. 186.

This book outlines and circumvents two serious problems that appear to attach to Kant’s moral philosophy, or more precisely to the model of rational agency that underlies that moral philosophy: the problem of experiential incongruence and the problem of misdirected moral attention. The book’s central contention is that both these problems can be sidestepped. In order to demonstrate this, it argues for an entirely novel reading of Kant’s views on action and moral motivation. In addressing the two main problems in Kant’s moral philosophy, the book explains how the first problem arises because the central elements of Kant’s theory of action seem not to square with our lived experience of agency, and moral agency in particular. For example, the idea that moral deliberation invariably takes the form of testing personal policies against the Categorical Imperative seems at odds with the phenomenology of such reasoning, as does the claim that all our actions proceed from explicitlyadopted general policies, or maxims. It then goes on to discuss the second problem showing how it is a result of Kant’s apparent claim that when an agent acts from duty, her reason for doing so is that her maxim is lawlike. This seems to put the moral agent’s attention in the wrong place: on the nature of her own maxims, rather than on the world of other people and morally salient situations. The book shows how its proposed novel reading of Kant’s views ultimately paints an unfamiliar but appealing picture of the Kantian good-willed agent as much more embedded in and engaged with the world than has traditionally been supposed.

This collection of essays investigates the notions of life, living organisms, and human nature in Classical German Philosophy from a historical and conceptual perspective. Its 19 chapters move from the peculiarities of organic life to the peculiarities of the distinctly human life form and discuss the strengths and weaknesses of naturalistic accounts of life. In light of the growing interest in nature within current philosophical debates, the book provides an overview of what the philosophical epoch of Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Humboldt, the Romantics, Hegel, and others can contribute to our understanding of life today. The collection of essays represents a plurality of approaches that reflects the pluralism of the tradition itself – highlighting the liveliness and polyphonic nature of the issues at stake and the ways in which they were approached in post-Kantian thought.In combining historical and philosophical investigation, the collection constitutes a unique resourcefor scholars and graduate students working in various areas related to the study of nature in philosophy, contemporary theories of science, and the humanities more generally.

This collection of essays investigates the notions of life, living organisms, and human nature in Classical German Philosophy from a historical and conceptual perspective. Its 19 chapters move from the peculiarities of organic life to the peculiarities of the distinctly human life form and discuss the strengths and weaknesses of naturalistic accounts of life. In light of the growing interest in nature within current philosophical debates, the book provides an overview of what the philosophical epoch of Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Humboldt, the Romantics, Hegel, and others can contribute to our understanding of life today. The collection of essays represents a plurality of approaches that reflects the pluralism of the tradition itself – highlighting the liveliness and polyphonic nature of the issues at stake and the ways in which they were approached in post-Kantian thought.In combining historical and philosophical investigation, the collection constitutes a unique resourcefor scholars and graduate students working in various areas related to the study of nature in philosophy, contemporary theories of science, and the humanities more generally.

This book examines the unique views of philosopher Jacob Sigismund Beck, a student of Immanuel Kant who devoted himself to an exploration of his teacher's doctrine and to showing that Kant’s transcendental idealism is, contra to the common view, both internally consistent and is not a form of subjective idealism. In his attempt to explain away certain apparent contradictions found in Kant's system, Beck put forward a new reading of Kant’s critical theory, a view, which came to be known as the Standpunctslehre, the Doctrine of the Standpoint.Author Lior Nitzan reconstructs, step by step, the historical development of Beck’s doctrine. He shows how Beck's unique view is drastically different from that of his contemporaries and presents the relevance of Beck to contemporary debates about the proper interpretation of Kant’s notion of objectivity, the refutation of idealism and the role of the thing in itself in Kant’s transcendental idealism. In doing so, Nitzan presents a defense of Beck's radical perspective of Kant’s theory and claims that some of Kant’s negative responses to it may in fact be due more to the adversary academic environment at the time than to Kant’s true, well considered, opinion.Jacob Sigismund Beck’s Standpunctslehre challenges the two dominant schools in the interpretation of Kant’s transcendental idealism—the "two world" and the "two aspect" view. It presents a new way of understanding Kant’s transcendental idealism, according to which the thing in itself plays no positive role in relation to the possibility of experience. Moreover, it claims that eliminating the thing in itself as the ultimate object of knowledge is not to admit idealism but in fact is the only way to consistently uphold realism. In addition, the book also addresses the question why, assuming that the proposed interpretation is correct, Kant had chosen not to make his true intentions clear.

This book presents a solution to the problem known in philosophical aesthetics as the paradox of ugliness, namely, how an object that is displeasing can retain our attention and be greatly appreciated. It does this by exploring and refining the most sophisticated and thoroughly worked out theoretical framework of philosophical aesthetics, Kant’s theory of taste, which was put forward in part one of the Critique of the Power of Judgment. The book explores the possibility of incorporating ugliness, a negative aesthetic concept, into the overall Kantian aesthetic picture. It addresses a debate of the last two decades over whether Kant's aesthetics should allow for a pure aesthetic judgment of ugliness. The book critically reviews the main interpretations of Kant’s central notion of the free play of imagination and understanding and offers a new interpretation of free play, one that allows for the possibility of a disharmonious state of mind and ugliness.In addition, the book also applies an interpretation of ugliness in Kant’s aesthetics to resolve certain issues that have been raised in contemporary aesthetics, namely the possibility of appreciating artistic and natural ugliness and the role of disgust in artistic representation.Offering a theoretical and practical analysis of different kinds of negative aesthetic experiences, this book will help readers acquire a better understanding of his or her own evaluative processes, which may be helpful in coping with complex aesthetic experiences. Readers will gain unique insight into how ugliness can be offensive, yet, at the same time, fascinating, interesting and captivating.

This book examines the unique views of philosopher Jacob Sigismund Beck, a student of Immanuel Kant who devoted himself to an exploration of his teacher's doctrine and to showing that Kant’s transcendental idealism is, contra to the common view, both internally consistent and is not a form of subjective idealism. In his attempt to explain away certain apparent contradictions found in Kant's system, Beck put forward a new reading of Kant’s critical theory, a view, which came to be known as the Standpunctslehre, the Doctrine of the Standpoint.Author Lior Nitzan reconstructs, step by step, the historical development of Beck’s doctrine. He shows how Beck's unique view is drastically different from that of his contemporaries and presents the relevance of Beck to contemporary debates about the proper interpretation of Kant’s notion of objectivity, the refutation of idealism and the role of the thing in itself in Kant’s transcendental idealism. In doing so, Nitzan presents a defense of Beck's radical perspective of Kant’s theory and claims that some of Kant’s negative responses to it may in fact be due more to the adversary academic environment at the time than to Kant’s true, well considered, opinion.Jacob Sigismund Beck’s Standpunctslehre challenges the two dominant schools in the interpretation of Kant’s transcendental idealism—the "two world" and the "two aspect" view. It presents a new way of understanding Kant’s transcendental idealism, according to which the thing in itself plays no positive role in relation to the possibility of experience. Moreover, it claims that eliminating the thing in itself as the ultimate object of knowledge is not to admit idealism but in fact is the only way to consistently uphold realism. In addition, the book also addresses the question why, assuming that the proposed interpretation is correct, Kant had chosen not to make his true intentions clear.

This book presents a solution to the problem known in philosophical aesthetics as the paradox of ugliness, namely, how an object that is displeasing can retain our attention and be greatly appreciated. It does this by exploring and refining the most sophisticated and thoroughly worked out theoretical framework of philosophical aesthetics, Kant’s theory of taste, which was put forward in part one of the Critique of the Power of Judgment. The book explores the possibility of incorporating ugliness, a negative aesthetic concept, into the overall Kantian aesthetic picture. It addresses a debate of the last two decades over whether Kant's aesthetics should allow for a pure aesthetic judgment of ugliness. The book critically reviews the main interpretations of Kant’s central notion of the free play of imagination and understanding and offers a new interpretation of free play, one that allows for the possibility of a disharmonious state of mind and ugliness.In addition, the book also applies an interpretation of ugliness in Kant’s aesthetics to resolve certain issues that have been raised in contemporary aesthetics, namely the possibility of appreciating artistic and natural ugliness and the role of disgust in artistic representation.Offering a theoretical and practical analysis of different kinds of negative aesthetic experiences, this book will help readers acquire a better understanding of his or her own evaluative processes, which may be helpful in coping with complex aesthetic experiences. Readers will gain unique insight into how ugliness can be offensive, yet, at the same time, fascinating, interesting and captivating.

This book examines the concepts behind a philosophical project on postmodernism: the social and cultural condition of our time, the age of the achieved capitalism. It proposes an original theory of postmodern humanism based on the absence of form and describes the development of philosophical thought as a musical “cadenza” that produces meaning in the empty space between the past of the modern and the future of the postmodern. The book focuses on three main postmodernist themes: the denial of identity and the assertion of the differences, the shattered subject, and the absence of teleology in history and politics.

This book presents a comprehensive study of the influence of Immanuel Kant’s Critical Philosophy in the Russian Empire, spanning the period from the late 19th century to the Bolshevik Revolution. It systematically details the reception bestowed on Kant’s ideas during his lifetime and up to and through the era of the First World War. The book traces the tensions arising in the early 19th century between the imported German scholars, who were often bristling with the latest philosophical developments in their homeland, and the more conservative Russian professors and administrators. The book goes on to examine the frequently neglected criticism of Kant in the theological institutions throughout the Russian Empire as well as the last remaining, though virtually unknown, embers of Kantianism during the reign of Nicholas I. With the political activities of many young radicals during the subsequent decades having been amply studied, this book focuses on their largely ignored attempts to grapple with Kant’s transcendental idealism. It also presents a complete account of the resurgence of interest in Kant in the last two decades of that century, and the growing attempts to graft a transcendental idealism onto popular social and political movements. The book draws attention to the young and budding Russian neo-Kantian movement that mirrored developments in Germany before being overtaken by political events.

This book examines the concepts behind a philosophical project on postmodernism: the social and cultural condition of our time, the age of the achieved capitalism. It proposes an original theory of postmodern humanism based on the absence of form and describes the development of philosophical thought as a musical “cadenza” that produces meaning in the empty space between the past of the modern and the future of the postmodern. The book focuses on three main postmodernist themes: the denial of identity and the assertion of the differences, the shattered subject, and the absence of teleology in history and politics.

This book presents a comprehensive study of the influence of Immanuel Kant’s Critical Philosophy in the Russian Empire, spanning the period from the late 19th century to the Bolshevik Revolution. It systematically details the reception bestowed on Kant’s ideas during his lifetime and up to and through the era of the First World War. The book traces the tensions arising in the early 19th century between the imported German scholars, who were often bristling with the latest philosophical developments in their homeland, and the more conservative Russian professors and administrators. The book goes on to examine the frequently neglected criticism of Kant in the theological institutions throughout the Russian Empire as well as the last remaining, though virtually unknown, embers of Kantianism during the reign of Nicholas I. With the political activities of many young radicals during the subsequent decades having been amply studied, this book focuses on their largely ignored attempts to grapple with Kant’s transcendental idealism. It also presents a complete account of the resurgence of interest in Kant in the last two decades of that century, and the growing attempts to graft a transcendental idealism onto popular social and political movements. The book draws attention to the young and budding Russian neo-Kantian movement that mirrored developments in Germany before being overtaken by political events.

This book presents a comprehensive and detailed exploration of the relationship between the thought of G.W.F. Hegel and that of John McDowell, the latter of whom is widely considered to be one of the most influential living analytic philosophers. It serves as a point of entry in McDowell’s and Hegel’s philosophy, and a substantial contribution to ongoing debates on perceptual experience and perceptual justification, naturalism, human freedom and action. The chapters gathered in this volume, as well as McDowell’s responses, make it clear that McDowell’s work paves the way for an original reading of Hegel’s texts. His conceptual framework allows for new interpretive possibilities in Hegel’s philosophy which, until now, have remained largely unexplored. Moreover, these interpretations shed light on various aspects of continuity and discontinuity between the philosophies of these two authors, thus defining more clearly their positions on specific issues. In addition, they allow us to see Hegel’s thought as containing a number of conceptual tools that might be useful for advancing McDowell’s own philosophy and contemporary philosophy in general.

Kant’s "Critique of Pure Reason" is so outstanding among modern philosophical works, that it can be termed "the" foundation of modern philosophy. Schopenhauer termed it "the most important book ever to have been written in Europe." Otfried Höffe guides the reader through the "Critique" one step at a time, expounding Kant’s thoughts, submitting them to an interpretation and drawing a summary conclusion, placing the work and its topics within the context of its modern successors. A "critical" interpretation of Kant’s text reveals that he had something to say on many discussions that are said to have originated after his death. Reducing his argumentation to its central tenets, it can be made stronger and applicable to current problems. Kant’s eventual concern, however, even when writing theoretical philosophy, lay with the practical. Elaborating this concern and its connection to Kant’s theoretical philosophy is a prime tenet of this book.

Karl Leonhard Reinhold (1757-1823) is a complex figure of the late German Enlightenment. Sometime Catholic priest and active Mason even when still a cleric in Vienna; early disciple of Kant and the first to try to reform the Critique of Reason; influential teacher and prolific author; astute commentator on the immediate post-Kantian scene; and at all times convinced propagandist of the Enlightenment––in all these roles Reinhold reflected his age but also tested the limits of the values that had inspired it. This collection of essays, originally presented at an international workshop held in Montreal in 2007, conveys this multifaceted figure of Reinhold in all its details. In the four themes that run across the contributions––the historicity of reason; the primacy of moral praxis; the personalism of religious belief; and the transformation of classical metaphysics into phenomenology of mind––Reinhold is presented as a catalyst of nineteenth century thought but also as one who remained bound to intellectual prejudices that were typical of the Enlightenment and, for this reason, as still the representative of a past age. The volume contains the text of two hitherto unpublished Masonic speeches by Reinhold, and a description of recently recovered transcripts of student lecture notes dating to Reinhold’s early Jena period.

Salomon Maimon (1753-1800), one of the most fascinating characters of eighteenth-century intellectual history, came from a traditional orthodox Jewish community in Eastern Europe to Berlin to seek Enlightenment. Maimon remained an outsider: an 'Ostjude' among the enlightened Jews in Berlin, a freethinker among observant Jews and a Jew among the non-Jews. His autobiography became a classic of autobiographical literature of the Enlightenment. His 'inter-cultural' experience is reflected in his philosophy. Indebted to the Maimonidean as well as to the modern European (notably Kantian) philosophical tradition, he attempted a synthesis of normally exclusive orientations: 'Rational Dogmatism' and 'Empirical Skepticism'. Maimon's importance in the development from Kant to German Idealism has been acknowledged, but the interpretation of his own philosophical position suffered much from this narrow perspective. The essays of leading scholars collected in this volume focus on his synthesis of 'Rational Dogmatism' and 'Empirical Skepticism'.

This book contains the selected proceedings of a conference on Religion in German Idealism which took place in Nij- gen (Netherlands) in January 2000. The conference was - ganized by the Centre of German Idealism, which co-or- nates the research on classical German philosophy in the Netherlands and in Belgium. Generous support of the Dutch Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO) has made this conference possible. A few months after the conference Ludwig died, and this circumstance unexpectedly delayed efforts to bring the proceedings of the conference to p- lished form. We are now happy to present those proce- ings, dedicated to the memory of the founding father of the Centre. It was a great joy to work with Ludwig; it was an even greater joy to be reckoned amongst his friends. It was part of Ludwig’s distinctive charisma that he was able to combine friendship together with collaboration in philo- phical and scholarly work. William Desmond Ernst-Otto Onnasch Paul Cruysberghs ix INTRODUCTION WILLIAM DESMOND, ERNST-OTTO ONNASCHand PAUL CRUYSBERGHS 1 The studies in this book testify to the intimate relation of philosophy and religion in German idealism, a relation not also devoid of tensions, and indeed conflicts. Idealism gave expression to a certain affirmation of the autonomy of p- losophical reason, but this autonomy was one that tried to take into account the importance of religion. Sometimes the results of this claim to autonomy moved towards criticism of religion.

1. Introduction Kant considered the doctrine of transcendental idealism an indisp- sable part of the theory of knowledge presented in the Critique of Pure Reason. My aim in this book is to present a new defense of the coh- ence and plausibility of Kant’s transcendental idealism and its indisp- sability for his theory of knowledge. I will show that the main argument of the Transcendental Aesthetic and the Transcendental Analytic is - fensible independently of some of Kant’s claims which are said to threaten its coherence. I have undertaken an inquiry into the coherence of Kant’s transc- dental idealism for the following reasons. A defense of the coherence of transcendental idealism is required by the existing state of Kantian scholarship. The claim that Kant’s transcendental idealism is incoh- ent has appeared in various forms over the last two centuries. The most powerful and elaborate criticism of Kant’s transcendental idealism is found in Part Four of Strawson’s The Bounds of Sense. Several comm- tators have tried to reestablish its coherence. Although Allison and other commentators have contributed ideas that are valuable for an 1 account of the coherence of Kant’s transcendental idealism, their - guments fall short as a response to the standard objection. Indeed, the claim that Kant’s transcendental idealism is incoherent continues to be the view held by most thinkers. I have limited my goal in this book to establishing the coherence of Kant’s transcendental idealism due to two related reasons.

Hermann Cohen’s philosophy has now, finally, received the recognition it deserves. His thought undoubtedly has all the characteristics of a classic. It faced the great problems of philosophical tradition, with full critical awareness and at the same time, with the capacity to open up new, original routes. It represents one of the last expressions of great systematic thought. The papers collected in this volume deal with different aspects of Cohen’s thought, ethical, political, aesthetic and religious aspectsin particular. However they all represent attempts to follow the ubiquitous presence of certain important themes in Cohen and their capacity for containing meanings that cannot be limited to a single philosophical sphere: themes that are keys to reading unity of inspiration in his thought, which is more deeply imbedded than the exterior architectural unity of his work. The search for the fundamental themes behind Cohen is an important task, if we wish to see this philosopher as a present-day vital point of reference.

Kant is generally conceived to have offered little attention to the fact that we experience the world in and through our bodies. This book argues that this standard image of the great German philosopher is radically wrong. Not only does Kant - throughout his career and in works published before and after the Critique of pure reason - reflect constantly upon the fact that human life is embodied, but the Critique of pure reason itself may be read as a critical reflection aimed at exploring some significant philosophical implications of this fact. Bringing this aspect of Kant's philosophy into focus is important, not only because it sheds new light on our understanding of Kant's work, but also because it is relevant to contemporary discussions in philosophy about embodiment, learning and practice. By taking his philosophy of embodiment into account, the author makes Kant stand out as a true contemporary in new and unexpected ways.