Contributions in Military Studies – serie

Analyses the performance of two key parties engaged in fighting during World War II.

The period from the Indian wars to WWI saw the evolution of the U.S. Army from a 25,000 man frontier constabulary to a modern professionally led two million man force fighting in a coalition war in Europe. This study describes the context within which the Leavenworth schools--begun in 1881--evolved.

Lewis thoroughly analyzes the processes through which social reality is constructed and subjectively appropriated by individuals. Step-by-step he shows precisely how a war in Southeast Asia became a young man's reality, how Americans found themseles compelled to scrap the cultural knowledge they had been taught, how an individual went from civilian to combat soldier and back again and was flung into a cultural twilight zone. To reconstruct their world view, Lewis dips into the minds, hearts, and souls of the young men who witnessed the Vietnam War firsthand. As they tell their own stories he focuses on the socio-psychological consequences.

No army in the Middle East has been as written about in English as has Israel's, yet this book actually says something new. Reuven Gal, former chief psychologist of the IDF, looks at the influences on the Israeli soldier and their impact on the IDF's performance. He is able to deal with issues such as motivation and camaraderie, leadership and heroism from a human viewpoint. . . . a detailed assembly of data such as this one is welcome, and the sociological-psychological jargon is kept at a minimum. This is neither hagiography nor psychobabble, and it contains a great deal of detail. Middle East Journal

In October 1973, the State of Israel was invaded by Egyptian and Syrian forces. Despite early losses, Israel managed to outfight its opponents. The brief and bloody Yom Kippur War stands as a unique chapter in modern military history. Fought primarily by tank units, the war became a story not only of battle strategy and tactics, but also one of human discipline, endurance and sacrifice.While many historians have chronicled the events of the Yom Kippur War, few have been seasoned by actual combat. Avigdor Kahalani, commander of a tank battalion on the Golan Heights during the Yom Kippur War, describes this experience in The Heights of Courage. Beginning with a description of the initial Syrian offensive, he recounts the personal endeavors of his men, their fears and their ambitions, as well as their emotional and physical hardships. His stark account traces the efforts of the Israel Armored Corps as they struggle to overcome extreme difficulties and setbacks. The author describes their ultimate penetration into enemy territory and their approach to within forty kilometers of Damascus.

This book documents American planning for the occupation of Austria after World War II. The authors show how plans made during the war had to be changed in the face of military and political realities and the postwar years of frustration and hope, success and failure, especially until 1950. Despite the Allied instrusion, they demonstrate how the Austrians were able to defy the Allies and achieve their dream of economic and political survival within the framework of a democratic national government.

Gordon's book reveals an impressive mastery of the archival and secondary sources available on the subject. His writing is crisp and interesting, yet sober and scholarly at the same time. The daring and resourceful men of the British desert forces have found a historian whose ability to tell their story matches their ability to create some of the most daring and imaginative operations of World War II. This is an extraordinary book about extraordinary soldiers. Military Review

This wide-ranging collection of essays establishes a historical framework for understanding the evolution and current state of U.S. and Soviet policies toward arms control as it details the course of arms control negotiations between the two superpowers. In addition, it treats arms control, nuclear armaments, and strategic considerations from a variety of perspectives, examining the social and moral aspects as well as political and economic considerations.

Since the collapse of the French Army in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870, military strategists and officials have recognized the critical importance of mobilization and concentration to the outcome of armed conflicts. This study breaks new ground in the study of military history by providing a reconstruction of the French mobilization in 1870. Thomas Adriance demonstrates that the French defeat was largely due to their inability to match Prussia's mobilization and exploit Prussian concentration blunders. A major contribution to our understanding of the reasons for France's costly defeat in 1870, The Last Gaiter Button also sheds new light on the general importance of mobilization and concentration in the conduct of modern warfare.

This study provides a tactical, strategic, and operational view of the interwar German army as a fighting organization. The book describes in detail the process by which the Reichswehr attempted the accomplishment of its principal task--that of defending Germany's borders, particularly those along the eastern frontier, from the end of the First World War until the formation of the Hitler cabinet in January 1933.

The joint efforts of Roosevelt and Mahan to secure U.S. prominence in the Western Hemisphere through sea power and to develop a navy capable of confronting powerful enemies in the Atlantic and Pacific altered hemispheric relations irrevocably and had important consequences for the conduct and outcome of both world wars. The author describes the working relationship that developed between the two men when Roosevelt served first as civil service commissioner and subsequently as assistant secretary of the navy, and the events, controversies, and policies that eventually led to the creation of a strong naval force. Professor Turk's balanced, informed analysis sheds new light on the Roosevelt-Mahan relationship--both its collaborations and its conflicts--and the significance of their interaction for modern American history.

The Long Wait examines the history of the United States' dealings with the United Kingdom on nuclear matters in the first dozen years following the Second World War. Chief among the issues analyzed are whether to share nuclear information, know-how, and technology with the British; whether to cooperate in the control and allocation of critical raw and nuclear materials, whether to grant the British any right of consultation on use of American nuclear bombers based in Britain, and on what terms to introduce into Britain American intermediate range nuclear-tipped missiles.

The central problem discussed in this timely volume is the continuing question of how to incorporate nuclear weapons into NATO strategy in such a way that the military defense posture possesses sufficient credibility to deter the Soviet Union and reassure the allies. The evolution and differences in the strategic concepts of the major nations in the Alliance are analyzed by examining the character of the opposing military capabilities and some of the practical problems of fighting a local nuclear battle, a doctrine of nuclear constraints is proposed that would make the nature and purpose of employing tactical nuclear weapons more distinguishable, thus hopefully lessening miscalculation that might lead to escalation to general nuclear war. This is the first comprehensive conceptual analysis of a nuclear doctrine for actually fighting a land battle in Europe.

This volume is the first recent work to examine the major naval combatants of World War II. Sadkovich has brought together essays by eight contributors, each an expert in his field, to reevaluate the roles and performances of the particular navies and the specific geopolitical circumstances under which they operated. Also included is an introduction that both outlines the pre-War conditions that shaped the navies and draws comparisons between the eight combatants. Reevaluating Major Naval Combatants of World War II is a superb collection of provoactive essays on eight navies. Carl Boyd, Old Dominion UniversityThis study of World War II naval combatants, a collection of eight separate essays, developed out of the editor's recognition that no recent work has attempted to evaluate the performance of the war's major naval participants. Sadkovich commissioned an essay on each of the eight major navies involved in the war, allowing each essay's author to assess the role and performance of a particular navy according to the tasks and compositions of that combatant. Although each essay mirrors the peculiarities of the navy under discussion, the common elements allow comparisons and conclusions to be drawn.The volume is devoted to the United States, Great Britain, Canada, Japan, France, Germany, Italy, and the Soviet Union. Each essay has been written by an expert in the particular field. In addition, the editor has provided an introduction that describes the changing state of navies worldwide prior to the war and draws comparisons between the navies discussed in each essay. A selected bibliography has also been included. The book will be a noteworthy addition to both university and public libraries, and an essential source for researchers and scholars of naval history.

Those interested in reforming the Army's personnel and evaluation systems will find The Spit-Shine Syndome's fairly detailed proposals both interesting and thought-provoking. Armed Forces Journal Bassford's comprehensive proposals put him in an altogether different category from other self-proclaimed `defense reformers.' . . . Bassford criticizes but he also offers a package of solutions. His frustrations seem to be shared by at least some of the Army's leadership. Gen. John Galvin, our top commander in NATO, has lamented the `grindstone of bureaucratic business' that undermines combat readiness. In his approving foreword to Bassford's writing, retired Lt. Gen. Robert Elton declared: `The potential is there to mold a truly great Army. . . . This book screams for someone to listen.' And perhaps more important, to act. Chicago TribuneThe problem of adjusting American military organization to new social, political, and strategic realities has perplexed military thinkers since the closing days of World War II; proposals for reform have proliferated since the end of the Vietnam War. Practical solutions, however, have proven elusive. In this volume, the author examines the various existing approaches to reform and concludes that most are either unworkable or irrelevant--if not actually counter-productive--to improving the effectiveness of American combat forces. The author rejects suggestions that perennial American military failure can be traced to the inadequacies of military personnel or of American society in general; he argues that neither a return to the draft, imposition of an ethical code for military leaders, nor creation of a General Staff will address fundamental issues. Likewise, he argues that structural reform, while needed, can only strike at symptoms, not causes. It is the author's view that the roots of American military ineptitude lie in the military services' organizational methods, not their organizational structure. These methods are the natural product of the unique evolution of American military institutions. They are incompatible with the structure, role, and doctrine of the armed forces as they exist today.

This well-researched study explores a virtually unknown and largely enigmatic aspect of World War II--the nature of amphibious operations in the Aegean Sea in 1943. More than an historical account, it is designed to interpret and reassess the crucial decisions which influenced the outcome of what has become known as the Dodecanese Disaster. The British operations in the Aegean at that time present many parallels with the recent conflict in the Falklands in terms of scale and order of battle, the critical difference being that operations in the Aegean resulted in tragic failure.The author leads the reader through a web of intrigue, incompetence, fantasy, and cover-up to find the truth. He vividly portrays the tensions between American and British perspectives in the strategy for the war against Germany.

Beyond the traditional two-dimensional analyses of defense economics and defense politics lies a rapidly growing field of research: the political economy of defense. As the study of the interface between economics, politics, and defense proliferates, this collective volume sets out to identify the nature of political economy of defense inquiry, surpassing a narrower focus on the economic consequences of military spending.The starting point for this collaborative effort was a series of panel discussions, organized by Andrew L. Ross, in which most of the contributors to this volume participated. The majority of chapters were written expressly for this book and have not been previously published. These analytical and empirical investigations are intended to illustrate the broad, encompassing scope of political economy of defense research and contribute to the development of a research agenda. Andrew L. Ross has brought together a timely and significant array of inquiry into the impact of defense spending on world politics and global economics. This book will be of great interest to political scientists, defense specialists, and economists studying the military-industrial complex.

Although war has been analyzed from many perspectives, no scholar has satisfactorily explained why the human race fights and how we came to create a degree of military sophistication capable of destroying the entire species. Gabriel addresses these questions in his study of the origins and development of warfare. He looks particularly at the relationship between the evolution of the social institution of war and the development of the military institutions, tactical sciences, and technology required for organized conflict.Beginning with a discussion of the biological and evolutionary history of man, Gabriel investigates the proposition that the human race is genetically predisposed to warlike behavior. He next reviews the archaeological record to test the common assumption that war has existed from the earliest times. He traces the evolution of the social institutions and technology of war in a succession of ancient cultures beginning with the Bronze Age. The development of armies, tactics, logistics, and weapons is examined, together with the psychological and social implications of mankind's choice to use them. The work concludes with a discussion demonstrating how the practice of war in modern times relates to the perpetuation of values and institutional forms created by earlier societies--especially those of classical Greece and Rome. The first study to integrate the findings of cultural anthropology with the concerns of military analysis, this work will be of interest to students and academics in these and related fields.

When the German army invaded Russia in June 1941, the United States' Lend-Lease system was already in place to aid friendly powers at war and thereby promote the defense of the U.S. Enacted so that the U.S. could lend war material to Britain, the system allowed the transfer of weapons, machinery, agricultural products, and other defense items. Although politically and practically difficult, Lend-Lease was also extended to the Soviets, and in Feeding the Bear, van Tuyll studies the rarely scrutinized subject of the military impact of Lend-Lease on Russian efforts to repel the Nazi invaders. In the post-war period, many histories, memoirs, scholarly studies, and polemics on the Eastern Front by German, American, and Soviet authors have appeared but no comprehensive American official history of the Lend-Lease program was ever published. Van Tuyll uses a wealth of data from many sources including some from the substantial Military Mission files, declassified as recently as 1983, to assess the long-neglected issue of the actual impact of Lend-Lease aid on Soviet victory on the Eastern Front. By synthesizing the many types of technical information, economic data, and statistics, van Tuyll is able to formulate challenging conclusions regarding the program's impact. The difficulty in making this assessment was compounded not only by an almost fifty-year perspective, but also because Soviet information on its military situation, army, or internal economic conditions was scarce and often dismissive of foreign aid. The Germans viewed their failure as due to weather, numbers, Hitler's errors, inadequate intelligence, or lack of gasoline and not to Soviet expertise in the immense offensives of 1943-1945.Among the ten chapters there are considerations of the complicated Soviet view of Lend-Lease, analyses of the technical aspects, and explorations not only of the overall impact but also of the effect on decisive battles such as Stalingrad and Berlin. The introduction provides a thorough grounding in the background of the Lend-Lease program and surveys other treatments of the subject. The appendix contains over 45 valuable tables that provide data on every aspect of Lend-Lease, including exports by region, value of U.S. shipments to the Soviet Union, deliveries of food, clothing, and medicine, and estimated Soviet production capacity, among others. This is truly a landmark volume that will be consulted and read avidly by students and scholars of European and American History, and World War II in particular, as well as those involved with Military History, Soviet Studies, Soviet Economic History, and U.S.-Soviet Relations.

Although the stability of the Persian Gulf region has been of rising importance since World War II, it was during the 1980s, when the Iran-Iraq War threatened to upset the balance of power in the region, that its importance became even more magnified. This collection of essays surveys the current state of that region, placing into clearer perspective the political, security, and diplomatic dimensions of the recently ended war. By reevaluating the political landscape of the Gulf, the book produces a gauge for better assessing those factors and forces that affected the conflict's outcome and that will continue to influence future political and security developments in the region.The volume begins with an introduction by the editor that examines the geography of the Gulf and the primary geopolitical factors that influenced perceptions of the region during the war. The essays are then divided into two sections covering Strategic and Political Dimensions and Diplomatic and Legal Dimensions. Topics covered in the first section include the roots of the crisis, Soviet, Israeli and Arab Gulf states' interests in the conflict, U.S. policy in the region, and the role of U.S. military forces. Section two discusses the reflagging of Kuwaiti tankers, the United Nations' involvement, and the cease-fire negotiations. The book concludes with a selected bibliography and an index. This study will be an important resource for courses in political science, diplomacy, and Mid-East history, as well as a significant addition to both public and university libraries.