Contributions to Phenomenology – serie

This book has two parts. The first part is chiefly concerned with critically establishing the universally necessary order of the various steps of transcendental phenomenological method; the second part provides specific cases of phenomenological analysis that illustrate and test the method established in the first part. More than this, and perhaps even more important in the long run, the phenomeno­ logical analyses reported in the second part purport a foundation for drawing phenomenological-philosophical conclusions about prob­ lems of space perception, "other minds," and time perception. The non-analytical, that is, the literary, sources of this book are many. Principal among them are the writings of Husserl (which will be accorded a special methodological function) as well as the writings of his students of the Gottingen and Freiburg years. Of the latter especially important are the writings and, when memory serves, the lectures of Dorion Cairns and Aron Gurwitsch. Of the former especially significant are the writings of Heinrich Hofmann, Wilhelm Schapp, and Hedwig COlilrad-Martius.

As this collection of essays demonstrates, over a long career Edward Goodwin Ballard has written on a wide range of topics of philosophical interest. Although the present volume can be enjoy­ ably browsed, it is not simply a sampling of his writings. Rather, herein Professor Ballard has chosen and organized essays which pertain to the major concerns of his philosophic life. He has long held that the function of philosophy, particularly in a time such as ours, is the discernment and analysis of basic principles (archai) and their consequences. Indeed, in Philosophy at the Crossroads. he recommended focusing upon the history of philosophy understood as the movement of recognizing and interpreting the shifts in first principles as they reflect and determine human change. For Ballard, the study of the history of philosophy, like philosophy itself, is not so much a body of knowledge as an exercise (an art) whiQh moves the practitioner towards social and individual maturity. He holds, along with Plato and Husserl, that philosophy is a process of conversion to the love of wisdom as well as a grasp of the means for its attainment. Throughout his writings, Ballard has maintained that the difficulties of this journey have to do with the limitations of the pilgrim. Human being is perspectival, finite, and inevitably ignorant. Philosophic command and self -recognition reside in the just assessment of the limits of human knowledge.

It has been a constant intention of the series of AMERICAN UNIVERSITY PUBLICATIONS IN PHILOSOPHY to present to the philosophical reader books which probed the frontiers of contemporary philosophy. That intention remains true of the following volume, which offers an international dialogue regarding the phenomenological program and succeeding movements. Early in this Series we tried, as well, to initiate philosophical discussion across serious boundaries and barriers which have characterized contemporary reflection. That theme also continued in the original essays presented herein. With the publication of this fifth volume in the Series we have crossed something of a minor milestone in our endeavor, and are appreciative of the kind welcome with which we have been received by the readers. We wish to thank sincerely the contributors to this volume for their helpful and willing cooperation. We also wish to thank Ms. Irmgard Scherer for her translation of Professor Apel's paper, as well as Professor Apel himself for reviewing this translation. We are also pleased to thank the Office of the Dean of the College Of Arts And Sciences and especially Dean Betty T. Bennett, for a grant for typing, as well as Ms. Mary H. Wason for her fine typing skills and her kind cooperation.

The rift which has long divided the philosophical world into opposed schools-the "Continental" school owing its origins to the phenomenology of Husserl and the "analytic" school derived from Frege-is finally closing. But this closure is occurring in ways both different and in certain respects at odds with one another. On the one hand scholars are seeking to rediscover the concerns and positions common to both schools, positions from which we can continue fruitfully to address important philosophical issues. On the other hand successors to both traditions have developed criticisms of basic assumptions shared by the two schools. They have suggested that we must move not merely beyond the conflict between these two "modem" schools but beyond the kind of philosophy represented in the unity of the two schools and thereby move towards a new "postmodern" philosophical style. On the one hand, then and for example, Husserl scholarship has in recent years witnessed the development of an interpretation of Husserl which more closely aligns his phenomenology with the philosophical concerns of the "analytic" tradition. In certain respects, this should come as no surprise and is long overdue. It is true, after all, that the early Husserl occupied himself with many of the same philosophical issues as did Frege and the earliest thinkers of the analytic tradition. Examples include the concept of number, the nature of mathematical analysis, meaning and reference, truth, formalization, and the relationship between logic and mathematics.

by Paul Ricoeur It is already a piece of good fortune to find oneself understood by a reader who is at once demanding and benevolent. It is an even greater fortune to be better understood by another than by one's own self. In effect, when I look back, I am rather struck by the discontinuity among my works, each of which takes on a specific problem and apparently has little more in common with its predecessor than the fact of having left an overflow of unanswered questions behind it as a residue. On the contrary, Domenico Jervolino's interpretation of my works, which extend over more than forty years, stresses their coherence, in spite of the gap in time between my present, soon to be issued work--Temps et Recit--and my first, Philosophie de la Volonte: Ie Volontaire et l'lnvolontaire. Our friend finds the principle of coherence first of all in the recurrence of a problem: the destiny of the idea of subjectivity, caught in the cross-fire between Nietzsche and Heidegger on one side and semiology, psychoanalysis and the critique of ideology on the other. He finds it likewise in the insistence on a method: the mediating role played by interpretation, mainly of texts, with regard to reflexion on self.

This collection of essays draws together work done during a period of more than fifteen years. In the course of these years much has changed, including much about politics. Patterns of political activity have been trans­ formed. Ways in which we had been accustomed to construe politics have been substantially modified and sometimes replaced. Some apparently in­ tractable conflicts have been resolved. Other, apparently more manageable, conflicts have shown shocking durability. A number of political doctrines once considered indefinitely serviceable have lost all relevance. And the material and technical resources at our disposal look strikingly different than they did just a few years ago. Practical politics of whatever stripe encounters at every turn ever more grave environmental degradation. But, or so this collection assumes, not everything political has changed. Some political issues, both "theoretical" and "practical," remain persistently trenchant. Questions like the following demand ever renewed consideration. What is the point and worth of belonging to a political community? What entitlements and responsibilities follow upon such membership? Or even more fundamentally, what conditions are required for there to be politics at all? Taken together, the essays collected in this volume propose a way both to understand and to engage in politics which is properly responsive both to perennial political issues and to the peculiar exigencies of our era. Some of them present criticisms of widely held, warmly cherished ways of addressing political matters. Others propose constructive alternatives.

Thomas A. Fay Heidegger and the Formalization of Thought 1 Dagfinn F011esdal The Justification of Logic and Mathematics in Husserl's Phenomenology 25 Guillermo E. Rosado Haddock On Husserl's Distinction between State of Affairs (Sachverhalt) and Situation of Affairs (Sachlage) ...35 David Woodruff Smith On Situations and States of Affairs 49 Charles W. Harvey, Jaakko Hintikka Modalization and Modalities ...59 Gilbert T. Null Remarks on Modalization and Modalities 79 J. N. Mohanty Husserl's Formalism 93 Carl J. Posy Mathematics as a Transcendental Science 107 vi Gian-carlo Rota Mathematics and the Task of Phenomenology 133 John Scalon "Tertium Non Datur:" Husserl's Conception of a Definite Multiplicity ...139 Thomas M. Seebohm Psychologism Revisited 149 Gerald J. Massey Some Reflections on Psychologism 183 Robert S. Tragesser How Mathematical Foundation all but come about: A Report on Studies Toward a Phenomenological Critique of Godel's Views on Mathematical Intuition. . 195 Kenneth L. Manders On Geometric Intentionality 215 Dallas Willard Sentences which are True in Virtue of their Color ...225 John J.Drummond Willard and Husserl on Logical Form 243 Index of Names 257 Index of Subjects 259 PREFACE The phenomenology of logic and ideal objects is the topic of Husserl's Logical Investigations. This book determined the early development of the so called phenomenological movement. It is still the main source for many phenomenologists, even if they disagree with Husserl's transcendental turn and developed other phenomenological positions or positions beyond phenomenology he early sense.

Contemporaryphilosophyseems a great swirling almost chaos. Every situation must seem so at the time, probably because philosophy itself resists structura­ tion and because personal and political factors within as well as without the discipline must fade in order for the genuinely philosophical merits of performances to be assessed. Nevertheless, some remarks can still be made to situate the present volume. For example, at least half of philosophy on planet Earth is today pursued in North America (which is not to say that this portion is any less internally incoherent than the whole of which it thus becomes the largest part) and the present volume is North American. (Incidentally, the recognition of culturally geographic traditions and tendencies nowise implies that striving for cross-culturalif not trans-cultural philosophical validity has failed or ceased. Rather, it merely recognizes a significant aspect relevant from the historical point of view.) Episte- Aesthetics Ethics Etc. mology Analytic Philosophy Marxism Existentialism Etc. Figure 1. There are two main ways in which philosophical developments are classified. One is in terms of tendencies, movements, and schools of thought and the other is in terms of traditional sub-disciplines. When there is little contention among schools, the predominant way is in terms of sub-disciplines, such as aesthetics, ethics, politics, etc. Today this mode of classification can be seen to intersect with that in terms of movements and tendencies, both of which are represented in the above chart.

Philosophers contributing new ideas are commonly caught within a received philosophical vocabulary and will often coin new, technical terms. Husserl understood himself as advancing a new theory of intentionality, and he fashioned the new vocabulary of `noesis' and `noema'. But Husserl's own statements regarding the noema are ambiguous. Hence, it is no surprise that controversy has ensued. The articles in this book elucidate and clarify the notion of the noema; the book includes articles which phenomenologically describe and analyze the noemata of various experiences as well as articles which undertake the `metaphenomenological' explication of the doctrine of the noema. These two enterprises cannot be isolated from one another. Any analysis of the noema of a particular type of experience will necessarily illustrate, at least by instantiating the general notion of noema. And any metaphenomenological account of the noema itself will guide particular researches into the noemata of particular experiences.

§ 1. Remarks on the Current Status of the Problematic. The literature treating the relationship between the phenomenologies of Husserl and Heidegger has not been kind to Husserl. Heidegger's "devastating" phenomenologically ontological critique of traditional epistemology and ontology, advanced under the rubric of "fundamental ontology" in Being and Time, has almost been universallyl received, despite the paucity of its references to Husserl, as sounding the death knell for Husserl's original formulation of phenomenology. The recent publication of Heidegger's lectures from the period surrounding his composition of Being and Time, lectures that contain detailed references and critical analyses of Husserl's phenomenology, and which, in the words of one respected commentator, Rudolf Bernet, "offer at long last, insight into the principal sources of fundamental ontology,"2 will, if 3 the conclusions reached by the same commentator are any indication, serve only to reinforce the perception of Heidegger's phenomenological /I superiority" over Husserl. This is not to suggest that the tendency toward Heidegger partisan­ ship in the literature treating the relationship of his phenomenology to Husserl's has its basis in extra-philosophical or extra-phenome­ nological concerns and considerations. Rather, it is to draw attention to the undeniable 'fact' that Heidegger's reformulation of Husserl's phenomenology has cast a "spell" over all subsequent discussions of the basic problems and issues involved in what has become known as their "controversy.

This volume is a selection of essays from the Japanese-American Joint Seminar on Phenomenology held in the suburbs of Sanda-city (Japan) October 24-27, 1989, under the auspices of the Center for Advanced Research in Phenomenology, Inc. Florida Atiantic University and the Phenomenological Association of Japan. Professor Eiichi Shimomisse played a particularly impartant role in the organizational processes. The theme of the conference was "Japanese and Western Phenomenology. " This seminar marks the first attempt to organize, on a comparatively large scale, a cooperative research meeting in phenomenology (perhaps for the first time even in philosophy in general) between Japan and the English speaking West. Eighteen phenomenologists from the United States, Canada, and Australia and about thirty Japanese colleagues attended the meeting. Revised vers ions of aimost all the papers that were read and discussed in the sessions are inc1uded. It was not a trifling affair to setHe upon what language we phenome- nologists from across the world could use to communicate with each other at this conference.As many of the Japanese scholars had studied in Germany and speak better German than English, the official language of the seminar was defined to inc1ude both German and English. So me of the papers, accordingly, were written and read in German. But now they are all rewritten here in English. Not only these papers, but aH the manuscripts written by Japanese authors were edited both grammaticaHy and stylisticaHy by Professor Blosser.

To know the work of Jitendra Nath Mohanty even slightly is to commence to appreciate it immensely. Lucidity and sagacity have been its armor; originality and ingenuity have been its strength. And wearing the former and wielding the latter have become so persistent a mark of his work as to suggest that their appeal for Mohanty lies altogether more in the refmed reaches of philosophical craftsmanship than on the coarse ground of intellectual partisanship. The multifaceted character of his work in phenomenology and Indian philosophy has never left us palled by its significance and, as a consequence, has always left us conceding its command on our philosophical discourse. It has fulfilled the most welcomed promise of striking the chords of both imagination and reason by exposing Husserlian phenomenology to the concerns of both the so-called "analytical" and "continental" traditions and by exposing the philosophical tradition of Indian thought to the intricacies of Husserl. Although charting and periodizing the body ofMohanty' s work in phenomeno­ logy may be the function of a memory inconspicuous for originality and liveli­ ness, they nonetheless offer a precis conspicuous for the variety of topics that Mohanty has both engaged and enriched. Mohanty's career in phenomenology can be characterized by three phases, each concentrating on different themes, but with the latter two also epitomizing a more incisive and deeper discussion of the issues raised in the first.

This work makes a direct contribution to the connection between phenomenology and cognitive science. Continuing Husserl's science of consciousness, the author shows that consciousness is structured in all sorts of ways and that it is very complicated, with one kind of consciousness being enclosed within other kinds. In particular, he provides a notation to reveal the structures of consciousness more vividly, thus fixing and isolating issues and allowing for rational, communicable analysis of conscious awareness. With this tool, clear-cut distinctions among different forms of mentally representing and thereby intentionally referring to something are elaborated. The notation might also be of assistance in present-day discussions about parallelism in computer architecture and programming. This work should be of interest to philosophers of mind, cognitive scientists and psychologists, phenomenologists, neuroscientists interested in consciousness.

I have always had a great interest in the philosophy of science. At first this interest led to reflections on the mathematical sciences;l later my focus shifted to the natural sciences;2 during the past twenty years or so my interest has also included the behavioral, social, and historical sciences) From the very start my interest was always combined with a concern for the history of the sciences. In philosophy of science proper, my main interest was not in logical, methodological, or even epistemological issues, although I obviously studied and taught the most important insights proposed in the leading publications in this large field of study. My concern has always been predominantly ontological; and in that area I have approached the relevant issues from a 4 phenomenological perspective. For what follows it is perhaps of some importance to mention here that I came to phenomenology in a rather indirect way, through the philosophy of Nicolai Hartmann. Yet it was mainly the influence of Herman Van Breda and Alphonse De Waelhens which led me directly to Husserl's phenomenology. At first I fo- cused almost exclusively on Husserl's phenomenology.Later I moved in the direction of the philosophy of Merleau-Ponty and, 1Cf. Joseph J. Kockelmans, Philosophy of Mathematics in the Middle Ages (in Dutch) (Langemark: Vonksteen, 1953); "On the Mode of Being of Mathematical Entities" (in Dutch), in Tijdschrift voor Philosophie, 16(1954), pp. 289-33l. 2Joseph J. Kockelmans, On Time and Space.

Phenomenology of the Cultural Disciplines is an interdisciplinary study, reflecting the recent emergence of various particular forms of `phenomenological philosophy of ...'. Included are such fields as psychology, social sciences and history, as well as environmental philosophy, ethnic studies, religion and even more practical disciplines, such as medicine, psychiatry, politics, and technology. The Introduction provides a way of understanding how these various developments are integrated. On the basis of a Husserlian notion of culture, it proposes a generic concept of `cultural disciplines' (which is broader than but inclusive of `human sciences') which subsumes the more specific concepts of `cultural sciences', `axiotic disciplines' (e.g. architecture), and `practical disciplines'.

This encyclopedia presents phenomenological thought and the phenomenological movement within philosophy and within more than a score of other disciplines on a level accessible to professional colleagues of other orientations as well as to advanced undergraduate and graduate students. Entries average 3,000 words. In practically all cases, they include lists of works "For Further Study." The Introduction briefly chronicles the changing phenomenological agenda and compares phenomenology with other 20th Century movements. The 166 entries are a baut matters of seven sorts: ( 1) the faur broad tendencies and periods within the phenomenological movement; (2) twenty-three national traditions ofphenomenology; (3) twenty-two philosophical sub-disciplines, including those referred to with the formula "the philosophy of x"; (4) phenomenological tendencies within twenty-one non-philosophical dis­ ciplines; (5) forty major phenomenological topics; (6) twenty-eight leading phenomenological figures; and (7) twenty-seven non-phenomenological figures and movements ofinteresting sim­ ilarities and differences with phenomenology. Conventions Concern ing persons, years ofbirth and death are given upon first mention in an entry ofthe names of deceased non-phenomenologists. The names of persons believed tobe phenomenologists and also, for cross-referencing purposes, the titles of other entries are printed entirely in SMALL CAPITAL letters, also upon first mention. In addition, all words thus occurring in all small capital letters are listed in the index with the numbers of all pages on which they occur. To facilitate indexing, Chinese, Hungarian, and Japanese names have been re-arranged so that the personal name precedes the family name.

by Pierre Kerszberg Joseph J. Kockelmans: A Biographical Note Joseph Kockelmans was born on December I, 1923, at Meerssen in the Netherlands. In 1951 he received his doctoral degree in philosophy from the Institute for Medieval Philosophy, Angelico, Rome. Earlier on, he had earned a "Baccalaureate" and a "Licence" from the same institution. Upon his return to the Netherlands, he engaged in a series of post-doctoral studies. His first subject was mathematics, which he studied under H. Busard who taught at the Institute of Technology at Venlo (1952-55). A major turning-point then occurred when, from 1955 to 1962, his post-doctoral research centered simultaneously around physics under A. D. Fokker at the University of Leyden, and phenomenology under H. L. Van Breda at the Husserl Archives of the University of Louvain. Still in the Netherlands, his first position as professor of philosophy was at the Agricultural University of Wageningen from 1963 to 1964. Even though he had been a Visiting Professor at Duquesne University in 1962, the year 1964 marked the actual beginning of his career in the United States. He began by holding a professorship at the New School for Social Research in New York (1964-65). Before establishing himself permanently at the Pennsylvania State University from 1968 onward, where he became a Distinguished Professor of Philosophy in 1990, he also held a professorship at the University of Rittsburgh from 1965 to 1968.

This volume contains sOOeen essays written by his students and colleagues in honor of Maurice Natanson. The essays explore some of the diverse themes Professor Natanson has pursued through forty years of teaching and philosophizing in the tradition of existential phenomenology. Because it also includes a lengthy biographical and philosophical interview where one can find an absorbing account of Natanson's Lebens/au/in his own words, there is no need to detail that polypragmatic career here. Suffice to say that even passing acquaintance with the man and the work will reveal that Edmund Husserl's self-description holds equally of his distinguished interpreter: "I seek not to instruct but only to lead, to point out and describe what I see. I claim no other right than that of speaking according to my best lights, principally before myself but in the same manner also before others, as one who has lived in all its seriousness the fate of a philosophical existence. "l For Natanson, as the diversity of the contributions to this volume attest, such seriousness involves something other than that narrow technical vision for which a topic is the more philosophical the less it has to do with anything else. In Natanson's pages-to say nothing of his teaching and conversation-there are no men of straw but living, breathing human beings; with hirn philosophy's tentacles are ubiquitous.

Derrida and Phenomenology is a collection of essays by various authors, entirely devoted to Jacques Derrida's writing on Edmund Husserl's phenomenology. It gives a wide range of reactions to those writings, both critical and supportive, and contains many in-depth studies. Audience: Communicates new evaluations of Derrida's critique of Husserl to those familiar with the issues: specialists in phenomenology, deconstruction, the philosophies of Derrida and Husserl. Also contains a bibliography of recent relevant literature.

Art Line Thought discusses the main issues that beset our time and philosophy by locating these same issues in artworks and describing closely what is shown there. While respecting their differences, art and philosophy are thus made to cross back and forth into one another, delineating in fresh ways our concerns about nature, the human and non-human, the body, femininity, ecology, technology, textism, the end of history, community, postmodernism, relativism and non-Eurocentric ethics. A `philosophy of line' gathers these issues, opposing the current dominance of `word' and linguistic analyses. Art has long been aware that the line communicates meaning at least as well as the word. The volume is divided between contemporary and prehistoric art in order to reveal the presumptions of `Western' culture and how we might move beyond it. Since the book is a critique of Eurocentric thinking and prose, it works at finding new styles of both. Its philosophical meditation is directed equally to those who are intellectually interested in contemporary and prehistoric art, in theories of postmodern culture and criticism, and in anthropology.

The Urgency of Changing Our Thinking about Eros In Atlanta recently, a man broke into the apartment of his former girlfriend and brutally murdered both her and her new lover with an axe. When asked later whether he had considered the consequences of being apprehended and prosecuted, he responded that without his relationship to this particular woman his life had no meaning, and for this reason it made no difference what happened to him. All-too-facile explanations of such events can be devised in terms of neurological imbalances or improper child-rearing practices. But why are suicide, the murder of spouses and lovers, and other crimes of passion so much more prevalent in advanced, urban-industrial cultures, and especially in those where people's value is assessed in terms of socio-economic success and failure? And why do the associated psychic disturbances express themselves so prominently in terms of disruption of attitudes toward love relationships? It cannot be a mere coincidence that the most heinous crimes are crimes of love. I shall suggest here that the most direct way to understand the most prevalent dysfunctions of the modern psyche is to understand the dysfunctions of eros. The reason for this is twofold. First, eros is central tQl the project of defining meaning for conscious beings - for reasons more fundamentally philosophical than anything envisioned by Freud or other drive-reduction theorists.

lbis volume was occasioned by the desire of its contributors to honor Robert Sokolowski on his sixtieth birthday. The desire first took fonn on the streets of an American metropolis when several of us, while attending a philosophy conference, were bemoaning the lack of passion for doing philosophy as we all conceived it. In this expression of our discontent we all had a common exemplar in mind, someone for whom the passion for "the truthful" and "the good" is embodied in every sentence of his rich writings. Felicitously this very thinker was someone whom we an regard as manifesting in his person and life these same properties which his writings exhibit and pursue as luminous ideals. As a result, John Brough, John Drummond, and I came up with the idea that we hold our own conference and do philosophy as we envisage it and at the same time honor its foremost exemplary practitioner whose sixtieth birthday was the following year. Immediately the idea took wings among the handful ofus and the dreariness of that philosophy congress receded. The first task of thinking of possible speakers was easy. The issue of the venue for our symposium, what I like to call the "Sokofest," had to be decided, as well as the details of its realization.

This volume is chiefly composed of revised versions of essays presented and discussed at the research symposium of the same title held in Delray Beach, Florida, on May 7-9, 1993. The symposium was conducted under the sponsorship of the William F. Dietrich Eminent Scholar Chair in Philosophy at Florida Atlantic University and the Center for Advanced Research in Phenomenology, Inc. Several essays have been added, including the Husserl ineditum and its translation. The intention of the project was to attract even wider appreciation for this posthumous work by Husserl, especially since it has now been first translated into English by Andre Schuwer and Richard Rojcewicz. In manuscript form, the Ideas II was known to Martin Heidegger and Maurice Merleau-Ponty before Sein und Zeit (1927) and Phenomenologie de la perception (1945), as well to Edith Stein and Ludwig Landgrebe, of course, who worked on it as Husserl' s assistants. It was published in 1952 as Volume IV of the Husserliana series, and critical studies of that volume were written by Paul Ricoeur and Alfred Schutz. Now that there is an English translation, it is increasingly being taught in the United States along with the Ideas I.

Aron Gurwitsch (1900-73) was one of the most important figures in the phenomenological movement between the 1920s and the 1970s. Through his introduction of Gestalt theoretical concepts into phenomenology, he exerted a powerful influence on Maurice Merleau-Ponty and others. The contributions to this memorial volume, most written by friends and students of Gurwitsch, contain critical studies of the work of Aron Gurwitsch and attempts to extend his philosophical analyses to new problems and fields. Ranging from formal ontology through the philosophy of the social sciences to the interpretation of Kant, the essays assembled here are both a tribute to and a continuation of the philosophical legacy of Aron Gurwitsch. The contributions will be of interest to advanced undergraduates and graduate students, and to specialists in a wide range of areas.

James F. Sheridan Allegheny College As we come to the end of the century, an attentive student of con­ temporary European philosophy will no doubt be startled by a volume titled Husserl in Contemporary Context. Such philosophers are most likely to believe that Hussed has now been declared II classical" rather than a contemporary thinker or, worse, simply old fashioned. Access to Hussed today will most likely come through the allegedly definitive critiques of his work by Heidegger and Derrida and to a lesser extent through the readings of his work by Levinas and Merleau­ Ponty although Merleau-Ponty himself has been declared old fashioned by some postmodems. Hence, if by II contemporary" one understands the problematic set by the work of the late Heidegger, Derrida, Foucault, et. al., Hussed's work seems strange indeed in such a contemporary context, seems better understood as the last gasp of philosophy dominated by metaphysics and thus fit only for inclusion in courses in the history of philosophy.

Edith Stein has become almost a legend in recent years largely because of her heroic personality and her death in Auschwitz at the hands of the Nazis. She is known also as an eminent German-jewish-Christian intellectual and feminist, but more in the realm of the sacred than of the secular. Both are essential to understanding her. To know the real Edith Stein one must have some knowledge of her as philosopher, for philosophy was central to her very being. For this reason the present work is designed to be of interest to the general reader as well as to philosophers. Many of the latter have given evidence of interest in Stein's phenomenology and may welcome an introduction that gives clues to its substance and quality. Those who knew Edith Stein personally and professionally--Edmund Husser!, Roman lngarden, Hedwig Conrad-Martius, Peter Wust, and other friends at the universities of G6ttingen and Freiburg--affirm her genius and her passionate pursuit of truth in philosophy. james Collins, distinguished American historian of philosophy, who discovered some of her works about the time she died, wrote that "we may expect critical studies on her philosophy to multiply rapidly with the issuance of her collected works and the recognition of her high philosophical genius."l The fact is that this has not happened, although fourteen of her major works have been published posthumously by Nauwelaerts and Herder, and many are available from other sources.

Although a key aspect of the phenomenological movement is its contribution to value theory (axiology) and value perception (almost all the major figures devoted a great part of their labors to these topics), there has been relatively little attention paid to these themes. This volume in part makes up for this lacuna by being the first anthology on value-theory in the phenomenological movement. It indicates the scope of the issues by discussing, e.g., the distinctive acts of valuing, openness to value, the objectivity of values, the summation and combination of values, the deconstruction of values, the value of absence, and the value of nature. It also contains discussions of most of the major representative figures not only in their own right but also in relationship to one another: Von Ehrenfels, Brentano, Scheler, Hartmann, Husserl, Heidegger, Schutz, and Derrida.

Intended for scholars in the fields of philosophy, history of science and music, this book examines the legacy of the historical coincidence of the emergence of science and opera in the early modern period. But instead of regarding them as finished products or examining their genesis, or `common ground', or `parallel' ideas, opera and science are explored by a phenomenology of the formulations of consciousness (Gurwitsch) as compossible tasks to be accomplished in common (Schutz) which share an ideal possibility or `essence' (Husserl). Although the ideas of Galileo and Monteverdi form the parameters of the domain of phenomenological clarification, the scope of discussion extends from Classical ideas of science and music down to the beginning of the nineteenth century, but always with reference to the experience of sharing the sociality of a common world from which they are drawn (Plessner) and to which those ideas have given shape, meaning and even substance. At the same time, this approach provides a non-historicist alternative to understanding the arts and science of the modern period by critically clarifying the idea of whether their compossibility can rest on any other formulation of consciousness.