Elements in Epistemology – serie
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47 produkter
47 produkter
Häftad, Engelska, 2022
230 kr
Skickas inom 7-10 vardagar
Foundationalism is a view about the structure of knowledge and justification. The heart of the thesis is the claim that if there is any knowledge or justified belief at all, then there is a kind of knowledge and justified belief that does not require inference from something else known or justifiably believed. This Element begins by exploring abstract arguments for foundationalism and against proposed alternatives. It then explores disagreements among foundationalists about how to understand foundational knowledge and justified belief, what is plausibly included in the foundations, and what is required for legitimate inference from foundations to the rest of what we believe. The author argues for the conclusion that one can combine insights captured by different versions of foundationalism by making a distinction between ideal justification and justification that falls short of that ideal.
- Nyhet
Häftad, Engelska, 2026
230 kr
Skickas inom 7-10 vardagar
In this book I examine many philosophical theories that attempt to explain the epistemological limits and powers of memory. A traditional view is that our epistemic justification from memory in the present directly depends, in part or primarily, on the past. I reject this view, arguing that just the way the present is directly matters for the justification we have from memory now. Another traditional view is that our justification from memory is best accounted for by theories on which justification directly depends on features of the world external to the mind. I argue that the mental life suffices to account for memory justification. I then appeal to the tip of the tongue phenomenon to argue that just a portion of the mental matters for memory justification: what the subject internally accesses. The best epistemology of memory turns out to support a package of extreme and untraditional views.
Häftad, Engelska, 2022
232 kr
Skickas inom 7-10 vardagar
The distinction between the a priori and the a posteriori is an old and influential one. But both the distinction itself and the crucial notion of a priori knowledge face powerful philosophical challenges. Many philosophers worry that accepting the a priori is tantamount to accepting epistemic magic. In contrast, this Element argues that the a priori can be formulated clearly, made respectable, and used to do important epistemological work. The author's conception of the a priori and its role falls short of what some historical proponents of the notion may have hoped for, but it allows us to accept and use the notion without abandoning either naturalism or empiricism, broadly understood. This Element argues that we can accept and use the a priori without magic.
Häftad, Engelska, 2022
230 kr
Skickas inom 7-10 vardagar
Perhaps the most fundamental question of epistemology asks on what grounds our knowledge of the world ultimately rests. The traditional Cartesian answer is that it rests on indubitable facts arrived at through rational insight or introspection. Coherentists reject this answer, claiming instead that knowledge arises from relations of coherence or mutual support: if our beliefs cohere, we can be sure that they are mostly true. The first part of this Element introduces the reader to the main ideas and problems of coherentism. The next part describes the 'probabilistic turn', leading up to recent demonstrations that coherence fails to be conducive to truth. The final part reassesses the current debate about the proper definition of coherence from the standpoint of Rudolf Carnap's methodology of explication. The upshot is a tentative and qualified defence of one of the early coherence measures.
Häftad, Engelska, 2022
230 kr
Skickas inom 7-10 vardagar
By pooling together exhaustive analyses of certain philosophical paradoxes, we can prove a series of fascinating results regarding philosophical progress, agreement on substantive philosophical claims, knockdown arguments in philosophy, the wisdom of philosophical belief (quite rare, because the knockdown arguments show that we philosophers have been wildly wrong about language, logic, truth, or ordinary empirical matters), the epistemic status of metaphysics, and the power of philosophy to refute common sense. As examples, this Element examines the Sorites Paradox, the Liar Paradox, and the Problem of the Many - although many other paradoxes can do the trick too.
Häftad, Engelska, 2024
230 kr
Skickas inom 7-10 vardagar
This accessible Element defends version of virtue epistemology shown to have all-things-considered advantages over other views on the market. The view is unorthodox, in that it incorporates Sosa's animal/reflective knowledge distinction, which has thus far had few takers. The author shows why embracing a multi-tiered framework is not a liability within virtue epistemology but instead affords it an edge not attainable otherwise. The particular account of knowledge goes beyond Sosa's own view by introducing and incorporating several theoretical innovations (regarding both basing and risk, as well as the introduction of multiple species of reflective knowledge) which are aimed at revamping how we think about 'high-grade' knowledge, how we attain it, and what it demands of us. The result is a new and improved stratified virtue epistemology that can hold up against scrutiny.
Häftad, Engelska, 2022
230 kr
Skickas inom 7-10 vardagar
Post-Gettier epistemology is increasingly modalized epistemology - proposing and debating modally explicable conditionals with suitably epistemic content (an approach initially inspired by Robert Nozick's 1981 account of knowledge), as needing to be added to 'true belief' in order to define or understand knowing's nature. This Element asks whether such modalized attempts - construed as responding to what the author calls Knowing's Further Features question (bequeathed to us by the Meno and the Theaetetus) - can succeed. The answer is that they cannot. Plato's and Aristotle's views on definition reinforce that result. Still, in appreciating this, we might gain insight into knowing's essence. We might find that knowledge is, essentially, nothing more than true belief.
Häftad, Engelska, 2026
230 kr
Kommande
This Element brings three topics into closer contact: scepticism about the external world, the metaphysics of perception, and the epistemology of perception. It argues that a certain kind of response to external world scepticism is significantly stronger if we make certain theoretical commitments regarding the metaphysics and epistemology of perception. Particularly, it argues that a neo-Moorean epistemological disjunctivist response to scepticism is much more compelling when underpinned by a naïve realist theory of perceptual phenomenal character and the transparency model of how we acquire knowledge of our perceptual states. The possibility that these theories are true radically alters the dialectical situation with respect to external world scepticism: the sceptical argument is on much shakier ground than is usually appreciated. Integrating our theorising about our knowledge of the external world and our theorising about the metaphysics and epistemology of perception affords a more comprehensive view of our anti-sceptical options.
Häftad, Engelska, 2024
230 kr
Skickas inom 7-10 vardagar
This Element examines a main theme in religious epistemology, namely, the possibility of knowledge of God. Most often philosophers consider the rationality or justification of propositional belief about God, particularly beliefs about the existence and nature of God; and they will assess the conditions under which, if there is a God, such propositional beliefs would be knowledge, particularly in light of counter-evidence or the availability of religious disagreement. This Element surveys such familiar areas, then turns toward newer and less-developed terrain: interpersonal epistemology, namely what it is to know another person. It then explores the prospects for understanding what it might take to know God relationally, the contours of which are significant for many theistic traditions.
Häftad, Engelska, 2023
230 kr
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The higher-order evidence debate concerns how higher-order evidence affects the rationality of our first-order beliefs. This Element has two parts. The first part (Sections 1 and 2) provides a critical overview of the literature, aiming to explain why the higher-order evidence debate is interesting and important. The second part (Sections 3 to 6) defends calibrationism, the view that we should respond to higher-order evidence by aligning our credences to our reliability degree. The author first discusses the traditional version of calibrationism and explains its main difficulties, before proposing a new version of calibrationism called 'Evidence-Discounting Calibrationism.' The Element argues that this new version is independently plausible and that it can avoid the difficulties faced by the traditional version.
Häftad, Engelska, 2023
232 kr
Skickas inom 7-10 vardagar
Defeat is the loss of justification for believing something in light of new information. This Element mainly aims to work towards developing a novel account of defeat. It distinguishes among three broad views in the epistemology of defeat: scepticism, internalism, and externalism and argues that that sceptical and internalist accounts of defeat are bound to remain unsatisfactory. As a result, any viable account of defeat must be externalist. While there is no shortage of externalist accounts, the Element provides reason to think that extant accounts remain unsatisfactory. The Element also explains the constructive tasks of developing an alternative account of defeat and showing that it improves on the competition.
Häftad, Engelska, 2023
230 kr
Skickas inom 7-10 vardagar
What is wisdom? What does a wise person know? Can a wise person know how to act and live well without knowing the whys and wherefores of his own action? How is wisdom acquired? This Element addresses questions regarding the nature and acquisition of wisdom by developing and defending a skill theory of wisdom. Specifically, this theory argues that if a person S is wise, then (i) S knows that overall attitude success contributes to or constitutes well-being; (ii) S knows what the best means to achieve well-being are; (iii) S is reliably successful at acting and living well (in light of what S knows); and (iv) S knows why she is successful at acting and living well. The first three sections of this Element develop this theory, and the final two sections defend this theory against two objections to the effect that there are asymmetries between wisdom and skill.
Häftad, Engelska, 2024
230 kr
Skickas inom 7-10 vardagar
This Element explores the nature and formulation of skepticism about the external world by considering an important anti-skeptical strategy, 'veridicalism.' According to veridicalism, even if you are in a skeptical scenario, your beliefs about the existence of ordinary objects are still true. For example, even if you are in a global simulation, things such as tables exist as simulated objects. Therefore, your ignorance of whether you are in such a scenario does not negate your knowledge that there are tables. This strategy fails because it raises an equally troubling skepticism about what such objects are: is the table you now see a simulated object? That this is equally troubling suggests that the core skeptical problem is about what the causes of our experiences are, regardless of whether they count as ordinary objects like tables. This motivates a reconsideration of the standard formulation of the skeptical argument, and undermines some other anti-skeptical strategies as well.
Häftad, Engelska, 2024
230 kr
Skickas inom 7-10 vardagar
Transcendental arguments were prominent in Western philosophy, German idealism, phenomenological tradition, and P. F. Strawson's thinking. They have fallen out of fashion because of their associations with transcendental idealism and verificationism. They are still invoked by important figures in the analytic tradition even if the very same tradition has cast doubt on such arguments. The nature of transcendental arguments remains unclear: Are they supposed to be deductive? Are they synthetic or analytic? If they are a priori, how are they supposed to be about the empirical world? What are their relations to necessity, conceivability, and essence? This Element takes up the challenge of elucidating the nature of transcendental arguments, embedded in the wider context of transcendental epistemology. It will be argued that the key premise 'transcendental conditional' is synthetic, necessary, and a posteriori.
Häftad, Engelska, 2024
230 kr
Skickas inom 7-10 vardagar
Peer review is supposed to ensure that published work, in philosophy and in other disciplines, meets high standards of rigor and interest. But many people fear that it no longer is fit to play this role. This Element examines some of their concerns. It uses evidence that critics of peer review sometimes cite to show its failures, as well as empirical literature on the reception of bullshit, to advance positive claims about how the assessment of scholarly work is appropriately influenced by features of the context in which it appears: for example, by readers' knowledge of authorship or of publication venue. Reader attitude makes an appropriate and sometimes decisive difference to perceptions of argument quality. This Element finishes by considering the difference that author attitudes to their own arguments can appropriately make to their reception. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.
Häftad, Engelska, 2025
230 kr
Skickas inom 7-10 vardagar
Knowledge of our emotional and bodily states helps us to further know our goals, values, interests, cares, and concerns. The authors first lay out a puzzle as to why bodily and emotional self-knowledge is strongly associated with good mental health and well-being. They solve this puzzle by mapping out connections between bodily states, emotional states, and our goals with an account of emotions as embodied appraisals. Emotions being embodied implies that self-knowledge of our bodily states aids in acquiring knowledge of our emotional states. Emotions as appraisals means that situations are appraised relative to our goals, such that self-knowledge of emotional states aids in acquiring knowledge of our goals, which are not always transparent to us. While emotional self-knowledge can be difficult to acquire, through skilled practice we can improve awareness and knowledge of our emotional and bodily states.
Häftad, Engelska, 2025
230 kr
Skickas inom 7-10 vardagar
Compared to our appreciation of the epistemology of the sciences and mathematics, we have a relatively poor understanding of the epistemology of logic. This Element highlights three causes of this lack of progress: (i) failure to distinguish between the epistemology of logical theorising and that of good (logical) reasoning; (ii) hesitancy to base epistemology of logic on how logicians actually justify their logics, rather than our own presumptions about logic; and (iii) a presumption that the epistemology of logic must be significantly different to other research areas, such as the recognised sciences. The Element ends by highlighting what can be achieved by avoiding these pitfalls, presenting an account of theory-choice in logic, logical predictivism, motivated by actual logical practice, which suggests that the mechanisms of theory-choice in logic are not that different to those in the recognised sciences. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.
Häftad, Engelska, 2024
232 kr
Skickas inom 7-10 vardagar
What kind of knowledge does one have when one knows what it is like to, say, fall in love, eat vegemite(TM), be a parent, or ride a bike? This Element addresses this question by exploring the tension between two plausible theses about this form of knowledge: (i) that to possess it one must have had the corresponding experience, and (ii) that to possess it one must know an answer to the 'what it is like' question. The Element shows how the tension between these two theses helps to explain existing debates about this form of knowledge, as well as puzzling conflicts in our attitudes towards the possibility of sharing this knowledge through testimony, or other sources like literature, theories, and simulations. The author also offers a view of 'what it is like' knowledge which can resolve both the tension between (i) and (ii), and these puzzles around testimony.
Häftad, Engelska, 2024
232 kr
Skickas inom 7-10 vardagar
This Element engages with the epistemic significance of disagreement, focusing on its skeptical implications. It examines various types of disagreement-motivated skepticism in ancient philosophy, ethics, philosophy of religion, and general epistemology. In each case, it favors suspension of judgment as the seemingly appropriate response to the realization of disagreement. One main line of argument pursued in the Element is that, since in real-life disputes we have limited or inaccurate information about both our own epistemic standing and the epistemic standing of our dissenters, personal information and self-trust can rarely function as symmetry breakers in favor of our own views.
- Nyhet
Häftad, Engelska, 2026
230 kr
Skickas inom 7-10 vardagar
Sincerity is essential to communication: without a norm of sincerity, we could hardly trust what other people tell us. But what does it take to be sincere, exactly? And why is sincerity so important? Sincerity and Insincerity offers a comprehensive review of existing philosophical work on the nature of sincerity and its epistemic value. It puts forward a novel, fine-grained account of what sincerity and insincerity are, and dives into the grey area between the two, identifying various ways in which speakers can be partially sincere. Integrating ideas from different philosophical subfields and traditions, it offers an updated perspective on what makes sincerity epistemically valuable, giving serious consideration to the idea that sincerity is the norm of assertion. Overall, this Element provides a novel, informed perspective on what sincerity is, how it works, and why it matters.
Häftad, Engelska, 2025
232 kr
Skickas inom 7-10 vardagar
How do we arrive at aesthetic knowledge? This might seem an odd question for philosophers to ask. Some will take its answer to be obvious: we learn about the aesthetic qualities of paintings by looking at them, of musical works by listening to them, and so on. Others will take the question to be misguided, how can there be aesthetic knowledge when aesthetics is merely 'a matter of taste'? Finally, aesthetic knowledge itself might seem singularly unimportant. We don't engage with beautiful artworks to learn that they're beautiful but, rather, to appreciate that beauty. This Element argues that each of these objections is misplaced. Aesthetic knowledge is both valuable and attainable, but canonical philosophical (and folk) views of how we attain it are mistaken. The Element surveys some recent arguments against the reliability of aesthetic perception and in favour of other, more social, sources of aesthetic knowledge.
Häftad, Engelska, 2025
232 kr
Skickas inom 7-10 vardagar
Received theories of self-deception are problematic. The traditional view, according to which self-deceivers intend to deceive themselves, generates paradoxes: you cannot deceive yourself intentionally because you know your own plans and intentions. Non-traditional views argue that self-deceivers act intentionally but deceive themselves unintentionally or that self-deception is not intentional at all. The non-traditional approaches do not generate paradoxes, but they entail that people can deceive themselves by accident or by mistake, which is controversial. The author argues that a functional analysis of deception solves these problems. On the functional view, a certain thing is deceptive if and only if its function is to mislead; hence, while (self-)deception may but need not be intended, it is never accidental or a mistake. Also, self-deceivers need not benefit from deception and they need not end up with epistemically unjustified beliefs; rather, they must 'not be themselves'. Finally, self-deception need not be adaptive.
Inbunden, Engelska, 2023
742 kr
Skickas inom 7-10 vardagar
Defeat is the loss of justification for believing something in light of new information. This Element mainly aims to work towards developing a novel account of defeat. It distinguishes among three broad views in the epistemology of defeat: scepticism, internalism, and externalism and argues that that sceptical and internalist accounts of defeat are bound to remain unsatisfactory. As a result, any viable account of defeat must be externalist. While there is no shortage of externalist accounts, the Element provides reason to think that extant accounts remain unsatisfactory. The Element also explains the constructive tasks of developing an alternative account of defeat and showing that it improves on the competition.
Inbunden, Engelska, 2025
742 kr
Skickas inom 7-10 vardagar
Knowledge-first epistemology places knowledge at the normative core of epistemological affairs: on this approach, central epistemic phenomena are to be analyzed in terms of knowledge. This Element offers a defence of an integrated, naturalistic knowledge-first account of justified belief, reasons, evidence and defeat, permissible assertion and action, and the epistemic normativity of practical and theoretical reasoning. On this account, the epistemic is an independent normative domain organized around one central etiological epistemic function: generating knowledge. In turn, this epistemic function generates epistemic norms of proper functioning that constitute the epistemic domain, and govern moves in our epistemic practice, such as forming beliefs, asserting, and reasoning. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.
Häftad, Engelska, 2025
230 kr
Skickas inom 7-10 vardagar
Knowledge-first epistemology places knowledge at the normative core of epistemological affairs: on this approach, central epistemic phenomena are to be analyzed in terms of knowledge. This Element offers a defence of an integrated, naturalistic knowledge-first account of justified belief, reasons, evidence and defeat, permissible assertion and action, and the epistemic normativity of practical and theoretical reasoning. On this account, the epistemic is an independent normative domain organized around one central etiological epistemic function: generating knowledge. In turn, this epistemic function generates epistemic norms of proper functioning that constitute the epistemic domain, and govern moves in our epistemic practice, such as forming beliefs, asserting, and reasoning. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.
Inbunden, Engelska, 2024
742 kr
Skickas inom 7-10 vardagar
This Element explores the nature and formulation of skepticism about the external world by considering an important anti-skeptical strategy, 'veridicalism.' According to veridicalism, even if you are in a skeptical scenario, your beliefs about the existence of ordinary objects are still true. For example, even if you are in a global simulation, things such as tables exist as simulated objects. Therefore, your ignorance of whether you are in such a scenario does not negate your knowledge that there are tables. This strategy fails because it raises an equally troubling skepticism about what such objects are: is the table you now see a simulated object? That this is equally troubling suggests that the core skeptical problem is about what the causes of our experiences are, regardless of whether they count as ordinary objects like tables. This motivates a reconsideration of the standard formulation of the skeptical argument, and undermines some other anti-skeptical strategies as well.
Inbunden, Engelska, 2024
742 kr
Skickas inom 7-10 vardagar
Peer review is supposed to ensure that published work, in philosophy and in other disciplines, meets high standards of rigor and interest. But many people fear that it no longer is fit to play this role. This Element examines some of their concerns. It uses evidence that critics of peer review sometimes cite to show its failures, as well as empirical literature on the reception of bullshit, to advance positive claims about how the assessment of scholarly work is appropriately influenced by features of the context in which it appears: for example, by readers' knowledge of authorship or of publication venue. Reader attitude makes an appropriate and sometimes decisive difference to perceptions of argument quality. This Element finishes by considering the difference that author attitudes to their own arguments can appropriately make to their reception. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.
Inbunden, Engelska, 2024
742 kr
Skickas inom 7-10 vardagar
This accessible Element defends version of virtue epistemology shown to have all-things-considered advantages over other views on the market. The view is unorthodox, in that it incorporates Sosa's animal/reflective knowledge distinction, which has thus far had few takers. The author shows why embracing a multi-tiered framework is not a liability within virtue epistemology but instead affords it an edge not attainable otherwise. The particular account of knowledge goes beyond Sosa's own view by introducing and incorporating several theoretical innovations (regarding both basing and risk, as well as the introduction of multiple species of reflective knowledge) which are aimed at revamping how we think about 'high-grade' knowledge, how we attain it, and what it demands of us. The result is a new and improved stratified virtue epistemology that can hold up against scrutiny.
Inbunden, Engelska, 2026
742 kr
Kommande
Can practical factors affect our epistemic standings or their ascriptions? This Element critically examines shifty epistemology, a cluster of views that answer yes to this question. It investigates three prominent types of shifty epistemology: on knowledge, justification and rational credence. It assesses key arguments for each of these views, and argues for pragmatic encroachment on rational credence.
Häftad, Engelska, 2026
230 kr
Kommande
Can practical factors affect our epistemic standings or their ascriptions? This Element critically examines shifty epistemology, a cluster of views that answer yes to this question. It investigates three prominent types of shifty epistemology: on knowledge, justification and rational credence. It assesses key arguments for each of these views, and argues for pragmatic encroachment on rational credence.