Moral Psychology of the Emotions – serie

Under what circumstances can love generate moral reasons for action? Are there morally appropriate ways to love? Can an occurrence of love or a failure to love constitute a moral failure? Is it better to love morally good people? This volume explores the moral dimensions of love through the lenses of political philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience. It attempts to discern how various social norms affect our experience and understanding of love, how love, relates to other affective states such as emotions and desires, and how love influences and is influenced by reason. What love is affects what love ought to be. Conversely, our ideas of what love ought to be partly determined by our conception of what love is.

Under what circumstances can love generate moral reasons for action? Are there morally appropriate ways to love? Can an occurrence of love or a failure to love constitute a moral failure? Is it better to love morally good people? This volume explores the moral dimensions of love through the lenses of political philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience. It attempts to discern how various social norms affect our experience and understanding of love, how love, relates to other affective states such as emotions and desires, and how love influences and is influenced by reason. What love is affects what love ought to be. Conversely, our ideas of what love ought to be partly determined by our conception of what love is.

Curiosity has taken a winding path through intellectual history, from Early Christian vice to Enlightenment virtue and beyond. This original volume sees contemporary philosophers and psychologists examining the nature and value of curiosity, shedding light on some of its most interesting features and exploring its role in human experience. Authors examine the nature and history of curiosity, the psychology of curiosity and its relationship to interest, understanding, and desire, the impact of language in shaping our curiosity, the cultivation and measurement of curiosity, and the vital part that curiosity can and should play in education. With perspectives on curiosity from all over the world, this diverse, interdisciplinary collection provides an in-depth and multi-faceted examination of the epistemological, psychological, moral, and educative dimensions of curiosity.

Expressions of gratitude abound. Hardly a book is published that does not include in its preface or acknowledgments some variation on, “I am grateful to…for…” Indeed, most achievements come to be only through the help of others. We value the benevolence of others, and when we—or our loved ones—are the recipients of benevolence, our emotional response is often one of gratitude. But, are we bound to the requirement of ‘repaying’ our benefactors in some way? If we are, and there are—as ordinary language suggests—debts of gratitude, what kind of debts are these? Does the appropriateness of my gratitude require that my benefactor in fact intended to benefit me (in just the way she did)? Is there a difference between feeling grateful and being grateful? Is a precondition of my being grateful to another that I respect her? Do we owe a special sort of gratitude to those who have shaped us into the persons we are? What are the psychological and normative relations between gratitude the emotion, and gratitude the virtue?These are among the questions carefully addressed in The Moral Psychology of Gratitude. This volume provides readers with the state-of-the-art in research on gratitude. It does so in the form of sixteen never-before published articles on the emotion by leading voices in philosophy and the sciences of the mind.

By bringing the work of philosophers and psychologists together this volume is an interdisciplinary, though predominantly philosophical, exploration of an often discussed but rarely researched emotion; admiration. By exploring the moral psychology of admiration the volume examines the nature of this emotion, how it relates to other emotions such as wonder, envy and pride and what role admiration plays in our moral lives. As to the latter, a strong focus is on the potential link between admiration, emulation and the improvement of our characters, as well as of society as a whole.

Envy is a vicious and shameful response to the good fortune of others, one that ruins friendships and plagues societies—or so the common thinking goes, shaped by millennia of religious and cultural condemnation. Envy’s bad reputation is not completely unwarranted; envy can indeed motivate malicious and counterproductive behavior and may strain or even tear apart relations between people. However, that is not always the case. Investigating the complex nature of this emotion reveals that it plays important functions in social hierarchies and it can motivate one to self-improve and even to achieve moral virtue.Philosophers and psychologists in this volume explore envy’s characteristics in different cultures, spanning from small hunter-gatherer communities to large industrialized countries, to contexts as diverse as academia, marketing, artificial intelligence, and Buddhism. They explore envy’s role in both the personal and the political sphere, showing the many ways in which envy can either contribute or detract to our flourishing as individuals and as citizens of modern democracies.

A 2022 Choice Reviews Outstanding Academic TitleThe Moral Psychology of Hate provides the first systematic introduction to the moral psychology of hate compiling specially commissioned essays by an international team of scholars with a wide range of disciplinary orientations. In light of the recent revival of interest in emotions in academic philosophy, and the current social and political interest in hate, this volume provides arguments for and against the value of hate through a combination of empirical and philosophical methods. The authors examine hate not merely as a destructive feeling but as an emotion of great moral significance that illuminates how we understand each other and ourselves. The book will be of major interest to anyone concerned with the dynamics and the moral and political implications of this most powerful of human emotions.

Amusement is an emotion with power. It has the power to make us laugh, but it can also have a power over us (for good or for ill) to control our attention or memory. Amusement can empower our resistance to oppression, or it can itself become an oppressive force. Our amusement can make others feel shame. Amusement even has the power to affect (and be affected by) out moral assessment of others.This volume offers twelve essays from leading and emerging scholars that explore the moral quagmire that is the emotion of amusement. It is a collection that considers the moral psychology of amusement from a range of perspectives, going as far back as ancient Chinese and Greek philosophy up to the most current psychological and sociological findings.

Whether we like it or not, boredom is a major part of human life. It permeates our personal, social, practical, and moral existence. It shapes our world by demarcating what is engaging, interesting, or meaningful from what is not. It also sets us in motion insofar as its presence can motivate us to act in a plethora of ways. Indeed, in our search for engagement, interest, or meaning, our responses to boredom straddle the line between the good and the bad, the beneficial and the harmful, the creative and the mundane. In this volume, world-renowned researchers come together to explore a neglected but crucially important aspect of boredom: its relationship to morality. Does boredom cause individuals to commit immoral acts? Does it affect our moral judgment? Does the frequent or chronic experience boredom make us worse people? Is the experience of boredom something that needs to be avoided at all costs? Or can boredom be, at least sometimes, a solution and a positive moral force? The Moral Psychology of Boredom sets out to answer these and other timely questions.

A 2022 Choice Reviews Outstanding Academic TitleThe Moral Psychology of Hate provides the first systematic introduction to the moral psychology of hate compiling specially commissioned essays by an international team of scholars with a wide range of disciplinary orientations. In light of the recent revival of interest in emotions in academic philosophy, and the current social and political interest in hate, this volume provides arguments for and against the value of hate through a combination of empirical and philosophical methods. The authors examine hate not merely as a destructive feeling but as an emotion of great moral significance that illuminates how we understand each other and ourselves. The book will be of major interest to anyone concerned with the dynamics and the moral and political implications of this most powerful of human emotions.

In most Western societies, guilt is widely regarded as a vital moral emotion. In addition to playing a central role in moral development and progress, many take the capacity to feel guilt as a defining feature of morality itself: no truly moral person escapes the pang of guilt when she has done something wrong. But proponents of guilt's importance face important challenges, such as distinguishing healthy from pathological forms of guilt, and accounting for the fact that not all cultures value guilt in the same way, if at all. In this volume, philosophers and psychologists come together to think more systematically about the nature and value of guilt. The book begins with chapters on the biological origins and psychological nature of guilt and moves on to discuss the culturally enriched conceptions of guilt and its value that we find in various eastern and western philosophic traditions. In addition, numerous chapters discuss healthy or morally valuable forms guilt and their pathological or irrational shadows.

That we can hope is one of the capacities that define us as human beings. To hope means not just to have beliefs about what will happen, but to imagine the future as potentially fulfilling some of our most important wishes. It is therefore not surprising that hope has received attention by philosophers, psychologists and by religious thinkers throughout the ages. The contributions in this volume, written by leading scholars in the philosophy of hope, gives a systematic overview over the philosophical history of hope, about contemporary debates and about the role of hope in our collective life.

Envy is a vicious and shameful response to the good fortune of others, one that ruins friendships and plagues societies—or so the common thinking goes, shaped by millennia of religious and cultural condemnation. Envy’s bad reputation is not completely unwarranted; envy can indeed motivate malicious and counterproductive behavior and may strain or even tear apart relations between people. However, that is not always the case. Investigating the complex nature of this emotion reveals that it plays important functions in social hierarchies and it can motivate one to self-improve and even to achieve moral virtue.Philosophers and psychologists in this volume explore envy’s characteristics in different cultures, spanning from small hunter-gatherer communities to large industrialized countries, to contexts as diverse as academia, marketing, artificial intelligence, and Buddhism. They explore envy’s role in both the personal and the political sphere, showing the many ways in which envy can either contribute or detract to our flourishing as individuals and as citizens of modern democracies.

Few emotions have divided opinion as deeply as shame. Some scholars have argued that shame is essentially a maladaptive emotion used to oppress minorities and reinforce stigmas and traumas, an emotion that leaves the self at the mercy of powerful others. Other scholars, however, have argued that the absence of a sense of shame in a subject—their shamelessness—is tantamount to a vicious moral insensitivity. As the eleven original chapters in this collection attest, however, shame scholars are entering a new phase, one in which scholarship no longer attempts to defend one side of shame against the other, but rather accepts both faces as faithful to the phenomenon to be explained. At the core of our understanding of shame there are profound disagreements about the importance of the Other in shaping our moral identity. As this collection shows by its study of shame, the difficulty of the connection between Self, Other, and morality spans over millennia and cultures and currently animates important debates at the core of feminism and disability studies. Contributors: Mark Alfano, Alessandra Fussi, Lorenzo Greco, JeeLoo Liu, Katrine Krause-Jensen, Heidi L. Maibom, Tjeert Olthof, Imke von Maur, Alba Montes Sánchez, Raffaele Rodogno, Alessandro Salice, Krista K. Thomason, Íngrid Vendrell Ferran

Is it good to be trusting, or should we be wary of trusting others? Trust seems to be the basis of large-scale social cooperation and even of democracy itself, but in recent years many commentators and researchers have lamented the dawn of a post-trust era. Edited by David Collins, Iris Vidmar Jovanovic, and Mark Alfano, The Moral Psychology of Trust examines trust from a variety of perspectives in philosophy and the social sciences. The contributors explore topics such as the nature of trust and its connection to a range of other emotions, conditions under which it is good to be trusting and trustworthy, and what role trust might play in our intellectual, moral, and political lives. The chapters apply theoretical perspectives on trust to a number of issues of current concern, including how trust can and should function in conditions of social oppression, trust and technology, trust and conspiracy theories, the place of trust in medical ethics, and the ethics of trust in a variety of interpersonal relationships.

Edited by David Rondel and Samir Chopra, The Moral Psychology of Anxiety presents new work on the causes, consequences, and value of anxiety. Straddling philosophy, psychology, clinical medicine, history, and other disciplines, the chapters in this volume explore anxiety from an impressively wide range of perspectives. The first part is more historical, exploring the meaning of anxiety in different philosophical traditions and historical periods, including ancient Chinese Confucianism, twentieth-century European existentialism, and the Roman Stoics. The second part focuses on a cluster of questions having to do with anxiety’s nature and significance: Is anxiety something biological or cultural, or perhaps both? What is at the root of anxiety? Why should human beings suffer in this way? What is the experience of anxiety like, and what, if anything, are the benefits associated with it? Does anxiety have the potential to make us more virtuous or improve the quality of our inquiry? Addressing an area where newer work in moral psychology is sorely needed, this collection and the varied perspectives it offers will be of great interest to scholars, professionals, and students across philosophy, psychology, and related fields.

Although resentment gets a lot of bad press for undermining relationships and polarizing people, it is also essential to our interpersonal moral accountability practices. We blame others by resenting them and we forgive them by forswearing this resentment. Moreover, resentment often seems to be the most fitting response to disrespect, injustice, and enmity. Therefore, if we want to better understand our interpersonal responsibility practices and how to respond to injustice, we need to better understand resentment. Does resentment necessarily involve a desire for revenge? Is it an emotion or a sentiment? What makes resentment fitting? What gives someone the standing to resent another person? How is resentment related to self-respect? Is resentment the only morally appropriate way to respond to wrongdoing, injustice, or injury? Does being resentful negatively affect our well-being? Is resentment politically valuable?These are among the important questions grappled with in this collection, edited by Antti Kauppinen and Max Lewis, which presents cutting-edge research on the metaphysics, psychology, and normativity of resentment from preeminent scholars in philosophy and psychology. Given the rising interest in reactive attitudes, having a better grasp of the nature, normativity, and value of resentment will be indispensable for a clearer picture of the reactive attitudes in general and specific reactive attitudes—such as gratitude and guilt—in particular.

The Moral Psychology of Fear brings together contemporary philosophers to consider how fear can shape or compromise moral motivation, and in particular the ways in which fear might motivate morally and politically troubling actions for individuals and communities. While the topics addressed by the chapters vary widely, the contributors share a commitment to analyzing the moral significance of fear for motivation, action, and responsibility in novel and creative ways.Edited by Ami Harbin, the volume is divided into four parts: In Part I, authors lay the groundwork for new philosophical analyses of fear by establishing some theoretical considerations about the connection of fear to injustice and the scope of what kinds of experiences count as fear. Part II turns to everyday experiences of fear—like fear of missing out and fear of one’s own death—that can have surprising moral implications. Part III delves into the way fears have been present in contexts of climate and public health crisis. Part IV offers reflections on the complex position of fear in some of the most charged political issues facing communities: migration, political polarization, violence, and oppressive ideologies more broadly.

What does it mean to be sad? What difference does it make whether, how, and why we experience our own, and other people’s, sadness? Is sadness always appropriate and can it be a way of seeing more clearly into ourselves and others? In this volume, a multi-disciplinary team of scholars - from fields including philosophy, women’s and gender studies, bioethics and public health, and neuroscience - addresses these and other questions related to this nearly-universal emotion that all of us experience, and that some of us dread. Somewhat surprisingly, sadness has been largely ignored by philosophers and others within the humanities, or else under-theorized as a subject worthy of serious and careful attention. This volume reverses this trend, presenting sadness as not merely a feeling or affect, but an emotion of great moral significance that in important ways underwrites how we understand ourselves and each other.

What does it mean to be sad? What difference does it make whether, how, and why we experience our own, and other people’s, sadness? Is sadness always appropriate and can it be a way of seeing more clearly into ourselves and others? In this volume, a multi-disciplinary team of scholars - from fields including philosophy, women’s and gender studies, bioethics and public health, and neuroscience - addresses these and other questions related to this nearly-universal emotion that all of us experience, and that some of us dread. Somewhat surprisingly, sadness has been largely ignored by philosophers and others within the humanities, or else under-theorized as a subject worthy of serious and careful attention. This volume reverses this trend, presenting sadness as not merely a feeling or affect, but an emotion of great moral significance that in important ways underwrites how we understand ourselves and each other.

Is it good to be proud? We sometimes happily speak of being proud of our achievements, ethnicities and identities, yet pride is also often described as the most serious of the seven deadly sins. This edited collection of original essays examines pride from a variety of perspectives in philosophy, psychology, sociology and anthropology. The volume seeks to explore such topics as the nature of pride, its connection to other human emotions, whether it is a virtue or vice (or both), and what role it might play in both our intellectual and moral lives. Containing diverse voices and viewpoints, this book aims to illuminate the various and complex dimensions of pride.

Is it good to be proud? We sometimes happily speak of being proud of our achievements, ethnicities and identities, yet pride is also often described as the most serious of the seven deadly sins. This edited collection of original essays examines pride from a variety of perspectives in philosophy, psychology, sociology and anthropology. The volume seeks to explore such topics as the nature of pride, its connection to other human emotions, whether it is a virtue or vice (or both), and what role it might play in both our intellectual and moral lives. Containing diverse voices and viewpoints, this book aims to illuminate the various and complex dimensions of pride.

The Moral Psychology of Anger is the first comprehensive study of the moral psychology of anger from a philosophical perspective. In light of the recent revival of interest in emotions in philosophy and the current social and political interest in anger, this collection provides an inclusive view of anger from a variety of philosophical perspectives. The authors explore the nature of anger, explain its resilience in our emotional lives and normative frameworks, and examine what inhibits and encourages thoughts, feelings, and expressions of anger. The volume also examines rage, anger’s cousin, and examines in what ways rage is a moral emotion, what black rage is and how it is policed in our society; how berserker rage is limited and problematic for the contemporary military; and how defenders of anger respond to classical and contemporary arguments that expressing anger is always destructive and immoral. This volume provides arguments for and against the value of anger in our ethical lives and in politics through a combination of empirical psychological and philosophical methods. This authors approach these questions and aims from a historical, phenomenological, empirical, feminist, political, and critical-theoretic perspective.

The Moral Psychology of Anger is the first comprehensive study of the moral psychology of anger from a philosophical perspective. In light of the recent revival of interest in emotions in philosophy and the current social and political interest in anger, this collection provides an inclusive view of anger from a variety of philosophical perspectives. The authors explore the nature of anger, explain its resilience in our emotional lives and normative frameworks, and examine what inhibits and encourages thoughts, feelings, and expressions of anger. The volume also examines rage, anger’s cousin, and examines in what ways rage is a moral emotion, what black rage is and how it is policed in our society; how berserker rage is limited and problematic for the contemporary military; and how defenders of anger respond to classical and contemporary arguments that expressing anger is always destructive and immoral. This volume provides arguments for and against the value of anger in our ethical lives and in politics through a combination of empirical psychological and philosophical methods. This authors approach these questions and aims from a historical, phenomenological, empirical, feminist, political, and critical-theoretic perspective.

The feeling that one can’t get over a moral wrong is challenging even in the best of circumstances. This volume considers challenges to forgiveness in the most difficult circumstances. It explores forgiveness in criminal justice contexts, under oppression, after genocide, when the victim is dead or when bystanders disagree, when many different negative reactions abound, and when anger and resentment seem preferable and important. The book gathers together a diverse assembly of authors with publication and expertise in forgiveness, while centering the work of new voices in the field and pursuing new lines of inquiry grounded in empirical literature. Some scholars consider how forgiveness influences and is influenced by our other mental states and emotions, while other authors explore the moral value of the emotions attendant upon forgiveness in particularly challenging contexts. Some authors critically assess and advance applications of the standard view of forgiveness predominant in Anglophone philosophy of forgiveness as the overcoming of resentment, while others offer rejections of basic aspects of the standard view, such as what sorts of feelings are compatible with forgiving. The book offers new directions for inquiry into forgiveness, and shows that the moral psychology of forgiveness continues to enjoy challenges to its theoretical structure and its practical possibilities.

The feeling that one can’t get over a moral wrong is challenging even in the best of circumstances. This volume considers challenges to forgiveness in the most difficult circumstances. It explores forgiveness in criminal justice contexts, under oppression, after genocide, when the victim is dead or when bystanders disagree, when many different negative reactions abound, and when anger and resentment seem preferable and important. The book gathers together a diverse assembly of authors with publication and expertise in forgiveness, while centering the work of new voices in the field and pursuing new lines of inquiry grounded in empirical literature. Some scholars consider how forgiveness influences and is influenced by our other mental states and emotions, while other authors explore the moral value of the emotions attendant upon forgiveness in particularly challenging contexts. Some authors critically assess and advance applications of the standard view of forgiveness predominant in Anglophone philosophy of forgiveness as the overcoming of resentment, while others offer rejections of basic aspects of the standard view, such as what sorts of feelings are compatible with forgiving. The book offers new directions for inquiry into forgiveness, and shows that the moral psychology of forgiveness continues to enjoy challenges to its theoretical structure and its practical possibilities.

What kind of an emotion is regret? What difference does it make whether, how, and why we experience it, and how does this experience shape our current and future thoughts, decisions, goals? Under what conditions is regret appropriate? Is it always one kind of experience, or does it vary, based on who is doing the regretting, and why? How is regret different from other backward-looking emotions? In The Moral Psychology of Regret, scholars from several disciplines—including philosophy, gender studies, disability studies, law, and neuroscience—come together to address these and other questions related to this ubiquitous emotion that so many of us seem to dread. And while regret has been somewhat under-theorized as a subject worthy of serious and careful attention, this volume is offered with the intent of expanding the discourse on regret as an emotion of great moral significance that underwrites how we understand ourselves and each other.

What kind of an emotion is regret? What difference does it make whether, how, and why we experience it, and how does this experience shape our current and future thoughts, decisions, goals? Under what conditions is regret appropriate? Is it always one kind of experience, or does it vary, based on who is doing the regretting, and why? How is regret different from other backward-looking emotions? In The Moral Psychology of Regret, scholars from several disciplines—including philosophy, gender studies, disability studies, law, and neuroscience—come together to address these and other questions related to this ubiquitous emotion that so many of us seem to dread. And while regret has been somewhat under-theorized as a subject worthy of serious and careful attention, this volume is offered with the intent of expanding the discourse on regret as an emotion of great moral significance that underwrites how we understand ourselves and each other.

Does disgust guide moral behavior, or does it hamper it? Does disgust play a critical role in ordinary moral judgments, or almost no role at all? In this volume, experts in the field come together to explore fundamental questions about the role that disgust plays (and ought to play) in our moral lives. This book features twelve new essays, nestled comfortably at the intersection of psychology and philosophy.The Moral Psychology of Disgust brings together leading scholars—ethical theorists, cognitive scientists, developmental psychologists, legal scholars, cognitive neuroscientists, anthropologists—each answering questions that arise at the intersection of morality and disgust. The book introduces readers to the most pressing issues facing the field, and gives a perspective that is representative of the range of views and concerns that reflect the current research terrain.The book addresses three main themes: the origins of moral disgust, exploring the evolutionary function of disgust and its role in sustaining group dynamics; the psychological mechanisms underlying disgust responses and the way in which disgust influences reasoning about agency, violence, sex, and meaning; and the ethical challenges posed by disgust. The contributors explore whether we are justified in using disgust to form beliefs about right and wrong and how disgust sheds light on the very nature of morality.