The trust is a highly popular mode of property-holding and one of the most important innovations in the law of equity. It presents the jurist with numerous conceptual, doctrinal, and ethical challenges. In addition to being used towards the pursuit of good, trusts have also been used for ill, and the interaction of trust law with other laws agitates received principles of justice, efficiency, and coherence in the law. Trust law remains, nevertheless, under-theorized. While its technical and doctrinal aspects have been studied intensively, the foundational questions to which they give rise have remained largely unexamined. This volume takes an important step towards filling this gap. The chapters in this book explore some of these quandaries with a view to initiating and encouraging further engagement and learning. They identify different challenges and adopt a variety of methodological approaches and perspectives towards their resolution, ranging from conceptual questions about what is 'the trust' and 'trusts law', chapters analysing the legal and/or moral statuses of each of the settlor, trustee, and beneficiary, to chapters questioning the moral foundations of different trusts and range of pursuits towards which parties have deployed them.

Philosophical Foundations of Precedent offers a broad, deep, and diverse range of philosophical investigations of the role of precedent in law, adjudication, and morality. The forty chapters present the work of a large and inclusive group of authors which comprises of well-established leaders in the discipline and new voices in legal philosophy. The magnitude of the resulting project is extraordinary, presenting a diverse array of innovative and creative philosophical investigations of the practice of adhering to past decisions, in law and allied fields of practical reasoning. And by the same token, the contributions elucidate the reasons that courts and other decision-makers may have for departing from what has been done before. The phenomena under investigation include the law and practice of common law and civil jurisdictions around the world. In addition to its fundamental relevance to common law jurisdictions, this work will be of broad and significant interest to theoretically minded audiences in continental Europe, Latin America, and Asia because it involves an extensive study of practices of precedent in civil law systems as well as common law systems.

Private international law has long been understood as a doctrinal and technical body of law, without interesting theoretical foundations or implications. By systematically exploring the rich array of philosophical topics that are part of the fabric of private international law, Philosophical Foundations of Private International Law fills a significant and long-standing void in the legal and philosophical literature.The contributions to this volume are testimony to the significant potential for interaction between philosophy and private international law. Some aim to expand and rethink classical jurisprudential theories by focusing on law beyond the state and on the recognition of foreign law and judgments in domestic courts. Others bring legal and moral theories to bear on traditional debates in private international law, such as legal pluralism, transnational justice, the interpretation of foreign legal policies, and the boundaries of the legal system. Several engage with the history of both private international law and legal and political philosophy. They point to missed opportunities when philosophers ignored law's transnational dimensions, or when private international law scholars failed to position their theories within broader philosophical schools of thought. Some seek to complete past attempts to articulate the philosophical dimensions of private international law that were never carried through. Thought-provoking and topical, this volume displays the varied themes cutting through the disciplines of private international law and philosophy.

Contemporary philosophy and tort law have long enjoyed a happy union. Tort theory today is an exceptionally active and wide ranging field within legal philosophy. This volume brings together established and emerging scholars from around the world and from varying disciplines that bring their distinct perspective to the philosophical problems of tort law. These ground breaking essays advance longstanding debates and open up new avenues of enquiry thus deepening and broadening the field. Contributions cover the major problematic areas of tort law, such as the relations between responsibility, fault, and strict liability; the morality of harm, compensation, and repair; and the relationship of tort with criminal and property law among many others.

Fiduciary law is a critically important body of law. Fiduciary duties ensure the integrity of a remarkable variety of relationships, institutions, and organizations. They apply to relationships of great personal significance, including in some jurisdictions the relationship between parents and children. They structure a wide variety of commercial relationships, and they are essential to the regulation of relationships between professional service providers and their clients, including relationships between lawyer and client, doctor and patient, and investment manager and client. Fiduciary duties, perhaps uniquely in private law, challenge traditional ways of marking the boundaries between private and public law, inasmuch as they figure prominently in public governance. Indeed, there is even a storied tradition of thinking of the authority of the state in fiduciary terms. Notwithstanding its importance, fiduciary law has been woefully under-analysed by legal theorists. Filling this gap with a series of chapters by leading theorists, this book includes chapters on: the nature of fiduciary relationships, the connection between fiduciary duties and morality, the content and significance of fiduciary loyalty, the economic significance of fiduciary law, the application of fiduciary principles to public law and international law, the import of fiduciary relationships to theories of authority, and various other fundamental topics in the field. In many cases, new and important questions are raised by the book's chapters. Indeed, this book not only offers a much-needed theoretical assessment of fiduciary topics, it defines the field going forward, setting an agenda for future philosophical study of fiduciary law.

In recent years there has been a revival of interest in the philosophical study of contract law. In 1981 Charles Fried claimed that contract law is based on the philosophy of promise and this has generated what is today known as 'the contract and promise debate'. Cutting to the heart of contemporary discussions, this volume brings together leading philosophers, legal theorists, and contract lawyers to debate the philosophical foundations of this area of law.Divided into two parts, the first explores general themes in the contract theory literature, including the philosophy of promising, the nature of contractual obligation, economic accounts of contract law, and the relationship between contract law and moral values such as personal autonomy and distributive justice. The second part uses these philosophical ideas to make progress in doctrinal debates, relating for example to contract interpretation, unfair terms, good faith, vitiating factors, and remedies. Together, the essays provide a picture of the current state of research in this revitalized area of law, and pave the way for future study and debate.

In recent years there has been a revival of interest in the philosophical study of contract law. In 1981 Charles Fried claimed that contract law is based on the philosophy of promise and this has generated what is today known as 'the contract and promise debate'. Cutting to the heart of contemporary discussions, this volume brings together leading philosophers, legal theorists, and contract lawyers to debate the philosophical foundations of this area of law. Divided into two parts, the first explores general themes in the contract theory literature, including the philosophy of promising, the nature of contractual obligation, economic accounts of contract law, and the relationship between contract law and moral values such as personal autonomy and distributive justice. The second part uses these philosophical ideas to make progress in doctrinal debates, relating for example to contract interpretation, unfair terms, good faith, vitiating factors, and remedies. Together, the essays provide a picture of the current state of research in this revitalized area of law, and pave the way for future study and debate.

The intersection between law and neuroscience has been a focus of intense research for the past decade, as an unprecedented amount of attention has been triggered by the increased use of neuroscientific evidence in courts. While the majority of this attention is currently devoted to criminal law, including capital cases, the wide-ranging proposals for how neuroscience may inform issues of law and public policy extend to virtually every substantive area in law. Bringing together the latest work from leading scholars in the field, this volume examines the philosophical issues that inform this emerging and vibrant subfield of law. From discussions featuring the philosophy of the mind to neuroscience-based lie detection, each chapter addresses foundational questions that arise in the application of neuroscientific technology in the legal sphere.

Constitutional law has been and remains an area of intense philosophical interest, and yet the debate has taken place in a variety of different fields with very little to connect them. In a collection of essays bringing together scholars from several constitutional systems and disciplines, Philosophical Foundations of Constitutional Law unites the debate in a study of the philosophical issues at the very foundations of the idea of a constitution: why one might be necessary; what problems it must address; what problems constitutions usually address; and some of the issues raised by the administration of a constitutional regime. Although these issues of institutional design are of abiding importance, many of them have taken on new significance in the last few years as law-makers have been forced to return to first principles in order to justify novel practices and arrangements in their constitutional orders. Thus, questions of constitutional 'revolutions,' challenges to the demands of the rule of law, and the separation of powers have taken on new and pressing importance. The essays in this volume address these questions, filling the gap in the philosophical analysis of constitutional law. The volume will provoke specialists in philosophy, politics, and law to develop new philosophically grounded analyses of constitutional law, and will be a valuable resource for graduate students in law, politics and philosophy.

Constitutional law has been and remains an area of intense philosophical interest, and yet the debate has taken place in a variety of different fields with very little to connect them. In a collection of essays bringing together scholars from several constitutional systems and disciplines, Philosophical Foundations of Constitutional Law unites the debate in a study of the philosophical issues at the very foundations of the idea of a constitution: why one might be necessary; what problems it must address; what problems constitutions usually address; and some of the issues raised by the administration of a constitutional regime. Although these issues of institutional design are of abiding importance, many of them have taken on new significance in the last few years as law-makers have been forced to return to first principles in order to justify novel practices and arrangements in their constitutional orders. Thus, questions of constitutional 'revolutions', challenges to the demands of the rule of law, and the separation of powers have taken on new and pressing importance. The essays in this volume address these questions, filling the gap in the philosophical analysis of constitutional law. The volume will provoke specialists in philosophy, politics, and law to develop new philosophically grounded analyses of constitutional law, and will be a valuable resource for graduate students in law, politics, and philosophy.

Fiduciary law is a critically important body of law. Fiduciary duties ensure the integrity of a remarkable variety of relationships, institutions, and organizations. They apply to relationships of great personal significance, including in some jurisdictions the relationship between parents and children. They structure a wide variety of commercial relationships, and they are essential to the regulation of relationships between professional service providers and their clients, including relationships between lawyer and client, doctor and patient, and investment manager and client. Fiduciary duties, perhaps uniquely in private law, challenge traditional ways of marking the boundaries between private and public law, inasmuch as they figure prominently in public governance. Indeed, there is even a storied tradition of thinking of the authority of the state in fiduciary terms. Notwithstanding its importance, fiduciary law has been woefully under-analysed by legal theorists. Filling this gap with a series of chapters by leading theorists, this book includes chapters on: the nature of fiduciary relationships, the connection between fiduciary duties and morality, the content and significance of fiduciary loyalty, the economic significance of fiduciary law, the application of fiduciary principles to public law and international law, the import of fiduciary relationships to theories of authority, and various other fundamental topics in the field. In many cases, new and important questions are raised by the book's chapters. Indeed, this book not only offers a much-needed theoretical assessment of fiduciary topics, it defines the field going forward, setting an agenda for future philosophical study of fiduciary law.

This volume brings together new essays in law and philosophy on a broad range of topics in children's and family law. It is the first volume to bring together essays by legal scholars and philosophers for an integrated, critical analysis of key issues in this area, marking the 'coming of age' of a comparatively new field of family law. Debates in children's and family law are at once theoretical and empirical in nature. Not only does children's and family law have significant consequences for individuals' intimate lives, the field's impact on lived experience highlights the socially constructed nature of law. Approaching this area of law often involves exploring a legal concept familiar from daily life, such as the very notion of 'marriage' or 'family', and examining it within its social, economic, and historical context. The normative basis for law regulating intimate personal and family life extends beyond any narrow legal philosophy or social context to its broader foundations in theories of morality or justice. The chapters included bring together a representative and broad range of pieces that engage with long-standing and contemporary debates. A wide range of perspectives is represented on topics such as same-sex marriage, polygamy and polyamory, alimony, unmarried cohabitation, gestational surrogacy and assisted reproductive technologies, child support, parental rights and responsibilities, children's rights, family immigration, religious freedom, and the rights of paid caregivers. There is also philosophical discussion of concepts such as care, intimacy, and the nature of family and family law itself.

Tax law changes at a startling rate - not only does societal change bring with it demands for change in the tax system, but changes in the political climate will force change, as will many other competing pressures. With this pace of change, it is easy to focus on the practical and forget the core underpinnings of the tax system and their philosophical justifications. Taking a pause to remind ourselves of those principles and how they can operate in the modern tax system is crucial to ensuring that the tax system does not diverge too far from what it should be or could be. It is essential to understand the answers to some of the seemingly basic questions that surround tax before we can even begin to think about what a tax system should look like. This collection brings together major themes and difficult questions in the philosophical foundations of tax law. The chapters consider practical issues such as justification, enforcement, design, and mechanics, and provide a full and coherent analysis of the basis for tax law. Philosophical Foundations of Tax Law allows the reader to consider how tax systems should move forward in the modern world, with a sound philosophical basis, to provide the practical tax system that the state requires and citizens deserve.

In recent years we have witnessed major developments in philosophical inquiry concerning the nature of law and, with the continuing development of international and transnational legal institutions, in the phenomenon of law itself. This volume gathers leading writers in the field to take stock of current debates on the nature of law and the aims and methods of legal philosophy.The volume covers four broad themes. The essays within the first theme address and develop the traditional debates between legal positivism, natural law theory, and Dworkinian interpretivism. Papers within the second theme focus on the power of coercion, often overlooked in contemporary legal philosophy. The third set of papers addresses the aims and methods of legal theory, and the role of conceptual analysis. The final section explores new methods and issues in the subject, and offers fresh starting points for future work in the field. Gathering many leading and up-and-coming writers in the subject, the volume offers a snapshot of the best current work in general jurisprudence.

The law of Equity, a latecomer to the field of private law theory, raises fundamental questions about the relationships between law and morality, the nature of rights, and the extent to which we are willing to compromise on the rule of law ideal to achieve social goals. In this volume, leading scholars come together to address these and other questions about underlying principles of Equity and its relationship to the common law: What relationships, if any, are there between the legal, philosophical, and moral senses of 'equity'? Does Equity form a second-order constraint on law? If so, is its operation at odds with the rule of law? Do the various theories of Equity require some kind of separation of law and equity-and, if they do, what kind of separation? The volume further sheds light on some of the most topical questions of jurisprudence that are embedded in the debate around 'fusion'. A noteworthy addition to the Philosophical Foundations series, this volume is an important contribution to an ongoing debate, and will be of value to students and scholars across the discipline.

Contemporary philosophy and tort law have long enjoyed a happy union. Tort theory today is an exceptionally active and wide ranging field within legal philosophy. This volume brings together established and emerging scholars from around the world and from varying disciplines that bring their distinct perspective to the philosophical problems of tort law. These ground breaking essays advance longstanding debates and open up new avenues of enquiry thus deepening and broadening the field. Contributions cover the major problematic areas of tort law, such as the relations between responsibility, fault, and strict liability; the morality of harm, compensation, and repair; and the relationship of tort with criminal and property law among many others.

This collection of essays presents an interdisciplinary investigation by lawyers and philosophers into the philosophical ideas, concepts, and principles that provide the foundation for the field of labour law and employment law. The book addresses the doubts that have been expressed about whether a body of labour law that protects workers is needed at all, what should be regarded as the proper scope of the field in the light of developments such as the integration of work and home life by means of technology, the globalization of the economy, and the precarious kinds of work that thrive in the gig economy. Paying particular attention to political philosophy and theories of justice, the contributions focus on four themes: I. freedom, dignity, and human rights; II. distributive justice and exploitation; III. workplace democracy and self-determination; and IV. social inclusion.

Philosophy has a strong presence in evidence law and the nature of evidence is a highly debated topic in both general and social epistemology; legal theorists working in the evidence law area draw on different underlying philosophical theories of knowledge, inference and probability. Core evidentiary concepts and principles, such as the presumption of innocence, standards of proof, and others, reply on moral and political philosophy for their understanding and interpretation. Written by leading scholars across the globe, this volume brings together philosophical debates on the nature and function of evidence, proof, and law of evidence. It presents a cross-disciplinary overview of central issues in the theory and methodology of legal evidence and covers a wide range of contemporary debates on topics such as truth, proof, economics, gender, and race. The volume covers different theoretical approaches to legal evidence, including the Bayesian approach, scenario theory and inference to the best explanation.Divided in to five parts, Philosophical Foundations of Evidence Law, covers different theoretical approaches to legal evidence, including the Bayesian approach, scenario theory and inference to the best explanation.

Disability law is one of the most urgent and rapidly developing areas of legal scholarship, engaging fundamental questions about equality, autonomy, personhood, and the role of law in responding to exclusion. Yet its philosophical foundations have not been brought together in a sustained way. By placing disability law in dialogue with philosophy and related fields, this volume offers a major intervention in an emerging area and a framework for understanding its scope, principles, and future direction.The collection brings conceptual clarity to legal challenges that continue to shape disabled people's lives, from discrimination and structural exclusion to questions of respect, human flourishing, and legal recognition. Its chapters move across areas of law and legal traditions while opening disability law to broader interdisciplinary conversations, including perspectives from theology, literature, and history.Philosophical Foundations of Disability Law is the first volume of its kind to bring together distinguished scholars in law and philosophy, as well as other relevant disciplines, with contributions that can grow the field of disability law like never before. Through an innovative approach, the chapters cover an especially extensive and diverse range of topics, engaging key philosophical themes as well as intersectional perspectives. For researchers and students interested in disability law, disability and philosophy, and disability studies, the collection can serve as a foundational text.

25 leading contemporary theorists of criminal law tackle a range of foundational issues about the proper aims and structure of the criminal law in a liberal democracy. The challenges facing criminal law are many. There are crises of over-criminalization and over-imprisonment; penal policy has become so politicized that it is difficult to find any clear consensus on what aims the criminal law can properly serve; governments seeking to protect their citizens in the face of a range of perceived threats have pushed the outer limits of criminal law and blurred its boundaries. To think clearly about the future of criminal law, and its role in a liberal society, foundational questions about its proper scope, structure, and operations must be re-examined. What kinds of conduct should be criminalized? What are the principles of criminal responsibility? How should offences and defences be defined? The criminal process and the criminal trial need to be studied closely, and the purposes and modes of punishment should be scrutinized. Such a re-examination must draw on the resources of various disciplines-notably law, political and moral philosophy, criminology and history; it must examine both the inner logic of criminal law and its place in a larger legal and political structure; it must attend to the growing field of international criminal law, it must consider how the criminal law can respond to the challenges of a changing world.Topics covered in this volume include the question of criminalization and the proper scope of the criminal law; the grounds of criminal responsibility; the ways in which offences and defences should be defined; the criminal process and its values; criminal punishment; the relationship between international criminal law and domestic criminal law. Together, the essays provide a picture of the exciting state of criminal law theory today, and the basis for further research and debate in the coming years.

This volume takes stock of the rapid changes to the law of unjust enrichment over the last decade. It offers a set of original contributions from leading private law theorists examining the philosophical foundations of the law. The essays consider the central questions raised by demarcating unjust enrichment as a separate area of private law - including how its normative foundations relate to those of other areas of private law, how the concept of enrichment relates to property theory, how the remedy of restitution relates to principles of corrective justice and what role mental elements should play in shaping the law.

This collection brings together the best contemporary philosophical work in the area of intersection between philosophy of language and the law. Some of the contributors are philosophers of language who are interested in applying advances in philosophy of language to legal issues, and some of the participants are philosophers of law who are interested in applying insights and theories from philosophy of language to their work on the nature of law and legal interpretation. By making this body of recent work available in a single volume, readers will gain both a general overview of the various interactions between language and law, and also detailed analyses of particular areas in which this interaction is manifest. The contributions to this volume are grouped under three main general areas: The first area concerns a critical assessment, in light of recent advances in philosophy of language, of the foundational role of language in understanding the nature of law itself. The second main area concerns a number of ways in which an understanding of language can resolve some of the issues prevalent in legal interpretation, such as the various ways in which semantic content can differ from law's assertive content; the contribution of presuppositions and pragmatic implicatures in understanding what the law conveys; the role of vagueness in legal language, for example. The third general topic concerns the role of language in the context of particular legal doctrines and legal solutions to practical problems, such as the legal definitions of inchoate crimes, the legal definition of torture, or the contractual doctrines concerning default rules. Together, these three key issues cover a wide range of philosophical interests in law that can be elucidated by a better understanding of language and linguistic communication.

The supranational law of the European Union represents a uniquely powerful, far-reaching, and controversial instance of the growth of international legal governance, one that has forever altered the political and legal landscape of its Member States. The EU has attracted significant attention from political scientists, economists, and lawyers who have analysed its polity and constructed theoretical models of the integration process. Yet it has been almost entirely neglected by analytic philosophers, and the philosophical tools that have been developed to analyse and evaluate the Union are still in their infancy.This book brings together legal philosophers, political philosophers, and EU legal academics in the service of developing the philosophical analysis of EU law. In a series of original and complementary essays they bring their varied disciplinary expertise and theoretical perspectives to bear on central issues facing the Union and its law. Combining both abstract thought in legal and political philosophy and more tangible theoretical work on specific legal issues, the essays in this volume make a significant contribution to developing work on the philosophical foundations of EU law, and will engender further debate between philosophers, political philosophers, and EU legal academics. They will be of interest to all those engaged in understanding the nature and purpose of this unique legal entity.

How do we understand and justify the particular partialities that discrimination law tries to protect against? Are different discrimination laws from around the world grounded in a single set of norms? And does discrimination law fail to treat people as individuals?The philosophical study around discrimination law in the private and public sector is a relatively young field of inquiry. This is owing to the fact that anti-discrimination laws are relatively new. It is arguably only since the Second World War that these rights have been adopted by countries in a broad sense, ensuring that all citizens have civil rights and the right to non-discrimination. Theory around discrimination law has until recently been threefold, doctrinal in its approach, questioning equality - why it matters and why should it influence legislatures in the design of policy - and thirdly focusing on the issue of affirmative action.This volume takes a fresh look at the philosophy of discrimination law, identifying points of discussion in need of further study. It addresses how we are to understand and justify laws prohibiting discrimination. For instance, how discrimination might be best conceived - as a personal wrong or as an unfair distribution of resources. The volume then turns to a number of meta-theoretical questions, whether different discrimination laws are coherent and grounded in collectively held beliefs or are instead a collection of very different rules that have no underlying coherence. Lastly, the authors focus on issues in discrimination law that are currently the topic of considerable political debate. The questions raised here are urgent and necessary and it is the hope of the authors that other academics and philosophers may join in their discussions.

Property has long played a central role in political and moral philosophy. Philosophers dealing with property have tended to follow the consensus that property has no special content but is a protean construct - a mere placeholder for theories aimed at questions of distributive justice and efficiency. Until recently there has been a relative absence of serious philosophical attention paid to the various doctrines that shape the actual law of property. If the philosophy of property is to be more attentive to concepts lying between broad considerations of political philosophy and distributive justice on the one hand and individual rules on the other, what in this broad space needs explaining, and how might we justify what we find?The papers in this volume are a first step towards filling this gap in the philosophical analysis of private law. This is achieved here by revisiting the contributions of philosophers such as Hume, Locke, Kant, and Grotius and revealing how particular doctrines illuminate the way in which property law respects the equality and autonomy of its subjects. Secondly, by exploring the central notions of possession, ownership, and title and finally by considering the very foundations of conceptualism in property.

Twenty-five leading contemporary theorists of criminal law tackle a range of foundational issues about the proper aims and structure of the criminal law in a liberal democracy.The challenges facing criminal law are many. There are crises of over-criminalization and over-imprisonment; penal policy has become so politicized that it is difficult to find any clear consensus on what aims the criminal law can properly serve; governments seeking to protect their citizens in the face of a range of perceived threats have pushed the outer limits of criminal law and blurred its boundaries. To think clearly about the future of criminal law, and its role in a liberal society, foundational questions about its proper scope, structure, and operations must be re-examined. What kinds of conduct should be criminalized? What are the principles of criminal responsibility? How should offences and defences be defined? The criminal process and the criminal trial need to be studied closely, and the purposes and modes of punishment should be scrutinized.Such a re-examination must draw on the resources of various disciplines-notably law, political and moral philosophy, criminology and history; it must examine both the inner logic of criminal law and its place in a larger legal and political structure; it must attend to the growing field of international criminal law, it must consider how the criminal law can respond to the challenges of a changing world.Topics covered in this volume include the question of criminalization and the proper scope of the criminal law; the grounds of criminal responsibility; the ways in which offences and defences should be defined; the criminal process and its values; criminal punishment; the relationship between international criminal law and domestic criminal law. Together, the essays provide a picture of the exciting state of criminal law theory today, and the basis for further research and debate in the coming years.

This collection brings together the best contemporary philosophical work in the area of intersection between philosophy of language and the law. Some of the contributors are philosophers of language who are interested in applying advances in philosophy of language to legal issues, and some of the participants are philosophers of law who are interested in applying insights and theories from philosophy of language to their work on the nature of law and legal interpretation. By making this body of recent work available in a single volume, readers will gain both a general overview of the various interactions between language and law, and also detailed analyses of particular areas in which this interaction is manifest.The contributions to this volume are grouped under three main general areas: The first area concerns a critical assessment, in light of recent advances in philosophy of language, of the foundational role of language in understanding the nature of law itself. The second main area concerns a number of ways in which an understanding of language can resolve some of the issues prevalent in legal interpretation, such as the various ways in which semantic content can differ from law's assertive content; the contribution of presuppositions and pragmatic implicatures in understanding what the law conveys; the role of vagueness in legal language, for example. The third general topic concerns the role of language in the context of particular legal doctrines and legal solutions to practical problems, such as the legal definitions of inchoate crimes, the legal definition of torture, or the contractual doctrines concerning default rules.Together, these three key issues cover a wide range of philosophical interests in law that can be elucidated by a better understanding of language and linguistic communication.

In recent years we have witnessed major developments in philosophical inquiry concerning the nature of law and, with the continuing development of international and transnational legal institutions, in the phenomenon of law itself. This volume gathers leading writers in the field to take stock of current debates on the nature of law and the aims and methods of legal philosophy.The volume covers four broad themes. The essays within the first theme address and develop the traditional debates between legal positivism, natural law theory, and Dworkinian interpretivism. Papers within the second theme focus on the power of coercion, often overlooked in contemporary legal philosophy. The third set of papers addresses the aims and methods of legal theory, and the role of conceptual analysis. The final section explores new methods and issues in the subject, and offers fresh starting points for future work in the field. Gathering many leading and up-and-coming writers in the subject, the volume offers a snapshot of the best current work in general jurisprudence.

What makes something a human right? What is the relationship between the moral foundations of human rights and human rights law? What are the difficulties of appealing to human rights?This book offers the first comprehensive survey of current thinking on the philosophical foundations of human rights. Divided into four parts, this book focusses firstly on the moral grounds of human rights, for example in our dignity, agency, interests or needs. 'Secondly, it looks at the implications that different moral perspectives on human rights bear for human rights law and politics. Thirdly, it discusses specific and topical human rights including freedom of expression and religion, security, health and more controversial rights such as a human right to subsistence. The final part discusses nuanced critical and reformative views on human rights from feminist, Kantian and relativist perspectives among others.The essays represent new and canonical research by leading scholars in the field. Each part is comprised of a set of essays and replies, offering a comprehensive analysis of different positions within the debate in question.The introduction from the editors will guide researchers and students navigating the diversity of views on the philosophical foundations of human rights.

The trust is a highly popular mode of property-holding and one of the most important innovations in the law of equity. It presents the jurist with numerous conceptual, doctrinal, and ethical challenges. In addition to being used towards the pursuit of good, trusts have also been used for ill, and the interaction of trust law with other laws agitates received principles of justice, efficiency, and coherence in the law. Trust law remains, nevertheless, under-theorized. While its technical and doctrinal aspects have been studied intensively, the foundational questions to which they give rise have remained largely unexamined. This volume takes an important step towards filling this gap. The chapters in this book explore some of these quandaries with a view to initiating and encouraging further engagement and learning. They identify different challenges and adopt a variety of methodological approaches and perspectives towards their resolution, ranging from conceptual questions about what is 'the trust' and 'trusts law', chapters analysing the legal and/or moral statuses of each of the settlor, trustee, and beneficiary, to chapters questioning the moral foundations of different trusts and range of pursuits towards which parties have deployed them.

Philosophical Foundations of Precedent offers a broad, deep, and diverse range of philosophical investigations of the role of precedent in law, adjudication, and morality. The forty chapters present the work of a large and inclusive group of authors which comprises of well-established leaders in the discipline and new voices in legal philosophy. The magnitude of the resulting project is extraordinary, presenting a diverse array of innovative and creative philosophical investigations of the practice of adhering to past decisions, in law and allied fields of practical reasoning. And by the same token, the contributions elucidate the reasons that courts and other decision-makers may have for departing from what has been done before. The phenomena under investigation include the law and practice of common law and civil jurisdictions around the world. In addition to its fundamental relevance to common law jurisdictions, this work will be of broad and significant interest to theoretically minded audiences in continental Europe, Latin America, and Asia because it involves an extensive study of practices of precedent in civil law systems as well as common law systems.

Private international law has long been understood as a doctrinal and technical body of law, without interesting theoretical foundations or implications. By systematically exploring the rich array of philosophical topics that are part of the fabric of private international law, Philosophical Foundations of Private International Law fills a significant and long-standing void in the legal and philosophical literature.The contributions to this volume are testimony to the significant potential for interaction between philosophy and private international law. Some aim to expand and rethink classical jurisprudential theories by focusing on law beyond the state and on the recognition of foreign law and judgments in domestic courts. Others bring legal and moral theories to bear on traditional debates in private international law, such as legal pluralism, transnational justice, the interpretation of foreign legal policies, and the boundaries of the legal system. Several engage with the history of both private international law and legal and political philosophy. They point to missed opportunities when philosophers ignored law's transnational dimensions, or when private international law scholars failed to position their theories within broader philosophical schools of thought. Some seek to complete past attempts to articulate the philosophical dimensions of private international law that were never carried through. Thought-provoking and topical, this volume displays the varied themes cutting through the disciplines of private international law and philosophy.

Contemporary philosophy and tort law have long enjoyed a happy union. Tort theory today is an exceptionally active and wide ranging field within legal philosophy. This volume brings together established and emerging scholars from around the world and from varying disciplines that bring their distinct perspective to the philosophical problems of tort law. These ground breaking essays advance longstanding debates and open up new avenues of enquiry thus deepening and broadening the field. Contributions cover the major problematic areas of tort law, such as the relations between responsibility, fault, and strict liability; the morality of harm, compensation, and repair; and the relationship of tort with criminal and property law among many others.

Fiduciary law is a critically important body of law. Fiduciary duties ensure the integrity of a remarkable variety of relationships, institutions, and organizations. They apply to relationships of great personal significance, including in some jurisdictions the relationship between parents and children. They structure a wide variety of commercial relationships, and they are essential to the regulation of relationships between professional service providers and their clients, including relationships between lawyer and client, doctor and patient, and investment manager and client. Fiduciary duties, perhaps uniquely in private law, challenge traditional ways of marking the boundaries between private and public law, inasmuch as they figure prominently in public governance. Indeed, there is even a storied tradition of thinking of the authority of the state in fiduciary terms. Notwithstanding its importance, fiduciary law has been woefully under-analysed by legal theorists. Filling this gap with a series of chapters by leading theorists, this book includes chapters on: the nature of fiduciary relationships, the connection between fiduciary duties and morality, the content and significance of fiduciary loyalty, the economic significance of fiduciary law, the application of fiduciary principles to public law and international law, the import of fiduciary relationships to theories of authority, and various other fundamental topics in the field. In many cases, new and important questions are raised by the book's chapters. Indeed, this book not only offers a much-needed theoretical assessment of fiduciary topics, it defines the field going forward, setting an agenda for future philosophical study of fiduciary law.

In recent years there has been a revival of interest in the philosophical study of contract law. In 1981 Charles Fried claimed that contract law is based on the philosophy of promise and this has generated what is today known as 'the contract and promise debate'. Cutting to the heart of contemporary discussions, this volume brings together leading philosophers, legal theorists, and contract lawyers to debate the philosophical foundations of this area of law.Divided into two parts, the first explores general themes in the contract theory literature, including the philosophy of promising, the nature of contractual obligation, economic accounts of contract law, and the relationship between contract law and moral values such as personal autonomy and distributive justice. The second part uses these philosophical ideas to make progress in doctrinal debates, relating for example to contract interpretation, unfair terms, good faith, vitiating factors, and remedies. Together, the essays provide a picture of the current state of research in this revitalized area of law, and pave the way for future study and debate.

In recent years there has been a revival of interest in the philosophical study of contract law. In 1981 Charles Fried claimed that contract law is based on the philosophy of promise and this has generated what is today known as 'the contract and promise debate'. Cutting to the heart of contemporary discussions, this volume brings together leading philosophers, legal theorists, and contract lawyers to debate the philosophical foundations of this area of law. Divided into two parts, the first explores general themes in the contract theory literature, including the philosophy of promising, the nature of contractual obligation, economic accounts of contract law, and the relationship between contract law and moral values such as personal autonomy and distributive justice. The second part uses these philosophical ideas to make progress in doctrinal debates, relating for example to contract interpretation, unfair terms, good faith, vitiating factors, and remedies. Together, the essays provide a picture of the current state of research in this revitalized area of law, and pave the way for future study and debate.

The intersection between law and neuroscience has been a focus of intense research for the past decade, as an unprecedented amount of attention has been triggered by the increased use of neuroscientific evidence in courts. While the majority of this attention is currently devoted to criminal law, including capital cases, the wide-ranging proposals for how neuroscience may inform issues of law and public policy extend to virtually every substantive area in law. Bringing together the latest work from leading scholars in the field, this volume examines the philosophical issues that inform this emerging and vibrant subfield of law. From discussions featuring the philosophy of the mind to neuroscience-based lie detection, each chapter addresses foundational questions that arise in the application of neuroscientific technology in the legal sphere.

Constitutional law has been and remains an area of intense philosophical interest, and yet the debate has taken place in a variety of different fields with very little to connect them. In a collection of essays bringing together scholars from several constitutional systems and disciplines, Philosophical Foundations of Constitutional Law unites the debate in a study of the philosophical issues at the very foundations of the idea of a constitution: why one might be necessary; what problems it must address; what problems constitutions usually address; and some of the issues raised by the administration of a constitutional regime. Although these issues of institutional design are of abiding importance, many of them have taken on new significance in the last few years as law-makers have been forced to return to first principles in order to justify novel practices and arrangements in their constitutional orders. Thus, questions of constitutional 'revolutions,' challenges to the demands of the rule of law, and the separation of powers have taken on new and pressing importance. The essays in this volume address these questions, filling the gap in the philosophical analysis of constitutional law. The volume will provoke specialists in philosophy, politics, and law to develop new philosophically grounded analyses of constitutional law, and will be a valuable resource for graduate students in law, politics and philosophy.

Constitutional law has been and remains an area of intense philosophical interest, and yet the debate has taken place in a variety of different fields with very little to connect them. In a collection of essays bringing together scholars from several constitutional systems and disciplines, Philosophical Foundations of Constitutional Law unites the debate in a study of the philosophical issues at the very foundations of the idea of a constitution: why one might be necessary; what problems it must address; what problems constitutions usually address; and some of the issues raised by the administration of a constitutional regime. Although these issues of institutional design are of abiding importance, many of them have taken on new significance in the last few years as law-makers have been forced to return to first principles in order to justify novel practices and arrangements in their constitutional orders. Thus, questions of constitutional 'revolutions', challenges to the demands of the rule of law, and the separation of powers have taken on new and pressing importance. The essays in this volume address these questions, filling the gap in the philosophical analysis of constitutional law. The volume will provoke specialists in philosophy, politics, and law to develop new philosophically grounded analyses of constitutional law, and will be a valuable resource for graduate students in law, politics, and philosophy.

Fiduciary law is a critically important body of law. Fiduciary duties ensure the integrity of a remarkable variety of relationships, institutions, and organizations. They apply to relationships of great personal significance, including in some jurisdictions the relationship between parents and children. They structure a wide variety of commercial relationships, and they are essential to the regulation of relationships between professional service providers and their clients, including relationships between lawyer and client, doctor and patient, and investment manager and client. Fiduciary duties, perhaps uniquely in private law, challenge traditional ways of marking the boundaries between private and public law, inasmuch as they figure prominently in public governance. Indeed, there is even a storied tradition of thinking of the authority of the state in fiduciary terms. Notwithstanding its importance, fiduciary law has been woefully under-analysed by legal theorists. Filling this gap with a series of chapters by leading theorists, this book includes chapters on: the nature of fiduciary relationships, the connection between fiduciary duties and morality, the content and significance of fiduciary loyalty, the economic significance of fiduciary law, the application of fiduciary principles to public law and international law, the import of fiduciary relationships to theories of authority, and various other fundamental topics in the field. In many cases, new and important questions are raised by the book's chapters. Indeed, this book not only offers a much-needed theoretical assessment of fiduciary topics, it defines the field going forward, setting an agenda for future philosophical study of fiduciary law.

This volume brings together new essays in law and philosophy on a broad range of topics in children's and family law. It is the first volume to bring together essays by legal scholars and philosophers for an integrated, critical analysis of key issues in this area, marking the 'coming of age' of a comparatively new field of family law. Debates in children's and family law are at once theoretical and empirical in nature. Not only does children's and family law have significant consequences for individuals' intimate lives, the field's impact on lived experience highlights the socially constructed nature of law. Approaching this area of law often involves exploring a legal concept familiar from daily life, such as the very notion of 'marriage' or 'family', and examining it within its social, economic, and historical context. The normative basis for law regulating intimate personal and family life extends beyond any narrow legal philosophy or social context to its broader foundations in theories of morality or justice. The chapters included bring together a representative and broad range of pieces that engage with long-standing and contemporary debates. A wide range of perspectives is represented on topics such as same-sex marriage, polygamy and polyamory, alimony, unmarried cohabitation, gestational surrogacy and assisted reproductive technologies, child support, parental rights and responsibilities, children's rights, family immigration, religious freedom, and the rights of paid caregivers. There is also philosophical discussion of concepts such as care, intimacy, and the nature of family and family law itself.

Tax law changes at a startling rate - not only does societal change bring with it demands for change in the tax system, but changes in the political climate will force change, as will many other competing pressures. With this pace of change, it is easy to focus on the practical and forget the core underpinnings of the tax system and their philosophical justifications. Taking a pause to remind ourselves of those principles and how they can operate in the modern tax system is crucial to ensuring that the tax system does not diverge too far from what it should be or could be. It is essential to understand the answers to some of the seemingly basic questions that surround tax before we can even begin to think about what a tax system should look like. This collection brings together major themes and difficult questions in the philosophical foundations of tax law. The chapters consider practical issues such as justification, enforcement, design, and mechanics, and provide a full and coherent analysis of the basis for tax law. Philosophical Foundations of Tax Law allows the reader to consider how tax systems should move forward in the modern world, with a sound philosophical basis, to provide the practical tax system that the state requires and citizens deserve.

In recent years we have witnessed major developments in philosophical inquiry concerning the nature of law and, with the continuing development of international and transnational legal institutions, in the phenomenon of law itself. This volume gathers leading writers in the field to take stock of current debates on the nature of law and the aims and methods of legal philosophy.The volume covers four broad themes. The essays within the first theme address and develop the traditional debates between legal positivism, natural law theory, and Dworkinian interpretivism. Papers within the second theme focus on the power of coercion, often overlooked in contemporary legal philosophy. The third set of papers addresses the aims and methods of legal theory, and the role of conceptual analysis. The final section explores new methods and issues in the subject, and offers fresh starting points for future work in the field. Gathering many leading and up-and-coming writers in the subject, the volume offers a snapshot of the best current work in general jurisprudence.

The law of Equity, a latecomer to the field of private law theory, raises fundamental questions about the relationships between law and morality, the nature of rights, and the extent to which we are willing to compromise on the rule of law ideal to achieve social goals. In this volume, leading scholars come together to address these and other questions about underlying principles of Equity and its relationship to the common law: What relationships, if any, are there between the legal, philosophical, and moral senses of 'equity'? Does Equity form a second-order constraint on law? If so, is its operation at odds with the rule of law? Do the various theories of Equity require some kind of separation of law and equity-and, if they do, what kind of separation? The volume further sheds light on some of the most topical questions of jurisprudence that are embedded in the debate around 'fusion'. A noteworthy addition to the Philosophical Foundations series, this volume is an important contribution to an ongoing debate, and will be of value to students and scholars across the discipline.

Contemporary philosophy and tort law have long enjoyed a happy union. Tort theory today is an exceptionally active and wide ranging field within legal philosophy. This volume brings together established and emerging scholars from around the world and from varying disciplines that bring their distinct perspective to the philosophical problems of tort law. These ground breaking essays advance longstanding debates and open up new avenues of enquiry thus deepening and broadening the field. Contributions cover the major problematic areas of tort law, such as the relations between responsibility, fault, and strict liability; the morality of harm, compensation, and repair; and the relationship of tort with criminal and property law among many others.

This collection of essays presents an interdisciplinary investigation by lawyers and philosophers into the philosophical ideas, concepts, and principles that provide the foundation for the field of labour law and employment law. The book addresses the doubts that have been expressed about whether a body of labour law that protects workers is needed at all, what should be regarded as the proper scope of the field in the light of developments such as the integration of work and home life by means of technology, the globalization of the economy, and the precarious kinds of work that thrive in the gig economy. Paying particular attention to political philosophy and theories of justice, the contributions focus on four themes: I. freedom, dignity, and human rights; II. distributive justice and exploitation; III. workplace democracy and self-determination; and IV. social inclusion.

Philosophy has a strong presence in evidence law and the nature of evidence is a highly debated topic in both general and social epistemology; legal theorists working in the evidence law area draw on different underlying philosophical theories of knowledge, inference and probability. Core evidentiary concepts and principles, such as the presumption of innocence, standards of proof, and others, reply on moral and political philosophy for their understanding and interpretation. Written by leading scholars across the globe, this volume brings together philosophical debates on the nature and function of evidence, proof, and law of evidence. It presents a cross-disciplinary overview of central issues in the theory and methodology of legal evidence and covers a wide range of contemporary debates on topics such as truth, proof, economics, gender, and race. The volume covers different theoretical approaches to legal evidence, including the Bayesian approach, scenario theory and inference to the best explanation.Divided in to five parts, Philosophical Foundations of Evidence Law, covers different theoretical approaches to legal evidence, including the Bayesian approach, scenario theory and inference to the best explanation.

Disability law is one of the most urgent and rapidly developing areas of legal scholarship, engaging fundamental questions about equality, autonomy, personhood, and the role of law in responding to exclusion. Yet its philosophical foundations have not been brought together in a sustained way. By placing disability law in dialogue with philosophy and related fields, this volume offers a major intervention in an emerging area and a framework for understanding its scope, principles, and future direction.The collection brings conceptual clarity to legal challenges that continue to shape disabled people's lives, from discrimination and structural exclusion to questions of respect, human flourishing, and legal recognition. Its chapters move across areas of law and legal traditions while opening disability law to broader interdisciplinary conversations, including perspectives from theology, literature, and history.Philosophical Foundations of Disability Law is the first volume of its kind to bring together distinguished scholars in law and philosophy, as well as other relevant disciplines, with contributions that can grow the field of disability law like never before. Through an innovative approach, the chapters cover an especially extensive and diverse range of topics, engaging key philosophical themes as well as intersectional perspectives. For researchers and students interested in disability law, disability and philosophy, and disability studies, the collection can serve as a foundational text.

25 leading contemporary theorists of criminal law tackle a range of foundational issues about the proper aims and structure of the criminal law in a liberal democracy. The challenges facing criminal law are many. There are crises of over-criminalization and over-imprisonment; penal policy has become so politicized that it is difficult to find any clear consensus on what aims the criminal law can properly serve; governments seeking to protect their citizens in the face of a range of perceived threats have pushed the outer limits of criminal law and blurred its boundaries. To think clearly about the future of criminal law, and its role in a liberal society, foundational questions about its proper scope, structure, and operations must be re-examined. What kinds of conduct should be criminalized? What are the principles of criminal responsibility? How should offences and defences be defined? The criminal process and the criminal trial need to be studied closely, and the purposes and modes of punishment should be scrutinized. Such a re-examination must draw on the resources of various disciplines-notably law, political and moral philosophy, criminology and history; it must examine both the inner logic of criminal law and its place in a larger legal and political structure; it must attend to the growing field of international criminal law, it must consider how the criminal law can respond to the challenges of a changing world.Topics covered in this volume include the question of criminalization and the proper scope of the criminal law; the grounds of criminal responsibility; the ways in which offences and defences should be defined; the criminal process and its values; criminal punishment; the relationship between international criminal law and domestic criminal law. Together, the essays provide a picture of the exciting state of criminal law theory today, and the basis for further research and debate in the coming years.

This volume takes stock of the rapid changes to the law of unjust enrichment over the last decade. It offers a set of original contributions from leading private law theorists examining the philosophical foundations of the law. The essays consider the central questions raised by demarcating unjust enrichment as a separate area of private law - including how its normative foundations relate to those of other areas of private law, how the concept of enrichment relates to property theory, how the remedy of restitution relates to principles of corrective justice and what role mental elements should play in shaping the law.

This collection brings together the best contemporary philosophical work in the area of intersection between philosophy of language and the law. Some of the contributors are philosophers of language who are interested in applying advances in philosophy of language to legal issues, and some of the participants are philosophers of law who are interested in applying insights and theories from philosophy of language to their work on the nature of law and legal interpretation. By making this body of recent work available in a single volume, readers will gain both a general overview of the various interactions between language and law, and also detailed analyses of particular areas in which this interaction is manifest. The contributions to this volume are grouped under three main general areas: The first area concerns a critical assessment, in light of recent advances in philosophy of language, of the foundational role of language in understanding the nature of law itself. The second main area concerns a number of ways in which an understanding of language can resolve some of the issues prevalent in legal interpretation, such as the various ways in which semantic content can differ from law's assertive content; the contribution of presuppositions and pragmatic implicatures in understanding what the law conveys; the role of vagueness in legal language, for example. The third general topic concerns the role of language in the context of particular legal doctrines and legal solutions to practical problems, such as the legal definitions of inchoate crimes, the legal definition of torture, or the contractual doctrines concerning default rules. Together, these three key issues cover a wide range of philosophical interests in law that can be elucidated by a better understanding of language and linguistic communication.

The supranational law of the European Union represents a uniquely powerful, far-reaching, and controversial instance of the growth of international legal governance, one that has forever altered the political and legal landscape of its Member States. The EU has attracted significant attention from political scientists, economists, and lawyers who have analysed its polity and constructed theoretical models of the integration process. Yet it has been almost entirely neglected by analytic philosophers, and the philosophical tools that have been developed to analyse and evaluate the Union are still in their infancy.This book brings together legal philosophers, political philosophers, and EU legal academics in the service of developing the philosophical analysis of EU law. In a series of original and complementary essays they bring their varied disciplinary expertise and theoretical perspectives to bear on central issues facing the Union and its law. Combining both abstract thought in legal and political philosophy and more tangible theoretical work on specific legal issues, the essays in this volume make a significant contribution to developing work on the philosophical foundations of EU law, and will engender further debate between philosophers, political philosophers, and EU legal academics. They will be of interest to all those engaged in understanding the nature and purpose of this unique legal entity.

How do we understand and justify the particular partialities that discrimination law tries to protect against? Are different discrimination laws from around the world grounded in a single set of norms? And does discrimination law fail to treat people as individuals?The philosophical study around discrimination law in the private and public sector is a relatively young field of inquiry. This is owing to the fact that anti-discrimination laws are relatively new. It is arguably only since the Second World War that these rights have been adopted by countries in a broad sense, ensuring that all citizens have civil rights and the right to non-discrimination. Theory around discrimination law has until recently been threefold, doctrinal in its approach, questioning equality - why it matters and why should it influence legislatures in the design of policy - and thirdly focusing on the issue of affirmative action.This volume takes a fresh look at the philosophy of discrimination law, identifying points of discussion in need of further study. It addresses how we are to understand and justify laws prohibiting discrimination. For instance, how discrimination might be best conceived - as a personal wrong or as an unfair distribution of resources. The volume then turns to a number of meta-theoretical questions, whether different discrimination laws are coherent and grounded in collectively held beliefs or are instead a collection of very different rules that have no underlying coherence. Lastly, the authors focus on issues in discrimination law that are currently the topic of considerable political debate. The questions raised here are urgent and necessary and it is the hope of the authors that other academics and philosophers may join in their discussions.

Property has long played a central role in political and moral philosophy. Philosophers dealing with property have tended to follow the consensus that property has no special content but is a protean construct - a mere placeholder for theories aimed at questions of distributive justice and efficiency. Until recently there has been a relative absence of serious philosophical attention paid to the various doctrines that shape the actual law of property. If the philosophy of property is to be more attentive to concepts lying between broad considerations of political philosophy and distributive justice on the one hand and individual rules on the other, what in this broad space needs explaining, and how might we justify what we find?The papers in this volume are a first step towards filling this gap in the philosophical analysis of private law. This is achieved here by revisiting the contributions of philosophers such as Hume, Locke, Kant, and Grotius and revealing how particular doctrines illuminate the way in which property law respects the equality and autonomy of its subjects. Secondly, by exploring the central notions of possession, ownership, and title and finally by considering the very foundations of conceptualism in property.

Twenty-five leading contemporary theorists of criminal law tackle a range of foundational issues about the proper aims and structure of the criminal law in a liberal democracy.The challenges facing criminal law are many. There are crises of over-criminalization and over-imprisonment; penal policy has become so politicized that it is difficult to find any clear consensus on what aims the criminal law can properly serve; governments seeking to protect their citizens in the face of a range of perceived threats have pushed the outer limits of criminal law and blurred its boundaries. To think clearly about the future of criminal law, and its role in a liberal society, foundational questions about its proper scope, structure, and operations must be re-examined. What kinds of conduct should be criminalized? What are the principles of criminal responsibility? How should offences and defences be defined? The criminal process and the criminal trial need to be studied closely, and the purposes and modes of punishment should be scrutinized.Such a re-examination must draw on the resources of various disciplines-notably law, political and moral philosophy, criminology and history; it must examine both the inner logic of criminal law and its place in a larger legal and political structure; it must attend to the growing field of international criminal law, it must consider how the criminal law can respond to the challenges of a changing world.Topics covered in this volume include the question of criminalization and the proper scope of the criminal law; the grounds of criminal responsibility; the ways in which offences and defences should be defined; the criminal process and its values; criminal punishment; the relationship between international criminal law and domestic criminal law. Together, the essays provide a picture of the exciting state of criminal law theory today, and the basis for further research and debate in the coming years.

This collection brings together the best contemporary philosophical work in the area of intersection between philosophy of language and the law. Some of the contributors are philosophers of language who are interested in applying advances in philosophy of language to legal issues, and some of the participants are philosophers of law who are interested in applying insights and theories from philosophy of language to their work on the nature of law and legal interpretation. By making this body of recent work available in a single volume, readers will gain both a general overview of the various interactions between language and law, and also detailed analyses of particular areas in which this interaction is manifest.The contributions to this volume are grouped under three main general areas: The first area concerns a critical assessment, in light of recent advances in philosophy of language, of the foundational role of language in understanding the nature of law itself. The second main area concerns a number of ways in which an understanding of language can resolve some of the issues prevalent in legal interpretation, such as the various ways in which semantic content can differ from law's assertive content; the contribution of presuppositions and pragmatic implicatures in understanding what the law conveys; the role of vagueness in legal language, for example. The third general topic concerns the role of language in the context of particular legal doctrines and legal solutions to practical problems, such as the legal definitions of inchoate crimes, the legal definition of torture, or the contractual doctrines concerning default rules.Together, these three key issues cover a wide range of philosophical interests in law that can be elucidated by a better understanding of language and linguistic communication.

In recent years we have witnessed major developments in philosophical inquiry concerning the nature of law and, with the continuing development of international and transnational legal institutions, in the phenomenon of law itself. This volume gathers leading writers in the field to take stock of current debates on the nature of law and the aims and methods of legal philosophy.The volume covers four broad themes. The essays within the first theme address and develop the traditional debates between legal positivism, natural law theory, and Dworkinian interpretivism. Papers within the second theme focus on the power of coercion, often overlooked in contemporary legal philosophy. The third set of papers addresses the aims and methods of legal theory, and the role of conceptual analysis. The final section explores new methods and issues in the subject, and offers fresh starting points for future work in the field. Gathering many leading and up-and-coming writers in the subject, the volume offers a snapshot of the best current work in general jurisprudence.

What makes something a human right? What is the relationship between the moral foundations of human rights and human rights law? What are the difficulties of appealing to human rights?This book offers the first comprehensive survey of current thinking on the philosophical foundations of human rights. Divided into four parts, this book focusses firstly on the moral grounds of human rights, for example in our dignity, agency, interests or needs. 'Secondly, it looks at the implications that different moral perspectives on human rights bear for human rights law and politics. Thirdly, it discusses specific and topical human rights including freedom of expression and religion, security, health and more controversial rights such as a human right to subsistence. The final part discusses nuanced critical and reformative views on human rights from feminist, Kantian and relativist perspectives among others.The essays represent new and canonical research by leading scholars in the field. Each part is comprised of a set of essays and replies, offering a comprehensive analysis of different positions within the debate in question.The introduction from the editors will guide researchers and students navigating the diversity of views on the philosophical foundations of human rights.