SpringerBriefs in Philosophy – serie

The ancient Chinese scholars are fond of applying the Yin and Yang diagram to correlate almost everything.  This book continues that tradition and uses the model to study other non-“dialectical” theories and models.  The major finding qua contribution in this publication is to point out that the four diagrams are equivalent to the BaGua or BaGuaTu (BG), a set of eight ancient China symbolic notations/gossip.  Another finding is that dialectical/crab and frog motion remark is just the opposite of a non-dialectical/crab and frog motion (usually deductive, linear, or cause and effect) remark, or, at best, they must meet half-way.The two major tasks of this book are to, first, apply the author's one-dot theory, which is shored up by the crab and frog motion model, to convert other theories and models as well as studies and, second, apply his theory and model to reinvent some well-known western-derived theories and models and studies, such as game theory.  The attempt is to narrow down the gap between the East and the West scholarship/XueShu, broadly defined, making the book of interest to Eastern and Western philosophers and scholars alike.

This book approaches classic epistemological problems from a contextualist perspective. The author takes as his point of departure the fact that we are situated beings, more specifically that every single moment in our lives is already given within the framework of a specific context in the midst of which we understand ourselves and what surrounds us.In the process of his investigation, the author explores, in a fresh way, the works of key thinkers in epistemology. These include Bernard Bolzano, René Descartes, Gottlob Frege, Edmund Husserl, Immanuel Kant and Ludwig Wittgenstein, but also contemporary authors such as Stewart Cohen, Keith DeRose, David Lewis, Duncan Pritchard, Ernest Sosa and Charles Travis. Some of the topics covered are attributions of knowledge, the correspondence theory of truth, objectivity and subjectivity, possible worlds, primary and secondary evidence, scepticism, transcendentalism and relativism. The book also introduces a new contextualist thought-experiment for dealing with moral questions.Contextualism has received a great deal of attention in contemporary epistemology. It has the potential to resolve a number of issues that traditional epistemological approaches cannot address. In particular, a contextualist view opens the way to an understanding of those cognitive processes that require situational information to be fully grasped. However, contextualism poses serious difficulties in regard to epistemic invariance. This book offers readers an innovative approach to some fundamental questions in this field.

This monograph presents a synthesis and reconstruction of Rudolf Arnheim’s theory of media. Combining both Arnheim’s well-known writings on film and radio with his later work on the psychology of art, the author presents a coherent approach to the problem of the nature of a medium, space and time, and the differentia between different media. The latent ontological commitments of Arnheim’s theories is drawn out by affirming Arnheim’s membership in the Brentano school of Austrian philosophy, which allows his theories to be clarified and strengthened, particularly with the metaphysical writings of Roman Ingarden. The resulting theory is relational, portraying essential medial differences with neutral criteria and allowing for a rigorous definition of a medium. The way in which a medium is based on the inherent dispositions of medial materials creates a highly appealing theory that is determinate without being deterministic. The theory is thus highly timely as people in media studies seekto address the determinate nature of media after the post-medium condition. The book will appeal to researchers and graduate students in cultural and media studies as well as architecture and design.

This book offers the first systematic reading of Plato’s Laches in English after three decades of scholarly silence. It rekindles interest in this much-neglected dialogue by providing a fresh discussion of the major issues that arise from the text. Among these issues, pride of place is taken by the virtue of courage, for the definition of which Socrates is depicted as engaging in some long-winded dialectical exchange with his interlocutors. Yet, although there is no room for doubt that the Laches is Plato’s most explicit treatment of courage, this dialogue ends in perplexity and is thus traditionally thought of as an unsuccessful attempt to define what courage is. The present study challenges this suggestion. This book proposes a new paradigm for the interpretation of Plato’s Laches. In fact, it constitutes the first systematic attempt to study the dialogue in light of the idea that its composition could well have formed part of Plato’s overall planto establish a well-defined and rigorous justification of the life of philosophical inquiryThe book will be of key interest to classicists, philosophers, and intellectual historians, but will also appeal to students or anyone interested in ancient Greek philosophy.

This book provides a systematic analysis of the ethical implications of traditional and complementary medicine (T&CM), focusing on pragmatic solutions. The author uses a bioethical methodology called the “Ethical Matrix,” to consider the impact of T&CM use for animals and the environment as well as for humans.A systematic search of the literature reveals that most published ethical concerns are related to the safety of T&CM use for humans. However, application of the Ethical Matrix demonstrates that the ethical implications for T&CM use are much broader. In this book, the author analyses the most serious implications, including adverse events related to homeopathy, the use of animals in T&CM products, and the impact of herbal medicine on the environment. Comparisons with the ethical implications of conventional biomedicine help readers to contextualise debate, and highlight aspects that may be unique to T&CM.  Globally, many high-level health policy makerspromote T&CM as an accessible and affordable healthcare option. However, their use is considered by some to be a waste of resources, unscientific, and unethical. Offering a frank analysis of this largely ignored field of healthcare ethics, this book is both timely and essential. It helps patients, policy makers, practitioners, researchers, and students gain the knowledge they need to make more informed decisions.

In this book, the author takes a stand for a variant of panpsychism as being the best solution available to the mind-body problem. More exactly, he defends a view that can be labelled 'dual-aspect-pan-proto-psychism'. Panpsychism claims that mentality is ubiquitous to reality, and in combination with dual-aspect monism it claims that anything, from fundamental particles to rocks, trees, and human animals, has two aspects: a physical aspect and a mental aspect. In short, the view is that the nature of reality is 'phental' (physical-mental). But this does not mean, according to the author, that rocks and photons think or have conscious experiences, in the sense in which human animals have experiences. This is where pan-proto-psychism enters the picture as being a better theoretical option, where the mental aspects of fundamental particles, rocks, and trees are not experiential. Many hard questions arise here. In this book, Benovsky focuses on the combinationproblem: in short, how do tiny mental aspects of fundamental particles combine to yield macro-phenomenal conscious experiences, such as your complex experience when you enjoy a great gastronomic meal? What makes the question even harder is that the combination problem is not just one problem, but rather a family of various combination issues and worries. Benovsky offers a general strategy to deal with these combination problems and focuses on one in particular – namely, the worry concerning the existence of subjects of experience. Indeed, if standard panpsychism were true, we would need an explanation of how tiny micro-subjects combine into a macro-subject like a human person. And if panprotopsychism is true, it has to explain how a subject of experience can arise from proto-micro-mental aspects of reality. Benovsky shows that understanding the nature of subjectivity in terms of the growingly familiar notion of mineness in combination with an eliminativist view of the self, allowsus to have a coherent picture, where this type of combination problem is avoided, without throwing the baby out with the bathwater.

This book introduces a panorama of the philosophical theory of explanation. Written as a philosophical dialogue between two interlocutors, Philip and a student, it presents a defense of the position of explanatory pluralism. The fictional dialogue takes place on Cape Sounion, near Athens, where the two interlocutors are enjoying the view over the Aegean Sea. An initial exchange of arguments leads to a dialogue unfolding the development of the contemporary philosophical theory of explanation. The second part of the dialogue is devoted to an exchange of arguments on explanatory pluralism as a novel approach to the philosophical theory of explanation. The two also discuss historical cases as well as the ways of achieving explanatory progress in science.  We are all philosophers and we develop our own philosophy by exchanging views and arguments. The dialogue form is and should remain the principal form of philosophizing, since ideas do not merely exist –they develop. This is certainly the case in real-world philosophical interaction, and as this book aptly demonstrates, it can also be the case in written philosophical exposition.

This book argues that two great problems of learning confront humanity: learning about the nature of the universe and about ourselves and other living things as a part of it; and learning how to become civilized. The author proposes that with the creation of modern science in the 17th century, the first problem was essentially solved.  But the second problem has still not been solved today, and that combination of solving the first problem, but failing to solve the second one, puts us in a situation of unprecedented danger.  All our current global problems are the result.  The 18th century Enlightenment tried to solve the second great problem of achieving world enlightenment by learning from the solution to the first problem, but in implementing this idea, they made three serious blunders.  These ancient blunders are still built into academia today.  Correct the three blunders we have inherited from the Enlightenment, and we would have what we sourgently need: institutions of learning, universities and schools, rationally designed and devoted to helping us resolve our conflicts and global problems, and thus make progress towards a good, genuinely civilized world.  Science and Enlightenment: Two Great Problems of Learning will interest a broad audience, ranging from academics, university students and teachers; journalists, politicians and general readers concerned about global problems and the fate of the world.

This book introduces concepts in philosophy of mind and neurophilosophy. Inside, three scholars offer approaches to the problems of identity, consciousness, and the mind. In the process, they open new vistas for thought and raise fresh controversies to some of the oldest problems in philosophy. The first chapter focuses on the identity problem. The author employs an explanatory model he christened sense-phenomenalism to defend the thesis that personal identity is something or a phenomenon that pertains to the observable/perceptible aspect of the human person.  The next chapter explores the problem of consciousness. It deploys the new concept equiphenomenalism as a model to show that mental properties are not by-products but necessary products of consciousness. Herein, the notion of qualia is a fundamental and necessary product that must be experienced simultaneously with neural activities for consciousness to be possible. The last chapter addresses the mind/body problem. It adopts the new concept proto-phenomenalism as an alternative explanatory model. This model eliminates the idea of a mind. As such, it approaches the mind-body problem from a materialistic point of view with many implications such as, the meaning(lessness) of our existence, the possibility of thought engineering as well as religious implications.

This book analyses an inconsistency within epistemic contextualism known as the factivity problem. It also provides key insights into epistemic contextualism, an important innovation in contemporary epistemology, enabling readers to gain a better understanding of the various solutions to the factivity problem. As the authors demonstrate, each explanation is based on a different interpretation of the problem.  Divided into seven chapters, the book offers comprehensive coverage of this topic, which will be of major interest to philosophers engaged in epistemology and the philosophy of language. After an introductory chapter, Chapter 2 presents the most common understanding of epistemic contextualism and its semantic basis. It also clarifies the epistemological implications of the theory’s semantic assumptions. This chapter also explains the main argument of the factivity problem.The next four chapters discuss the respective solutions proposed by Wolfgang Freitag, Alexander Dinges, Anthony Brueckner and Christopher Buford, Michael Ashfield, Martin Montminy and Wes Skolits, and Peter Baumann. Stefano Leardi and Nicla Vassallo highlight the similarities and commonalities, identifying three main approaches to the factivity problem.Chapter 7 provides a brief overview of the solutions proposed to solve the factivity problem and presents an outline of the conclusions reached in the book.

This book examines phenomenal conservatism, one of the most influential and promising internalist conceptions of non-inferential justification debated in current epistemology and philosophy of mind. It also explores the significance of the findings of this examination for the general debate on epistemic justification. According to phenomenal conservatism, non-inferential justification rests on seemings or appearances, conceived of as experiences provided with propositional content. Phenomenal conservatism states that if it appears to S that P, in the absence of defeaters, S thereby has some justification for believing that P. This view provides the basis for foundationalism and many ordinary epistemic practices.This book sheds new light on phenomenal conservatism by assessing objections to it and examining epistemological merits and advantages attributed to it. In a nutshell, phenomenal conservatism is actually compatible with Bayesian reasoning, and it is unaffected by bootstrapping problems and challenges that appeal to the cognitive penetrability of perception. Nevertheless, appearance-based justification proves unstable or elusive and its anti-septical bite is more limited than expected. These difficulties could be surmounted if phenomenal conservatism were integrated with a theory of inferential justification. The book appeals to scholars and postgraduates in the field of epistemology and philosophy of mind who are interested in the rational roles of appearances.

This intriguing and compact book investigates whether or not philosophy can have a use in the face of ‘capitalist realism’ today. Can philosophy study everyday objects like computers and mobile phones? Can it think of advertising, the population, electricity, buildings and even dreams as ‘objects’ in their own right, which convey particular and novel qualities when analysed?Johns’ book starts from an immanent phenomenological study of objects, arguing that such objects disclose larger systems of anthropological meaning and control. The author moves away from the Husserlian ‘essence’ of the object and embeds his objects in a series of ‘uses’ (or ‘equipment’ as Heidegger called it). However, Johns makes a speculative move by positing the very existence of such ‘uses’ distinct from the human and first person phenomenological consciousness.  This is when the annals of phenomenology meet contemporary strands of realism such as Speculative and Object Oriented models. For Johns, the world is in a constant state of being utilised, not merely through humans but through objects and their relations, and not only on a macro scale but on a micro scale (described by the theories of quantum physics).The object then becomes a locus of use, yet, importantly, one that can never be reduced to relations alone. This is because the author believes that certain aspects of a relation withholds itself in its act of relating. The mutual dynamics of relation and property are thus rearticulated in a new light. This novel description of relation places Johns squarely between relational ontologies (such as Deleuze, Latour and Garcia) and non-relational ontologies (Harman).This work is invaluable to researchers and any reader of contemporary philosophy in the age of advanced technology and capitalism.

This book argues that Kant develops a theory of perception in the Critique of Judgment from which one can redefine his entire project, viewing and using aesthetics as its backbone, from the transcendental aesthetic of the First Critique to the Critique of Taste in the Third.  The author shows us how Kant exonerates the role of faculties that account for such judgments linked by inner senses, inclusive of sensus communis.  By re-examining the role of the aesthetic within Kant's critical philosophy, the compelling force of the aesthetic turn is revealed in modern philosophy. The text includes Heidegger’s, Hegel’s and Diderot's complex relationship to Kant in this context.This text provides important scholarship for those interested in the Kantian influence on German Idealism, the aesthetic turn in the continental tradition, especially the Frankfurt school, and more generally, those interested in the encounter between philosophy and art in this historical context.

This open access book is about exploring interesting borderline cases of art. It discusses the cases of gustatory and olfactory artworks (focusing on food), proprioceptive artworks (dance, martial arts, and rock climbing qua proprioceptive experiences), intellectual artworks (philosophical and scientific theories), as well as the vague limits between painting and photography. The book focuses on the author’s research about what counts as art and what does not, as well as on the nature of these limits. Overall, the author defends a very inclusive view, 'extending' the limits of art, and he argues for its virtues. Some of the limits discussed concern our senses (our different perceptual modalities), some concern vagueness and fuzzy boundaries between different types of works of art, some concern the amount of human intention and intervention in the process of creation of an artwork, and some concern the border between art and science. In these various ways,by understanding better such borderline cases, Benovsky suggests that we get a better grip on an understanding of the nature of art.

This book consists of a dialogue between two interlocutors, Pablo and a student, who discuss a great range of issues in social philosophy and political theory, and in particular, the emergence, working properties and economic effects of institutions. It uses the dialogical form to make philosophy more accessible, but also to show how ideas develop through intellectual interaction. The fact that one of the interlocutors is the "student" in a place in the real world makes the dialogue quasi-fictive in character and enables the active engagement of the reader. After all, we are all philosophers and we develop our own philosophy by exchanging views and arguments. The dialogue form is and should remain the principal form of philosophizing, since ideas, like butterflies, do not merely exist – they develop. This is certainly the case in actual philosophical interaction, and it can be the case in written philosophical exposition. Although the dialogue does not presuppose prior acquaintance with the respective philosophical and social scientific literature under discussion in this book, it makes arguments more accessible, and conveys the feeling that there are no definite solutions to philosophical problems.

The main themes and aims of this book are understanding aesthetics, contemporary art and the end of the avant-garde not from the traditional viewpoint of the metaphysics of the beautiful and the sublime but rather thru close connection to the techno-genesis of virtual worlds. This book tackles problems in contemporary art theory such as the body in space and time of digital technologies, along with other issues in visual studies and image science.  Further intentions exhibit the fundamental reasons for the disappearance of the picture in the era of virtual reality starting from the notion of contemporary art as realized iconoclasm; art has no world for its "image". The author argues that the iconoclasm of contemporary art has severe consequences.  This text appeals to philosophers of art and those interested in contemporary art theory.

Apart from its foray into technical issues of risk assessment and management,  this book has one principal aim. With situations of chancy outcomes certain key factors—including outcome possibilities, overall expectation, threat, and even luck—are measurable parameters. But risk is something different: it is not measurable a single parametric quantity, but a many-sided factor that has several different components, and constitutes a complex phenomenon that must be assessed judgmentally in a highly contextualized way. This book explains and analyzes how this works out in practice.Topics in this  work include choice and risk, chance and likelihood, as well as outcome-yield evaluation and risk. It takes into account abnormal situations and eccentric measurements, situational evaluation and expectation and scrutinizes the social aspect of risk. The book is of interest to logicians, philosophers of mathematics, and researchers of risk assessment. The project is a companion piece to the author's LUCK THEORY, also published by Springer.

This book makes the case that several urban technologies contribute to wicked problems such as climate change and vast social and economic inequalities. Such situations often create unfavorable conditions for mental life in cities. These conditions force us to expand the taxonomy of technology to include new designations: “wicked” and “saving” technologies. Epting holds that the latter can support worthwhile goals such as socially just urban sustainability. Along with fleshing out this view, he provides concrete examples of saving technologies, which include cohousing initiatives, ariel cable cars, participatory budgeting, and car-free zones/cities.

This monograph offers a new foundation for information theory that is based on the notion of information-as-distinctions, being directly measured by logical entropy, and on the re-quantification as Shannon entropy, which is the fundamental concept for the theory of coding and communications.Information is based on distinctions, differences, distinguishability, and diversity. Information sets are defined that express the distinctions made by a partition, e.g., the inverse-image of a random variable so they represent the pre-probability notion of information. Then logical entropy is a probability measure on the information sets, the probability that on two independent trials, a distinction or “dit” of the partition will be obtained. The formula for logical entropy is a new derivation of an old formula that goes back to the early twentieth century and has been re-derived many times in different contexts. As a probability measure, all the compound notions of joint, conditional, and mutual logical entropy are immediate. The Shannon entropy (which is not defined as a measure in the sense of measure theory)  and its compound notions are then derived from a non-linear dit-to-bit transform that re-quantifies the distinctions of a random variable in terms of bits—so the Shannon entropy is the average number of binary distinctions or bits necessary to make all the distinctions of the random variable. And, using a linearization method, all the set concepts in this logical information theory naturally extend to vector spaces in general—and to Hilbert spaces in particular—for quantum logical information theory which provides the natural measure of the distinctions made in quantum measurement.Relatively short but dense in content, this work can be a reference to researchers and graduate students doing investigations in information theory,  maximum entropy methods in physics, engineering, and statistics, and to all those with a special interest in a new approach to  quantum information theory.

This book is a treatise on Aristotelian assertoric syllogistic, which is currently of growing interest. Some centuries ago, it attracted the attention of the founders of modern logic, who approached it in several (semantical and syntactical) ways. Further approaches were introduced later on. In this book these approaches (with few exceptions) are discussed, developed and interrelated. Among other things, different facets of soundness, completeness, decidability, and independence for Aristotelian assertoric syllogistic are investigated. Specifically arithmetization (Leibniz), algebraization (Leibniz and Boole), and Venn models (Euler and Venn) are examined. The book is aimed at scholars in the fields of logic and history of logic.

This book suggests a radical departure in approaching the mind-body problem. Instead of trying to causally relate subjective experience to the functioning of the body, it begins with the notion of the psychosomatic unity of the individual and looks for its conditions of possibility. This text shows that what makes this unity possible is the generalized entanglement relation that connects a person's subjective experience with its body functioning in a specific way.In addition to providing a significant contribution to the long-standing philosophical debate about the nature of the mind-body connection, this change of perspective based on the concept of generalized entanglement allows for exploring a holistic approach to health. It can for example explain the existence of body memory and leads to a better understanding of the genesis and evolution of internal diseases, allowing for the development of mind-body therapies. This volume also provides new insights into mental disorders and sets the theoretical basis of self-healing methods appealing to students, researchers and professionals in the fields.

This book considers the important twentieth century Austrian philosopher, Ludwig Wittgenstein, and his conception of certainty. In his work entitled On Certainty, Wittgenstein provides not only a brilliant solution to a previously intractable philosophical problem, but also the elements of an entirely new way of approaching this and similar longstanding, apparently unresolvable, problems. In On Certainty, he re-conceives the problem of radical skepticism–the claim that we can never really be certain of anything except the contents of our own minds–as a kind of philosophical “disease” of thought. His approach to the problem, which is emphasized in the book, is similar to the treatment of disease, has two main goals: (1) bring about an awareness in the philosopher that this kind of extreme skepticism is not a methodological approach to be taken seriously, and, with this awareness, (2) an attempt to replace this radical skepticism with a practical, Common Sense framework. Implicit in Wittgenstein’s approach are a number of strategies found in a contemporary approach to psychotherapy known as Cognitive Behavioral Therapy (CBT). These strategies, along with philosophical methods and scientific practices rooted in the Scottish School of Common Sense, seek to diagnose and treat irrational thoughts and beliefs that often emerge (and re-emerge) in the discipline of philosophy. The aim of this book, then, is to provide students of philosophy with the tools necessary to adjust and reshape these irrational, self-defeating thoughts and beliefs into something new, something healthy.

This book throws a spotlight on the under-explored African perspective on the mercurial concept of human dignity. To do so, it employs two strategies. In the first instance, it considers African theories of human dignity: (1) vitality; (2) community; (3) Personhood. Secondly, it explores the plausibility of these theories by applying them to select applied ethics themes, specifically: animal ethics, disability ethics and euthanasia. The aim of this book is not to argue for the plausibility of these African theories, but to familiarize the global audience of philosophy, ethics and related disciplines (legal studies, sociology, bioethics and so on) with a neglected African perspective on this vital concept. The books is aimed at scholars of philosophy interested in non-European and specifically African perspective.

The first book-length study to address issues in modal logic at the eve of the Renaissance, this monograph provides important new insights into the way the debates on modal logic during the post-medieval period tied in with the so-called Wegestreit, the divide between the via antiqua and via moderna that dominated the discourse on logic during the 15th and early 16th centuries. The focus of the book is on the logic and philosophy of language of John Fabri of Valenciennes (fl. c. 1500), one of the last exponents of the terminist approach to logic that was bitterly criticized by the humanist movement. By means of a careful reconstruction of Fabri’s text, the book argues that Fabri's modal logic ultimately goes back to the work of John Buridan, and represents the same approach to the topic as the modal logics that were developed by adherents of the via moderna in Paris. This has significant implications for the historiography of post-medieval philosophy. Fabri was active in Louvain, which until the late 16th century was the most important intellectual center in the Low Countries. According to a long-standing tradition in the scholarship, Louvain was one of the few bulwarks of via antiqua logic on the map of post-medieval Europe. The book argues that this thesis is at least in part a scholarly fiction, and thus in need of revision. By shedding light on an author whose thought has thus far remained entirely unstudied, it also constitutes a valuable step towards a history of philosophy without any gaps. The book is aimed at graduate students and researchers in the history of logic and philosophy, but will also be of interest to intellectual historians, historians of ideas, and to any contemporary modal logician who is interested in the historical roots of their discipline.

The book considers the relationship between governance and participation, and the ways participation has been understood, framed and applied in the context of synthetic biology (SB) governance approaches. Based on fundamental questions about the scope, purpose, and responsibilities assigned to public participation activities, the authors conducted an literature review of policy reports and articles on SB governance. The authors identify key characteristics of synthetic biology, such as the complex interplay of research, engineering and IT expertise in the field, as well as the challenges these characteristics pose in designing governance frameworks. Drawing on insights from a literature review, the authors contest calls for “earlier” and “more” participation on the basis that such calls fail to consider the necessary structural adjustments and resources needed for such endeavors. The brief addresses ethical questions arising in synthetic biology that could be used for developing frameworks of governance in the ongoing COVID-19 crisis and the consequent innovations in vaccine research.

This open access book explores the gendered reality of learning philosophy at the university level, investigating the ways in which women and minority students become alienated from the social practices of a male-dominated field, and examining pedagogical solutions to this problem. It covers the roles and the interactions of the professor and student in the following ways: (1) the historical situation, (2) the affective, social and bodily situation, and (3) the moral situation.This text analyzes women’s passion for philosophy as a quest for truth, as well as their partial alienation from the social practices of philosophy. It demonstrates that recognition, generosity, and care are central ingredients of good learning and teaching experiences. Providing case studies of experimental courses in philosophy, the book discusses a variety of pedagogical approaches that might increase the inclusiveness of a philosophical education: novel and more gender-balanced ways of interpreting the history of philosophy, problem-based learning as a means of emancipating the student from the traditional master–disciple relationship, body awareness practices as a way of challenging the “disembodying” tendencies of philosophy, and a pluralism of methods to address the needs of different kinds of learners. Thanks to these features, the book is particularly useful for philosophy professors at the university level, but it also provides insights for all readers who feel puzzled about the persistent underrepresentation of women in philosophy.

This book provides a novel framework for understanding and revising labor markets and education policies in an era of machine learning. It posits that while learning and knowing both require thinking, learning is fundamentally different than knowing because it results in cognitive processes that change over time. Learning, in contrast to knowing, requires time and agency. Therefore, “learning algorithms”—that enable machines to modify their actions based on real-world experiences—are a fundamentally new form of artificial intelligence that have potential to be even more disruptive to labor markets than prior introductions of digital technology. To explore the difference between knowing and learning, Turing’s “Imitation Game,”—that he proposed as a test for machine thinking—is expanded to include time dependence.   The arguments presented in the book introduce three novel concepts:   (1) Comparative learning advantage: This is a concept analogous to comparative labor advantagebut arises from the disparate times required to learn new knowledge bases/skillsets. It is argued that in the future, comparative learning advantages between humans and machines will determine their division of labor.   (2) Two dimensions of job performance—expertise and interpersonal: Job tasks can be sorted into two broad categories. Tasks that require expertise have stable endpoints, which makes these tasks inherently repetitive and subject to automation. Tasks that are interpersonal are highly context-dependent and lack stable endpoints, which makes these tasks inherently non-routine. Humans compared to machines have a comparative learning advantage along the interpersonal dimension, which is increasing in value economically.   (3) The Learning Game is a time-dependent version of Turing’s “Imitation Game.” It is more than a thought experiment. The “Learning Game” provides a mathematical framework with quantitative criteria for training and assessing comparative learningadvantages.   The book is highly interdisciplinary—presenting philosophical arguments in economics, artificial intelligence, and education. It also provides data, mathematical analysis, and testable criteria that researchers in these fields will find of practical use. The book calls for a rethinking of how labor markets operate and how the education system should prepare students for future jobs. It concludes with a list of counterintuitive recommendations for future education and labor policies that all stakeholders—employers, employees, educators, students, and political leaders—should heed.

This book argues that no ethically appropriate relation to other human beings is possible unless we treat them as genuinely other. The authors provide reasons to be critical of various attempts, many of them popular in our contemporary (Western) culture, to encourage deeper attachment to and immersion into others’ lives and experiences. They defend the significance of the distance between human beings, criticizing exaggerated uses of, e.g., the concept of empathy and related concepts in academic as well as more popular ethical contexts, across a range of issues from the nature of ethical duty to the philosophy of love. The chapters offer non-technical philosophical and cultural criticism through selected perspectives on the continuum between closeness and distance, exploring various aspects of ethically significant relations between human beings. This book thus appeals to a wide audience, especially researchers and students in different fields of the humanities, including philosophy, literary studies, and cultural studies, by combining philosophical and literary methodologies in a humanistic examination of the value of distance. The book also argues that we have to be able to abstract from the concrete other in ethical relations, living in the normative and rational sphere of duty instead of emotional immersion.

This book provides a unique contribution to philosophy of science from the perspective of the practice of science. It focuses on processes that generate scientific knowledge and seeks general and universal features that characterize scientific practice; features that are inherent to the practice of science. Science is an activity, and the scientist is an agent who pursues some practice, which in one way or another engages evidence. In science, claims to knowledge are typically supported by argument that engages evidence at some point in explanation, in prediction, or indeed in any mode of presenting data and its interpretation. Thus, the practice of science includes at least three elements so that an argument can be formulated: presuppositions, modes of inference, and consequences that relate to evidence. The authors discuss in detail eight cases in chronological order with which they illustrate how commitment, methodology, and technique come into play in the practice of an individual physicist or a group of researchers in the physical sciences. Each case highlights aspects of the roles these categories play in scientific practice, where the goal is to generate and extend scientific knowledge.