Theory and Decision Library A: – serie

This book grew out of the conviction that the preparation and management of large-scale technological projects can be substantially improved. We have witnessed the often unhappy course of societal and political decision making concerning projects such as hazardous chemical installations, novel types of electric power plant or storage sites for solid wastes. This has led us to believe that probabilistic risk analysis, technical reliability analysis and environm,ental impact analysis are necessary but insufficient for making acceptable, and justifiable, social decisions about such projects. There is more to socio-technical decision making than applying acceptance rules based on neglige ably low accident probabilities or on maximum credible accidents. Consideration must also be given to psychological, social and political issues and methods of decision making. Our conviction initially gave rise to an international experts' workshop titled 'Social decision methodology for technological projects' (SDMTP) and held in May 1986 at the University of Groningen, the Netherlands, at a time when Cvetkovich spent a sabbatical there. The work­ shop - aimed at surveying the issues and listing the methods to address them - was the first part of an effort whose second part was directed at the production of this volume. Plans called for the book to deal systematically with the main problems of socio-technical decision making; it was to list a number of useful approaches and methods; and it was to present a number of integrative conclusions and recommendations for both policy makers and methodologists.

may be related to another basic assumption in economic psychology: that the human capacity to process information from the environment is limited, and that the kind of optimal use of that information postulated in many economic theories is therefore not possible. The research methods used are mainly geared towards empirical research, and there mostly towards survey research and experimentation. Experimentation involves most often simulated behaviour in a laboratory, which allows the experimental manipulation of possible causes of behaviour which would not be possible in real life. Survey research is the most widely used instrument for investigating real-world behaviour, with all its caveats about establishing causal explanations. Several introductory books (e. g. , Fumham & Lewis, 1986; Lea, Tarpy, & Webley, 1987; van Raaij, van Veldhoven, & Wlimeryd, 1988) and articles (e. g. , van Raaij, 1979; Wiswede, 1988) have appeared recently, which try to give an overview of the field of economic psychology, and which, in varying degrees, demonstrate the three foundations of economic psychology just mentioned. Others have concentrated on certain subtopics, such as the psychology of the labour market (e. g. , Baxter, 1988; Pelzmann, 1986).

As a psychologist by education, my interest is in how people solve problems. At the Economic Institute of Leyden Universi ty, I learned that economists study human behavior too, although their studies are limited to economic affairs. At the Institute of Scientific Research on Consumer Affairs became (SWOKA), I aware of the needs of consumer organizations and the government for consumer research to base their policy on. At Erasmus University Rotterdam, I got the opportunity to integrate my interests and knowledge into this book. The first part of the book attempts to integrate psychological theories of attitude, perception, motivation and decision into economics. Both disciplines are concerned with human behavior, and the economic paradigm of demand, subj ect to restrictions, is combined with the psychological tradition of direct measurements of perceptions and motivations. This results in a micro-model of economic choice that can be tested by means of information obtained directly from consumers. The empirical study deals with the problem of scrapping a durable consumption good. By means of a consumer survey, the micro-model of choice is applied to the decision to scrap a durable good, or to repair the good in case of a defect. This individual decision obviously is connected with the large scale problem of waste, and with the manufacturer's problem of producing durable goods with a certain quality and durabili ty.

60 -I 137.0~29 ERROR BARS • tONE (1" \ \ \ 4\0 \ \ E \ a. a. \ Z30 \ 137.0388 \ 0 137.0377 \ ~ \ ~20 \ \ 0 to 0 '50 Fig.1. Successive recommended values of the fine-structure constand IX-I (B. N. Taylor et 01., 1969,7) reminder that the value is not fully accepted by colleagues, since they will expect it to jump about for a while longer. Our next example is taken from a recent study in the social sciences. It shows how a set of related estimates of uncertainty can be expressed clearly and effectively by NUSAP. Suppose that we wish to forecast what the future price of a basic commodity might be, especially when at the moment its price is artificially maintained by a cartel of producers. There is no experimental evidence on such a future contingency, and yet we are not completely in the dark. There is a long history of expertise in the field; and there is a well-tried standard model by which experts' guesses can be translated into mathematical form.

Erwin Schroedinger has been described as one of the greatest figures of theoretical physics, but there is another side to the man: not only did his work revolutionize physics, it also radically changed the foundations of our modern world-view, modern biology, philosophy of science, philosophy of the mind, and epistemology. This book explores the lesser-known aspects of Schroedinger's thought, revealing the physicist as a philosopher and polymath whose ideas anticipated the current merging of the natural and the social sciences and the humanities. 13 renowned scientists and philosophers have contributed to the volume. Part I reveals the philosophical importance of Schroedinger's work as a physicist. Part II examines his theory of life and of the self-organization of matter. Part III shows how Schroedinger's ideas have influenced contemporary philosophy of nature and our modern view of the world, drawing a picture of the ongoing synthesis of nature and culture.

Current environmental problems and technological risks are a challenge for a new institutional arrangement of the value spheres of science, politics and morality. Distinguished authors from different European countries and America provide a cross-disciplinary perspective on the problems of political decision making under the conditions of scientific uncertainty. Cases from biotechnology and the environmental sciences are discussed. The papers collected for this volume address: controversies about risks and political decision making; concepts of science for policy; the use of social science in the policy making process; ethical problems with developments in science and technology; public and state interests in the development and control of technology.

Develops and defends a version of utilitarianism, including expected-utility theory, as a normative model of decision-making. The defence, based on the idea of utility as achievement of goals, considers the endorsement of a norm as a decision and asks what reasons we have to endorse norms for decision making. The reasons derive from our pre-existing goals, so any norm we endorse must not fly in the face of these goals, although it must not be selfishly biased, either. This approach is further clarified by drawing distinctions between decisions for the self, for a single other person, for several others, and for the self and others. The book discusses the implications of this argument for the psychological study of decision-making, the act-omission distinction; moral education; decision analysis; risk analysis; and other questions of public policy. The final chapter sketches a prescriptive approach to group decision-making.

In Consequentialism Reconsidered, Carlson strives to find a plausible formulation of the structural part of consequentialism. Key notions are analyzed, such as outcomes, alternatives and performability. Carlson argues that consequentialism should be understood as a maximizing rather than a satisficing theory, and as temporally neutral rather than future oriented. He also shows that certain moral theories cannot be reformulated as consequentialist theories. The relevant alternatives for an agent in a situation are taken to comprise all actions that they can perform in the situation. The defense of this idea necessitates certain modifications to the standard consequentialist criteria of obligatoriness, rightness and wrongness. The problem of whether agents should adapt their actions to their own future actions is also addressed. Further, a conditional analysis of performability is suggested, and it is argued that particular actions should in this connection be regarded as `abstract' rather than `concrete'. The final chapter sketches a consequentialist theory for collective agents.

After the unification of physical theories in a grand unified theory, the theories of evolution began to unify not only all social sciences but also the natural with the social sciences. This text provides an analysis of the new trends which lead into the 21st century, together with a critique of the received view. Presented here are 16 papers, two of which written by Nobel laureates. The first part, "Characteristic Features in Economic Science", criticizes the present status of traditional economic theories. "Discovery, Creativity, Cognition, and Computation: Basic Structure", the second part, opens up perspectives for the role of the new dynamic structures for the modern social sciences and philosophy. Part III, "Towards a Science of Man and Society: Philosophical and Methodological Foundations", offers the philosophical consequences that are triggered by the breakthrough of modern ideas.

This text documents an approach to explaining the existence of firms and markets, focusing on variability and co-ordination. It stands in contrast to the emphasis on transaction costs, and on monitoring and incentive structures, which are prominent in most of the modern literature in this field. This approach, called the variability approach, allows us to: show why both the need for communication and the co-ordination costs increase when the division of labour increases; explain why, while the firm relies on direction, the market does not; rigorously formulate the optimum divisionalization problem; better understand the relationship between technology and organization; show why the "size" of the firm is limited; and refine the analysis of whether the existence of a sharable input, or the presence of an external effect, leads to the emergence of a firm.

Model building in the social sciences can increasingly rely on well elaborated formal theories. At the same time inexpensive large computational capacities are now available. Both make computer-based model building and simulation possible in social science, whose central aim is in particular an understanding of social dynamics. Such social dynamics refer to public opinion formation, partner choice, strategy decisions in social dilemma situations and much more. In the context of such modelling approaches, novel problems in philosophy of science arise which must be analysed - the main aim of this book. Interest in social simulation has recently been growing rapidly world- wide, mainly as a result of the increasing availability of powerful personal computers. The field has also been greatly influenced by developments in cellular automata theory (from mathematics) and in distributed artificial intelligence which provided tools readily applicable to social simulation. This book presents a number of modelling and simulation approaches and their relations to problems in philosophy of science.It addresses sociologists and other social scientists interested in formal modelling, mathematical sociology, and computer simulation as well as computer scientists interested in social science applications, and philosophers of social science.

This is an account of the central characteristics and problems of the orthodox notion of consequentialist economic rationality, showing how the formal core of classical decision theory can be defended against objections and incorporated into a coherentist notion of practical reason. The "orthodox" paradigm of economic rationality is shown to be defective in several respects. The author maintains that there are many situations in which an agent makes a decision which a theory of rationality should be able to reconstruct as rational, but in which a reconstruction in terms of the standard consequentialist interpretation of economic rationality seems to be inadequate. The core of the classical theory of economic rationality is coherentist and does not necessarily call for a consequentialist interpretation. Therefore, the formal coherence axioms are compatible with a theory of practical rationality which accounts for good reasons for actions which cannot be incorporated into the consequentialist account of economic rationality.

This volume intends to provide a methodological framework, capable of critically analyzing the multiple aspects related to technological dynamics, and to arrive - at times ex post, at times ex ante - at assessments regarding the economic results that can be achieved at all levels, with the innovation and diffusion of technologies in the manufacturing activities. For this purpose, this volume describes and critically evaluates conceptual and quantitative methods and models which seem capable of achieving this goal. This volume includes a number of distinctive features, the most important of which are the relationships between technological dynamics, knowledge, production systems and structures, quality, efficiency, natural resources, ecological systems and sustainable development. The approach used in organizing this volume has been an interdisciplinary one. Methods for analysis typical of various disciplines were used with the aim of arriving at economic conclusions, assessments and generalizations. In short, it may be defined as techno-economic.

Action is conceived of as an intentional behaviour of an individual or of an institutional subject; it is determined by information processing, namely by a process in which pieces of descriptive and practical information are involved. Action is explained by a formal and finalistic theory which is connected with a specific theory of institutions. The philosophical basis of the logic of norm sentences and of other systems of practical thinking (formal teleology, axiology, logic of preferences) is discussed in this text. The author criticizes traditional deontic logic and argues in favour of a genuine logic of norms. The book gives a structure analysis of the so-called practical inference and of nomic causal propositions. Besides a critical account of von Wright's practical philosophy the author offers critical analyses of discourse rationality (Habermas, Apel, Alexy) and of Wittgenstein's views on philosophizing.

What function is played by concepts related to meaning and mereology in the cognitive sciences? How can one outline adequate simulation models for the continuous emergence of new categorization forms characterizing cognitive processes? To what extent is it possible to define new measures of meaningful complexity? How is it possible to describe synergetically the symbolic dynamics inherent in cognitive processes? What types of formal models should we use to describe the evolutionary aspects of cognition? These, the most difficult questions in cognitive science, are discussed here in 15 essays written by scholars drawn from a variety of disciplines. The first part presents an account of some trends in the functional modelling of cognitive activities, the synergetic models in particular. The second part focuses on advances in complexity theory, self-organizing networks, the theory of self reference, and the theory of self organization. The third part focuses on some methods of formal analysis that can be used to delineate consistent simulation models of cognitive activities at the perceptual, linguistic and computational levels.The volume also highlights traditional philosophical concerns about realism, the cognitivism-connectionism debate, and the role of holistic assumptions.

Human agency is constrained and structured by many kinds of rules: rules that are constitutive for communication, morality, persons, and society, and juridical rules. So the question is: what roles are played by social rules and the structural traits of human agency in rational decision making? What bearing does this have on the theory of practical rationality? These issues can only be discussed within an interdisciplinary setting, with researchers drawn from philosophy, decision theory and the economic and social sciences. The problem is of profound, fundamental concern to the social scientist and has attracted a great deal of intellectual effort.

This text discusses the mathematical analysis of social systems, understood in the following way: social systems consist of social actors who interact according to specific rules of interactions; the dynamics of social systems is then the consequences of these interactions, viz., the self-organization of social systems. According to particular demands of their environment, social systems are able to behave in an adaptive manner, that is they can change their rules of interaction by certain meta rules and thus generate a meta dynamics. It is possible to model and analyze mathematically both dynamics and meta dynamics, using cellular automata and genetic algorithms. These tools allow social systems theory to be carried through as precisely as the theories of natural systems, a feat that has not previously been possible. The text should be of use to researchers and graduate students in the fields of theoretical sociology and social and general systems theory and other interested scientists.

Conscience is an essential human attribute. Nevertheless, in the construction of formal models of the subject it is customarily left outside the framework of theoretical analysis. The Algebra of Conscience, whose first edition appeared in 1982, was the first specialized work modeling the phenomenon of conscience. The method used in this book made it possible to connect moral experience with decision-making procedures on the level of mathematical models. The application of such models allows us to propose the hypothesis of two fundamentally different ethical systems determining the normative patterns of human behavior in situations of conflict. Under the first ethical system the subject's self-esteem is raised if the subject seeks to resolve the conflict; in the second it is raised by seeking to dramatize the conflict. The new edition of The Algebra of Conscience is significantly expanded. The second part of the book, devoted to moral choice, is completely new. Based on the theory presented in the first part, it constructs the model of a subject capable of making an intentional choice. A special variable corresponds to the subject's intention.This development allows us to include within the model freedom of will and freedom of choice, and also to generalize classical 2x2 game theory to the case where outcomes, in addition to having utility measures, are either `positive' or `negative.' In its concluding chapters the book constructs a dynamic model of the intentional subject faced with a choice between two alternatives, neither of which is morally acceptable for the subject. It is shown that in this case the probabilities of choice of the alternatives may change chaotically. From this it follows that one cannot predict which alternative will be chosen or even the probabilities with which they will be chosen. Audience: The book is addressed to a broad readership having elementary knowledge of mathematical logic and the theory of probability. It can be used in college courses studying the modelling of moral choice. The book's material can also be used in the design of artificial intelligence systems.

Uncertainty could be associated with wisdom, enterprise, and discovery. In ordinary speech, however, it has mostly negative connotations. There is "fear of the unknown" and "ignorance is bliss;" there are maxims to the effect that "what you don't know doesn't hurt you" (or: "bother you") in several languages. This volume suggests that we need be bothered by the excessive confidence with which scientists, particularly social scientists, present some of their conclusions and overstate their range of application. Otherwise many of the questions that should be raised about all the major uncertainties attending a particular issue routinely may continue to be thwarted or suppressed. Down playing uncertainty does not lead to more responsible or surer action, it sidetracks research agendas, and leaves the decision makers exposed to nasty surprise. This volume demonstrates that recognizing the many forms of uncertainty that enter into the development of any particular subject matter is a precondition for more responsible choice and deeper knowledge. Our purpose is to contribute to a broader appreciation of uncertainty than regularly accorded in any of the numerous disciplines represented here. The seventeenth-century French philosopher Descartes, quoted in this volume, wrote that "whoever is searching after truth must, once in his life, doubt all things; insofar as this is possible. " White areas left on maps of the world in past centuries were a much more productive challenge than marking the end of the known world with the pillars of Hercules.

According to Platonists, entities such as numbers, sets, propositions and properties are abstract objects. But abstract objects lack causal powers and a location in space and time, so how we could ever come to know of the existence of such impotent and remote objects? In this text Colin Cheyne presents a systematic and detailed account of this epistemological objection to the Platonist doctrine that abstract objects exist and can be known. Since mathematics has such a central role in the acquisition of scientific knowledge, he concentrates on mathematical Platonism. He also concentrates on our knowledge of what exists, and argues for a causal constraint on such existential knowledge. Finally, he exposes the weaknesses of recent attempts by Platonists to account for our supposed Platonic knowledge.

Agent-based modelling on a computer appears to have a special role to play in the development of social science. It offers a means of discovering general and applicable social theory, and grounding it in precise assumptions and derivations, whilst addressing those elements of individual cognition that are central to human society. However, there are important questions to be asked and difficulties to be overcome in achieving this potential. What differentiates agent-based modelling from traditional computer modelling? Which model types should be used in which circumstances? If it is appropriate to use a complex model, how can it be validated? Has social simulation research to adopt a realist epistemology, or can it operate within a social constructionist framework? What are the sociological concepts of norms and norm processing that could either be used for planned implementation or for identifying equivalents of social norms among co-operative agents? Can sustainability be achieved more easily in a hierarchical agent society than in a society of isolated agents? What examples are there of hybrid forms of interaction between humans and artificial agents?These are some of the sociological questions that are addressed.

This volume deals with a fundamental problem in political and moral philosophy: why should an otherwise rational agent comply with norms? The book deals with this question in areas as diverse as evolutionary game theory, moral philosophy, action theory, formal decision theory, and social psychology. The author argues that standard rational choice analyses fail to explain several crucial features of norm-guided behaviour. A complete analysis of the reasons rational agents have for compliance with norms has to include an account of specific virtues, such as trust and fairness. In order to accommodate these virtues in the theory of rational choice, Verbeek argues that we need to give up the inherently forward-looking character of instrumentally rational deliberation.

This volume deals with the question of regularities in the course of sociocultural evolution. The evolutionary process of societies is defined as the generation of social roles and their relations; a role is understood as a pair of social rules and role specific knowledge. Accordingly evolution is the growth of cultural knowledge and the development of a network of social roles. These theoretical assumptions are clarified and tested via a mathematical model, that is, a sociocultural algorithm (SCA). Computer simulations show that the evolutionary course of societies is determined by an evolutionary parameter, that is the degree of differentiation or role autonomy respectively. An additional model of cognitive ontogenesis is provided; it can be shown that cognitive ontogenesis and sociocultural evolution are interdependent processes which basically follow the same logic. These considerations and results offer an explanation for the unique evolutionary path of Western civilization.

"Generating Images of Stratification" is a self-contained presentation of a theoretical research programme that deals with a significant explanatory problem relating to social inequality and that constructs generative theoretical models in doing so. In more detail: self-contained presentation - in respect to the background sociological facts and theoretical ideas and also the formal methods the book provides clear and simple accounts accompanied by examples; a theoretical research programme - the emphasis is on theory development, involving a series of theoretical models constructed within a core framework of principles and methods. The book deals with a significant explanatory problem relating to social inequality - we know from research that how people perceive the stratification system of a society depends upon their position in that system. So the problem is: what process generates this regularity and thereby explains empirical generalizations about the social structuration of images? The text constructs generative theoretical models and is an extended presentation of "generative theory" in sociology, a formal method of producing effective theoretical explanations.

Olof Dahlbäck's book breaks new ground for the analysis of crime from a rationality perspective by presenting models and methods that go far beyond those with which researchers have hitherto been equipped. The book examines single crimes, individual criminality, and societal crime, and it discusses thoroughly the general decision theoretical presuppositions necessary for analyzing these various types of crime. An expected utility maximization model for a single discrete choice regarding the commission of a crime is the foundation of most of the analyses presented. A version of this model is developed that permits interpersonal comparisons, and this basic model is used when deriving more complex models of crime as well as when analyzing the potential for such derivations. The rigorous, powerful methods suggested provide considerable opportunities for improving research and for seeing old problems in a new light.

Evolution and Constitution for the first time brings together case law and law based on norms. It offers the reader a survey and a new explanation of evolutionary emergence of social contracts and constitutions in the European history, and -after all - should help to build a bridge between 'two cultures', science and humanities. Evolutionary approach to law had been advocated already at the time of Darwin by English ethnologists of law like Sumner Maine and American anthropologists like Morgan. The present work is an attempt to apply evolutionary thought to the continental legal philosophy and juristic methodology. Although in the 19th century the idea of an evolution of law was present also on the continent it was burdened with reproaches of social Darwinism (proved nowadays as unreasonable). Grounds for the negotiability of evolutionary approach to complex social systems are provided by the latest research in evolutionary theory of cognition and evolutionary ethics as well as by the theory of complex systems in the sense of Friedrich von Hayek. This book provides a profounder (conformable to the biological theory of evolution) explanatory basis not only for anthropology and history of law but also for juristic methodology. In addition it offers a practical model of juristic argumentation processes, illustrated by many examples.

The world perceived at the visual level is constituted not by objects or static forms, but by processes appearing imbued with meaning. As G. Kanizsa stated, at the visual level the line per se does not exist: only the line which enters, goes behind, divides, etc., a line evolving according to a precise holistic context, in comparison with which function and meaning are indissolubly interlinked. Just as the meaning of words is connected with a universe of highly-dynamic functions and functional processes which operate syntheses, cancellations, integrations, etc. (a universe which can only be described in terms of symbolic dynamics), in the same way, at the level of vision, we must continuously unravel and construct schemata; we must assimilate and make ourselves available for selection by the co-ordinated information penetrating from external Reality. Lastly, we must interrelate all this with the internal selection mechanisms through a precise "jouney" into the regions of intensionality. obIn accordance with these intuitions, we may directly consider, from the more general point of view of contemporary Self-organisation theory, the network of meaningful programs living at the level

For the first time in history, scholars working on language and culture from within an evolutionary epistemological framework, and thereby emphasizing complementary or deviating theories of the Modern Synthesis, were brought together. Of course there have been excellent conferences on Evolutionary Epistemology in the past, as well as numerous conferences on the topics of Language and Culture. However, until now these disciplines had not been brought together into one all-encompassing conference. Moreover, previously there never had been such stress on alternative and complementary theories of the Modern Synthesis. Today we know that natural selection and evolution are far from synonymous and that they do not explain isomorphic phenomena in the world. ‘Taking Darwin seriously’ is the way to go, but today the time has come to take alternative and complementary theories that developed after the Modern Synthesis, equally seriously, and, furthermore, to examine how language and culture can merit from these diverse disciplines.As this volume will make clear, a specific inter- and transdisciplinary approach is one of the next crucial steps that needs to be taken, if we ever want to unravel the secrets of phenomena such as language and culture.