Little Debates about Big Questions - Böcker

In this book, Michael Huemer and Bryan Frances debate whether – and how – we can gain knowledge of the world outside of our own minds. Starting with opening statements, the debate moves through two rounds of replies.Frances argues that we lack knowledge because, for example, we cannot rule out the possibility that we are brains in vats being artificially stimulated in such a way as to create an illusion of living in the real world. Huemer disagrees that we need evidence against such possibilities in order to gain knowledge of the external world, maintaining instead that we are entitled to presume that things are as they appear unless and until we acquire specific grounds for thinking otherwise. The authors go on to discuss how one should think about controversial issues wherein the experts persistently disagree. Frances argues that we should generally withhold judgment about such issues or at least greatly reduce our confidence. Huemer agrees that people are often overconfident about controversial issues but tries to carve out exceptions wherein one can rationally hold on to controversial views.Accessible whilst also detailed and substantial, this thoughtful debate is suitable for readers at all levels, from those encountering the topic for the first time through those who are deeply familiar with the issues.Key Features:Showcases arguments from two leading philosophers in standard form and in clear languagePresents definitions in an easily accessible formSummary boxes recap key argumentsIncludes an annotated bibliography and glossary of all specialized vocabulary

In this book, Michael Huemer and Bryan Frances debate whether – and how – we can gain knowledge of the world outside of our own minds. Starting with opening statements, the debate moves through two rounds of replies.Frances argues that we lack knowledge because, for example, we cannot rule out the possibility that we are brains in vats being artificially stimulated in such a way as to create an illusion of living in the real world. Huemer disagrees that we need evidence against such possibilities in order to gain knowledge of the external world, maintaining instead that we are entitled to presume that things are as they appear unless and until we acquire specific grounds for thinking otherwise. The authors go on to discuss how one should think about controversial issues wherein the experts persistently disagree. Frances argues that we should generally withhold judgment about such issues or at least greatly reduce our confidence. Huemer agrees that people are often overconfident about controversial issues but tries to carve out exceptions wherein one can rationally hold on to controversial views.Accessible whilst also detailed and substantial, this thoughtful debate is suitable for readers at all levels, from those encountering the topic for the first time through those who are deeply familiar with the issues.Key Features:Showcases arguments from two leading philosophers in standard form and in clear languagePresents definitions in an easily accessible formSummary boxes recap key argumentsIncludes an annotated bibliography and glossary of all specialized vocabulary

Bertrand Russell famously quipped that he didn’t believe in God for the same reason that he didn’t believe in a teapot in orbit between the earth and Mars: it is a bizarre assertion for which no evidence can be provided. Is belief in God really like belief in Russell’s teapot? Kenneth L. Pearce argues that God is no teapot. God is a real answer to the deepest question of all: why is there something rather than nothing? Graham Oppy argues that we should believe that there are none but natural causal entities with none but natural causal properties—and hence should believe that there are no gods. Beginning from this basic disagreement, the authors proceed to discuss and debate a wide range of philosophical questions, including questions about explanation, necessity, rationality, religious experience, mathematical objects, the foundations of ethics, and the methodology of philosophy. Each author first presents his own side, and then they interact through two rounds of objections and replies. Pedagogical features include standard form arguments, section summaries, bolded key terms and principles, a glossary, and annotated reading lists. In the volume foreword, Helen De Cruz calls the debate "both edifying and a joy," and sums up what’s at stake: "Here you have two carefully formulated positive proposals for worldviews that explain all that is: classical theism, or naturalistic atheism. You can follow along with the authors and deliberate: which one do you find more plausible?"Though written with beginning students in mind, this debate will be of interest to philosophers at all levels and to anyone who values careful, rational thought about the nature of reality and our place in it.

Bertrand Russell famously quipped that he didn’t believe in God for the same reason that he didn’t believe in a teapot in orbit between the earth and Mars: it is a bizarre assertion for which no evidence can be provided. Is belief in God really like belief in Russell’s teapot? Kenneth L. Pearce argues that God is no teapot. God is a real answer to the deepest question of all: why is there something rather than nothing? Graham Oppy argues that we should believe that there are none but natural causal entities with none but natural causal properties—and hence should believe that there are no gods. Beginning from this basic disagreement, the authors proceed to discuss and debate a wide range of philosophical questions, including questions about explanation, necessity, rationality, religious experience, mathematical objects, the foundations of ethics, and the methodology of philosophy. Each author first presents his own side, and then they interact through two rounds of objections and replies. Pedagogical features include standard form arguments, section summaries, bolded key terms and principles, a glossary, and annotated reading lists. In the volume foreword, Helen De Cruz calls the debate "both edifying and a joy," and sums up what’s at stake: "Here you have two carefully formulated positive proposals for worldviews that explain all that is: classical theism, or naturalistic atheism. You can follow along with the authors and deliberate: which one do you find more plausible?"Though written with beginning students in mind, this debate will be of interest to philosophers at all levels and to anyone who values careful, rational thought about the nature of reality and our place in it.

In this little but profound volume, Robert Kane and Carolina Sartorio debate a perennial question: Do We Have Free Will? Kane introduces and defends libertarianism about free will: free will is incompatible with determinism; we are free; we are not determined. Sartorio introduces and defends compatibilism about free will: free will is compatible with determinism; we can be free even while our actions are determined through and through. Simplifying tricky terminology and complicated concepts for readers new to the debate, the authors also cover the latest developments on a controversial topic that gets us entangled in questions about blameworthiness and responsibility, coercion and control, and much more. Each author first presents their own side, and then they interact through two rounds of objections and replies. Pedagogical features include standard form arguments, section summaries, bolded key terms and principles, a glossary, and annotated reading lists. Short, lively and accessible, the debate showcases diverse and cutting-edge work on free will. As per Saul Smilansky’s foreword, Kane and Sartorio, "present the readers with two things at once: an introduction to the traditional free will problem; and a demonstration of what a great yet very much alive and relevant philosophical problem is like."Key Features:Covers major concepts, views and arguments about free will in an engaging formatAccessible style and pedagogical features for students and general readersCutting-edge contributions by preeminent scholars on free will.

In this little but profound volume, Robert Kane and Carolina Sartorio debate a perennial question: Do We Have Free Will? Kane introduces and defends libertarianism about free will: free will is incompatible with determinism; we are free; we are not determined. Sartorio introduces and defends compatibilism about free will: free will is compatible with determinism; we can be free even while our actions are determined through and through. Simplifying tricky terminology and complicated concepts for readers new to the debate, the authors also cover the latest developments on a controversial topic that gets us entangled in questions about blameworthiness and responsibility, coercion and control, and much more. Each author first presents their own side, and then they interact through two rounds of objections and replies. Pedagogical features include standard form arguments, section summaries, bolded key terms and principles, a glossary, and annotated reading lists. Short, lively and accessible, the debate showcases diverse and cutting-edge work on free will. As per Saul Smilansky’s foreword, Kane and Sartorio, "present the readers with two things at once: an introduction to the traditional free will problem; and a demonstration of what a great yet very much alive and relevant philosophical problem is like."Key Features:Covers major concepts, views and arguments about free will in an engaging formatAccessible style and pedagogical features for students and general readersCutting-edge contributions by preeminent scholars on free will.

What is consciousness and why is it so philosophically and scientifically puzzling? For many years philosophers approached this question assuming a standard physicalist framework on which consciousness can be explained by contemporary physics, biology, neuroscience, and cognitive science. This book is a debate between two philosophers who are united in their rejection of this kind of "standard" physicalism - but who differ sharply in what lesson to draw from this. Amy Kind defends dualism 2.0, a thoroughly modern version of dualism (the theory that there are two fundamentally different kinds of things in the world: those that are physical and those that are mental) decoupled from any religious or non-scientific connotations. Daniel Stoljar defends non-standard physicalism, a kind of physicalism different from both the standard version and dualism 2.0. The book presents a cutting-edge assessment of the philosophy of consciousness and provides a glimpse at what the future study of this area might bring.Key FeaturesOutlines the different things people mean by "consciousness" and provides an account of what consciousness isReviews the key arguments for thinking that consciousness is incompatible with physicalismExplores and provides a defense of contrasting responses to those arguments, with a special focus on responses that reject the standard physicalist frameworkProvides an account of the basic aims of the science of consciousnessWritten in a lively and accessibly styleIncludes a comprehensive glossary

Are we made entirely of matter, like sticks and stones? Or do we have a soul—a nonphysical entity—where our mental lives take place?The authors Eric T. Olson and Aaron Segal begin this accessible and wide-ranging debate by looking at the often-overlooked question of whether we appear in ordinary experience to be material things. Olson then argues that the dependence of our mental lives on the condition of our brains—the fact that general anesthesia causes complete unconsciousness, for instance—is best explained by saying that our mental lives are physical activities in our brains rather than nonphysical activities in the soul. Segal objects that this view is incompatible with two obvious and important facts about ourselves: that there is only one of you rather than trillions of almost identical beings now thinking your thoughts, and that we exist and remain conscious for more than an instant. These facts, he claims, are presupposed in our practical and moral judgments—but they require us to be immaterial things. Olson is forced to concede that there is no easy and uncontroversial answer to these objections but doubts whether taking us to be immaterial would be any help. The debate takes in large philosophical questions extending well beyond dualism and materialism.The book features clear statements of each argument, responses to counter-arguments, in-text definitions, a glossary of key terms, and section summaries. Scholars and students alike will find it easy to follow the debate and learn the key concepts from metaphysics, philosophy of mind, and other areas necessary to understand each position.Key Features Is the only introductory book devoted to the debate between substance dualism and materialism Discusses both traditional and novel arguments for each position Debates important but infrequently discussed questions, including: do we appear, in ordinary experience, to be material? should materialism be the default view? is there a good probabilistic argument for materialism? Written in a lively and accessible style Uses only a limited number of technical terms and defines all of them in the glossary

What gives some people the right to issue commands to everyone else and force everyone else to obey them? And why should people obey the commands of those with political power? These two key questions are the heart of the issue of political authority, and, in this volume, two philosophers debate the answers. Michael Huemer argues that political authority is an illusion and that no one is entitled to rule over anyone. He discusses and rebuts the major theories supporting political authority’s rightfulness: implicit social contract theory, hypothetical contract theories, democratic theories of authority, and utilitarian theories. Daniel Layman argues that democratic governments have authority because they are needed to protect our rights and because they are accountable to the people. Each author writes two replies directly addressing the arguments and ideas of the other.Key FeaturesCovers a key foundational problem of political philosophy: the authority of government.Debate format ensures a full hearing of both sides.A Glossary includes key concepts in political philosophy related to the issue of authority.Annotated Further Reading sections point students to additional resources.Clear, concrete examples and arguments help students clearly see both sides of the argument.A Foreword by Matt Zwolinski describes a broader context for political authority and then traces the key points and turns in the authors’ debate.

Can war be justified? Pacifists answer that it cannot; they oppose war and advocate for nonviolent alternatives to war. But defenders of just war theory argue that in some circumstances, when the effectiveness of nonviolence is limited, wars can be justified.In this book, two philosophers debate this question, drawing on contemporary scholarship and new developments in thinking about pacifism and just war theory. Andrew Fiala defends the pacifist position, while Jennifer Kling defends just war traditions. Fiala argues that pacifism follows from the awful reality of war and the nonviolent goal of building a more just and peaceful world. Kling argues that war is sometimes justified when it is a last-ditch, necessary effort to defend people and their communities from utter destruction and death. Pulling from global traditions and histories, their debate will captivate anyone who has wondered or worried about the morality of political violence and military force. Topics discussed include ethical questions of self-defense and other-defense, the great analogy between individuals and states, evolving technologies and methods of warfighting, moral injury and post-traumatic stress disorder, broader political and communal issues, and the problem of regional security in a globalizing world. The authors consider cultural and religious issues as well as the fundamental question of moral obligation in a world saturated in military conflict. The book was written in the aftermath of the war on terrorism and includes reflection on lessons learned from the past decades of war, as well as hopes for the future in light of emerging threats in Europe and elsewhere.The book is organized in a user-friendly fashion. Each author presents a self-contained argument, which is followed by a series of responses, replies, and counter-arguments. Throughout, the authors model civil discourse by emphasizing points of agreement and remaining areas of disagreement. The book includes reader-friendly summaries, a glossary of key concepts, and suggestions for further study. All of this will help students and scholars follow the authors’ dialogue so they may develop their own answer to the question of whether war can be justified.Key FeaturesSummarizes the debate between pacifism and just war theoryConsiders historical and traditional sources as well as contemporary scholarship and applicationsModels philosophical dialogue and civil discourse, while seeking common groundDiscusses issues of concern in contemporary warfighting and peacemaking, while offering an analysis of the war on terrorism

Can war be justified? Pacifists answer that it cannot; they oppose war and advocate for nonviolent alternatives to war. But defenders of just war theory argue that in some circumstances, when the effectiveness of nonviolence is limited, wars can be justified.In this book, two philosophers debate this question, drawing on contemporary scholarship and new developments in thinking about pacifism and just war theory. Andrew Fiala defends the pacifist position, while Jennifer Kling defends just war traditions. Fiala argues that pacifism follows from the awful reality of war and the nonviolent goal of building a more just and peaceful world. Kling argues that war is sometimes justified when it is a last-ditch, necessary effort to defend people and their communities from utter destruction and death. Pulling from global traditions and histories, their debate will captivate anyone who has wondered or worried about the morality of political violence and military force. Topics discussed include ethical questions of self-defense and other-defense, the great analogy between individuals and states, evolving technologies and methods of warfighting, moral injury and post-traumatic stress disorder, broader political and communal issues, and the problem of regional security in a globalizing world. The authors consider cultural and religious issues as well as the fundamental question of moral obligation in a world saturated in military conflict. The book was written in the aftermath of the war on terrorism and includes reflection on lessons learned from the past decades of war, as well as hopes for the future in light of emerging threats in Europe and elsewhere.The book is organized in a user-friendly fashion. Each author presents a self-contained argument, which is followed by a series of responses, replies, and counter-arguments. Throughout, the authors model civil discourse by emphasizing points of agreement and remaining areas of disagreement. The book includes reader-friendly summaries, a glossary of key concepts, and suggestions for further study. All of this will help students and scholars follow the authors’ dialogue so they may develop their own answer to the question of whether war can be justified.Key FeaturesSummarizes the debate between pacifism and just war theoryConsiders historical and traditional sources as well as contemporary scholarship and applicationsModels philosophical dialogue and civil discourse, while seeking common groundDiscusses issues of concern in contemporary warfighting and peacemaking, while offering an analysis of the war on terrorism

A central contested issue in contemporary economics and political philosophy is whether governments should redistribute wealth. In this book, a philosopher and an economist debate this question. James Otteson argues that respect for individual persons requires that the government should usually not alter the results of free exchanges, and so redistribution is usually wrong. Steven McMullen argues that governments should substantially redistribute wealth in order to ensure that all have a minimal opportunity to participate in economic life. Over the course of the exchange, the authors investigate a number of important questions. Is redistribution properly a question of justice, and what is the appropriate standard? Has the welfare state been effective at fighting poverty? Can we expect government intervention in the economy to be helpful or counterproductive? Are our obligations to help the poor best met through government action, or through private philanthropy and individual charity?The book features clear statements of each argument, responses to counterarguments, in-text definitions, a glossary of key terms, and section summaries. Scholars and students alike will find it easy to follow the debate and learn the key concepts from philosophy, politics, and economics necessary to understand each position.Key Features: Offers clear arguments written to be accessible to readers and students without a deep background in economics, philosophy, or political theory.Fosters a deep exchange of ideas with responses from each author to the main arguments.Provides in-text definitions and a glossary with definitions of key terms.Includes section summaries that give an overview of the main arguments and a comprehensive bibliography for further reading.

A central contested issue in contemporary economics and political philosophy is whether governments should redistribute wealth. In this book, a philosopher and an economist debate this question. James Otteson argues that respect for individual persons requires that the government should usually not alter the results of free exchanges, and so redistribution is usually wrong. Steven McMullen argues that governments should substantially redistribute wealth in order to ensure that all have a minimal opportunity to participate in economic life. Over the course of the exchange, the authors investigate a number of important questions. Is redistribution properly a question of justice, and what is the appropriate standard? Has the welfare state been effective at fighting poverty? Can we expect government intervention in the economy to be helpful or counterproductive? Are our obligations to help the poor best met through government action, or through private philanthropy and individual charity?The book features clear statements of each argument, responses to counterarguments, in-text definitions, a glossary of key terms, and section summaries. Scholars and students alike will find it easy to follow the debate and learn the key concepts from philosophy, politics, and economics necessary to understand each position.Key Features: Offers clear arguments written to be accessible to readers and students without a deep background in economics, philosophy, or political theory.Fosters a deep exchange of ideas with responses from each author to the main arguments.Provides in-text definitions and a glossary with definitions of key terms.Includes section summaries that give an overview of the main arguments and a comprehensive bibliography for further reading.

In Do Numbers Exist? Peter van Inwagen and William Lane Craig take opposite sides on whether there are abstract objects, such as numbers and properties. Craig argues that there are no abstract objects, whereas Van Inwagen argues that there are. Their exchange explores various arguments about the existence and nature of abstract objects. They focus especially on whether our ordinary and scientific thought and talk commit us to abstract objects, surveying the options available to us and the objections each faces. The debate covers central problems and methods in metaphysics, and also delves into theological questions raised by abstract objects.Key Features:Showcases the presentation and defense of two points of view on the existence of abstract objects, from two of the world’s leading philosophersPresents definitions in an easily accessible formProvides frequent summaries of previously covered materialIncludes a glossary of all specialized vocabulary

In Do Numbers Exist? Peter van Inwagen and William Lane Craig take opposite sides on whether there are abstract objects, such as numbers and properties. Craig argues that there are no abstract objects, whereas Van Inwagen argues that there are. Their exchange explores various arguments about the existence and nature of abstract objects. They focus especially on whether our ordinary and scientific thought and talk commit us to abstract objects, surveying the options available to us and the objections each faces. The debate covers central problems and methods in metaphysics, and also delves into theological questions raised by abstract objects.Key Features:Showcases the presentation and defense of two points of view on the existence of abstract objects, from two of the world’s leading philosophersPresents definitions in an easily accessible formProvides frequent summaries of previously covered materialIncludes a glossary of all specialized vocabulary

What gives some people the right to issue commands to everyone else and force everyone else to obey them? And why should people obey the commands of those with political power? These two key questions are the heart of the issue of political authority, and, in this volume, two philosophers debate the answers. Michael Huemer argues that political authority is an illusion and that no one is entitled to rule over anyone. He discusses and rebuts the major theories supporting political authority’s rightfulness: implicit social contract theory, hypothetical contract theories, democratic theories of authority, and utilitarian theories. Daniel Layman argues that democratic governments have authority because they are needed to protect our rights and because they are accountable to the people. Each author writes two replies directly addressing the arguments and ideas of the other.Key FeaturesCovers a key foundational problem of political philosophy: the authority of government.Debate format ensures a full hearing of both sides.A Glossary includes key concepts in political philosophy related to the issue of authority.Annotated Further Reading sections point students to additional resources.Clear, concrete examples and arguments help students clearly see both sides of the argument.A Foreword by Matt Zwolinski describes a broader context for political authority and then traces the key points and turns in the authors’ debate.

Should our beliefs be proportioned to our evidence? Are we doing something wrong in believing with little or no evidence? And may our beliefs be based partly or wholly on moral or practical considerations? These questions are harder than you think. Scott Stapleford and Elizabeth Jackson agree on the priority of evidence, but they differ on the degree of permissible slack and the relevance of other considerations. In this lively epistemological debate, Stapleford takes a hard line, defending the extremist view that any discrepancy between what we believe and what our evidence supports is an error that should be corrected. In the economy of our beliefs, evidence alone has a normative grip. Jackson is more forgiving. While evidence regulates belief, its authority is not complete. She takes a more liberal perspective that accords non-evidential factors a lawful role in delimiting the class of permissible beliefs. With echoes of the famous 19th century dispute between the mathematician William Clifford and the psychologist William James, the Stapleford–Jackson debate feels particularly relevant in a time when disagreement runs uncomfortably hot and evidence is treated with contempt. This debate will tempt—and gently instruct—anyone who has ever asked themselves: Can’t I just believe what I want?Key FeaturesIncludes accessible discussions of evidence, evidentialism, transparency, epistemic value monism, the aim of belief, permissivism, encroachment, practical reasons for belief, epistemic obligations, Pascal’s wager, and much more.Is highly readable, with clear language and an easy-to-follow format.Includes boxed summaries at the end of each section and partitioned expansions of key ideas that supplement the main lines of reasoning.

Should our beliefs be proportioned to our evidence? Are we doing something wrong in believing with little or no evidence? And may our beliefs be based partly or wholly on moral or practical considerations? These questions are harder than you think. Scott Stapleford and Elizabeth Jackson agree on the priority of evidence, but they differ on the degree of permissible slack and the relevance of other considerations. In this lively epistemological debate, Stapleford takes a hard line, defending the extremist view that any discrepancy between what we believe and what our evidence supports is an error that should be corrected. In the economy of our beliefs, evidence alone has a normative grip. Jackson is more forgiving. While evidence regulates belief, its authority is not complete. She takes a more liberal perspective that accords non-evidential factors a lawful role in delimiting the class of permissible beliefs. With echoes of the famous 19th century dispute between the mathematician William Clifford and the psychologist William James, the Stapleford–Jackson debate feels particularly relevant in a time when disagreement runs uncomfortably hot and evidence is treated with contempt. This debate will tempt—and gently instruct—anyone who has ever asked themselves: Can’t I just believe what I want?Key FeaturesIncludes accessible discussions of evidence, evidentialism, transparency, epistemic value monism, the aim of belief, permissivism, encroachment, practical reasons for belief, epistemic obligations, Pascal’s wager, and much more.Is highly readable, with clear language and an easy-to-follow format.Includes boxed summaries at the end of each section and partitioned expansions of key ideas that supplement the main lines of reasoning.

Are we made entirely of matter, like sticks and stones? Or do we have a soul—a nonphysical entity—where our mental lives take place?The authors Eric T. Olson and Aaron Segal begin this accessible and wide-ranging debate by looking at the often-overlooked question of whether we appear in ordinary experience to be material things. Olson then argues that the dependence of our mental lives on the condition of our brains—the fact that general anesthesia causes complete unconsciousness, for instance—is best explained by saying that our mental lives are physical activities in our brains rather than nonphysical activities in the soul. Segal objects that this view is incompatible with two obvious and important facts about ourselves: that there is only one of you rather than trillions of almost identical beings now thinking your thoughts, and that we exist and remain conscious for more than an instant. These facts, he claims, are presupposed in our practical and moral judgments—but they require us to be immaterial things. Olson is forced to concede that there is no easy and uncontroversial answer to these objections but doubts whether taking us to be immaterial would be any help. The debate takes in large philosophical questions extending well beyond dualism and materialism.The book features clear statements of each argument, responses to counter-arguments, in-text definitions, a glossary of key terms, and section summaries. Scholars and students alike will find it easy to follow the debate and learn the key concepts from metaphysics, philosophy of mind, and other areas necessary to understand each position.Key Features Is the only introductory book devoted to the debate between substance dualism and materialism Discusses both traditional and novel arguments for each position Debates important but infrequently discussed questions, including: do we appear, in ordinary experience, to be material? should materialism be the default view? is there a good probabilistic argument for materialism? Written in a lively and accessible style Uses only a limited number of technical terms and defines all of them in the glossary

Should You Choose to Live Forever?: A Debate addresses a centuries old question in philosophy, but also one with increasing relevance as scientists now see the real possibility of extending people’s lives for many hundreds of years.This accessible yet profound debate from two leading researchers in the area, Stephen Cave and John Martin Fischer, offers:Engaging philosophical discourse that brings abstract concepts to life through myth, literature, and thought experimentsBalanced perspectives with Cave arguing against immortality (citing problems of meaninglessness, overpopulation, social injustice, and boredom) and Fischer making the case for radical life extensionStructured format with clear chapter breakdowns, summaries, and a three-part debate format that models scholarly discourseContemporary relevance, connecting ancient philosophical questions to modern anti-aging research and technological developmentsInstrcutors praise this book as the most accessible volume in the ‘Little Debates’ series, noting its ideal structure for introducing complex literature to newcomers while presenting the most current positions from both authors.Perfect for courses in Philosophy of Death and Mortality, Ethics, Bioethics, Philosophy of Religion, Contemporary Philosophical Issues, and Introduction to Philosophy.

Should You Choose to Live Forever?: A Debate addresses a centuries old question in philosophy, but also one with increasing relevance as scientists now see the real possibility of extending people’s lives for many hundreds of years.This accessible yet profound debate from two leading researchers in the area, Stephen Cave and John Martin Fischer, offers:Engaging philosophical discourse that brings abstract concepts to life through myth, literature, and thought experimentsBalanced perspectives with Cave arguing against immortality (citing problems of meaninglessness, overpopulation, social injustice, and boredom) and Fischer making the case for radical life extensionStructured format with clear chapter breakdowns, summaries, and a three-part debate format that models scholarly discourseContemporary relevance, connecting ancient philosophical questions to modern anti-aging research and technological developmentsInstrcutors praise this book as the most accessible volume in the ‘Little Debates’ series, noting its ideal structure for introducing complex literature to newcomers while presenting the most current positions from both authors.Perfect for courses in Philosophy of Death and Mortality, Ethics, Bioethics, Philosophy of Religion, Contemporary Philosophical Issues, and Introduction to Philosophy.

This book takes up the question of whether past and future events exist. Two very different views are explored. According to one of these views (presentism), advanced by Nikk Effingham, the present is special. Effingham argues that only present things exist, but which things those are changes as time passes. Given presentism, although there once existed dinosaurs, they exist no more, and although you and I exist, at some time in the future we will come to exist no more. According to the alternative view (eternalism), advanced by Kristie Miller, our world is a giant four-dimensional block of spacetime in which all things, past, present, and future, exist. On this view, dinosaurs exist, it is just that they are not located at the current time. The book considers arguments for and against presentism and eternalism, including arguments that appeal to our best science, to the way the world seems to us to be in our experiences of time, change, and freedom, and to how to make sense of ordinary claims about the past. Key Features:Offers an accessible introduction to the philosophy of temporal ontologyCaptures the process of philosophical debate, giving readers an insight into the craft of philosophyEngages with and clearly explains state-of-the-art and cutting-edge research

This book takes up the question of whether past and future events exist. Two very different views are explored. According to one of these views (presentism), advanced by Nikk Effingham, the present is special. Effingham argues that only present things exist, but which things those are changes as time passes. Given presentism, although there once existed dinosaurs, they exist no more, and although you and I exist, at some time in the future we will come to exist no more. According to the alternative view (eternalism), advanced by Kristie Miller, our world is a giant four-dimensional block of spacetime in which all things, past, present, and future, exist. On this view, dinosaurs exist, it is just that they are not located at the current time. The book considers arguments for and against presentism and eternalism, including arguments that appeal to our best science, to the way the world seems to us to be in our experiences of time, change, and freedom, and to how to make sense of ordinary claims about the past. Key Features:Offers an accessible introduction to the philosophy of temporal ontologyCaptures the process of philosophical debate, giving readers an insight into the craft of philosophyEngages with and clearly explains state-of-the-art and cutting-edge research

Climate change is a pressing problem. Does each of us have a moral responsibility to help tackle it? In this volume, Marion Hourdequin and Dan Shahar debate the timely issue of individual behavior and climate change, examining what it takes to live morally in a warming world.Hourdequin argues there are important reasons for people to translate their concerns about climate change into actions in their personal lives. This includes attending to the many ways a single individual can help catalyze systemic change through choices about voting and political participation, food and clothing, energy use, travel, and so on. Shahar disagrees because he endorses moral specialization and division of labor in a world filled with many problems. He argues we should not expect everyone to take action on every serious issue: rather, it is acceptable and even desirable for people to focus on certain issues and decline to act on others – including climate change. The two authors take turns responding to each other and then defending their ultimate conclusions. This volume is sure to draw attention to the question of “individual choice” in climate change debates and to help clarify some of the best thinking on this issue.Key Features:Refocuses attention from big-picture debates over the actions of nations and corporations to more tractable questions about individual choicesExamines whether there are good reasons to structure our daily lives to reduce our impacts on the climateExplores whether it would be best if individuals became “moral specialists” by focusing on a small number of problems while declining to act on many othersIs highly accessible, with clear language and an easy-to-follow formatProvides a glossary of key terms that are bolded in the main textIncludes section summaries that give an overview of the main arguments and a comprehensive bibliography for further reading

Climate change is a pressing problem. Does each of us have a moral responsibility to help tackle it? In this volume, Marion Hourdequin and Dan Shahar debate the timely issue of individual behavior and climate change, examining what it takes to live morally in a warming world.Hourdequin argues there are important reasons for people to translate their concerns about climate change into actions in their personal lives. This includes attending to the many ways a single individual can help catalyze systemic change through choices about voting and political participation, food and clothing, energy use, travel, and so on. Shahar disagrees because he endorses moral specialization and division of labor in a world filled with many problems. He argues we should not expect everyone to take action on every serious issue: rather, it is acceptable and even desirable for people to focus on certain issues and decline to act on others – including climate change. The two authors take turns responding to each other and then defending their ultimate conclusions. This volume is sure to draw attention to the question of “individual choice” in climate change debates and to help clarify some of the best thinking on this issue.Key Features:Refocuses attention from big-picture debates over the actions of nations and corporations to more tractable questions about individual choicesExamines whether there are good reasons to structure our daily lives to reduce our impacts on the climateExplores whether it would be best if individuals became “moral specialists” by focusing on a small number of problems while declining to act on many othersIs highly accessible, with clear language and an easy-to-follow formatProvides a glossary of key terms that are bolded in the main textIncludes section summaries that give an overview of the main arguments and a comprehensive bibliography for further reading

Is it wrong for a man to buy sex from a woman? In this book, Holly Lawford-Smith argues that it is wrong: commercial sex is quintessentially hierarchical sex, and it is wrong both to have, and to perpetuate a market in, hierarchical sex. Angie Pepper argues that it isn’t wrong: men are permitted to buy sex from those women who freely choose to sell it.Important but different interests are at stake in these two positions. According to the first, we should prioritize the interest of all women in securing a society that has achieved equality between the sexes, and we should make the changes needed to get there including prohibiting men from buying sex from women. In contrast, the second position prioritizes the protection of individuals' rights to engage in consensual commercial sex exchanges and demands that we strive for gender equality without compromising these rights. The two authors debate the ethical issues involved in the decision to buy sex, arguing passionately for very different conclusions, in a way that is lively, constructive, and sure to leave readers with a lot to think about.Key Features:Focuses on the pressing moral issue of whether we’re morally permitted to buy sexAdvances two different normative ethical approaches to the issue and develops two competing argumentsDemonstrates how philosophical debate on controversial topics can be productive and easy-to-followProvides a glossary with definitions of key terms that are bolded in the main textIncludes section summaries that give an overview of the main arguments and a comprehensive bibliography for further reading

Is it wrong for a man to buy sex from a woman? In this book, Holly Lawford-Smith argues that it is wrong: commercial sex is quintessentially hierarchical sex, and it is wrong both to have, and to perpetuate a market in, hierarchical sex. Angie Pepper argues that it isn’t wrong: men are permitted to buy sex from those women who freely choose to sell it.Important but different interests are at stake in these two positions. According to the first, we should prioritize the interest of all women in securing a society that has achieved equality between the sexes, and we should make the changes needed to get there including prohibiting men from buying sex from women. In contrast, the second position prioritizes the protection of individuals' rights to engage in consensual commercial sex exchanges and demands that we strive for gender equality without compromising these rights. The two authors debate the ethical issues involved in the decision to buy sex, arguing passionately for very different conclusions, in a way that is lively, constructive, and sure to leave readers with a lot to think about.Key Features:Focuses on the pressing moral issue of whether we’re morally permitted to buy sexAdvances two different normative ethical approaches to the issue and develops two competing argumentsDemonstrates how philosophical debate on controversial topics can be productive and easy-to-followProvides a glossary with definitions of key terms that are bolded in the main textIncludes section summaries that give an overview of the main arguments and a comprehensive bibliography for further reading

Can religious citizens live cooperatively and justly with others in a pluralistic polity? Can religious arguments play a role within healthy democratic deliberation?In this volume, Paul Billingham and Marilie Coetsee debate these timely issues, examining what responsible democratic citizenship requires of the religiously committed. Billingham argues that a religious citizen doesn’t need to check or undermine her deepest beliefs in order to engage in the political life of a pluralistic society, and rebuts familiar worries about religious political arguments being dogmatic, domineering, and incomprehensible and unpersuasive to non-believers. Furthermore, he draws on real-life examples to argue that religious contributions to democratic deliberation can be beneficial, ultimately strengthening discourse, pluralism, and democracy. Coetsee is much more skeptical. She argues that a pluralistic democracy requires a “strong integrationist” commitment from all citizens, a commitment that poses strong challenges to the religiously devout and to the cohesion of religious communities. Such integrationist commitments, according to Coetsee, include being active in non-religious civic associations and advancing non-religious reasons for laws that those outside their faith will accept.The two authors then take turns responding to each other.

Can religious citizens live cooperatively and justly with others in a pluralistic polity? Can religious arguments play a role within healthy democratic deliberation?In this volume, Paul Billingham and Marilie Coetsee debate these timely issues, examining what responsible democratic citizenship requires of the religiously committed. Billingham argues that a religious citizen doesn’t need to check or undermine her deepest beliefs in order to engage in the political life of a pluralistic society, and rebuts familiar worries about religious political arguments being dogmatic, domineering, and incomprehensible and unpersuasive to non-believers. Furthermore, he draws on real-life examples to argue that religious contributions to democratic deliberation can be beneficial, ultimately strengthening discourse, pluralism, and democracy. Coetsee is much more skeptical. She argues that a pluralistic democracy requires a “strong integrationist” commitment from all citizens, a commitment that poses strong challenges to the religiously devout and to the cohesion of religious communities. Such integrationist commitments, according to Coetsee, include being active in non-religious civic associations and advancing non-religious reasons for laws that those outside their faith will accept.The two authors then take turns responding to each other.